The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy

Edited by

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FROM FREGE TO WITTGENSTEIN: PERSPECTIVES ON EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (editor, 2002)
FREGE'S LECTURES ON LOGIC. CARNAP'S STUDENT NOTES, 1910–1914 (co-editor with S. Awodey, 2004)
GOTTLOB FREGE: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING PHILOSOPHERS, VOLS. 1–4 (co-editor with M. Beaney, 2005)
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Series Editor’s Foreword

During the first half of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy gradually established itself as the dominant tradition in the English-speaking world, and over the last few decades it has taken firm root in many other parts of the world. There has been increasing debate over just what ‘analytic philosophy’ means, as the movement has ramified into the complex tradition that we know today, but the influence of the concerns, ideas and methods of early analytic philosophy on contemporary thought is indisputable. All this has led to greater self-consciousness among analytic philosophers about the nature and origins of their tradition, and scholarly interest in its historical development and philosophical foundations has blossomed in recent years, with the result that history of analytic philosophy is now recognized as a major field of philosophy in its own right.

The main aim of the series in which the present book appears, the first series of its kind, is to create a venue for work on the history of analytic philosophy, consolidating the area as a major field of philosophy and promoting further research and debate. The ‘history of analytic philosophy’ is understood broadly as covering the period from the last three decades of the nineteenth century to the start of the twenty-first century, beginning with the work of Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein, who are generally regarded as its main founders, and the influences upon them, and going right up to the most recent developments. In allowing the ‘history’ to extend to the present, the aim is to encourage engagement with contemporary debates in philosophy, for example, in showing how the concerns of early analytic philosophy relate to current concerns. In focusing on analytic philosophy, the aim is not to exclude comparisons with other – earlier or contemporary – traditions, or consideration of figures or themes that some might regard as marginal to the analytic tradition but which also throw light on analytic philosophy. Indeed, a further aim of the series is to deepen our understanding of the broader context in which analytic philosophy developed, by looking, for example, at the roots of analytic philosophy in neo-Kantianism or British idealism, or the connections between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, or discussing the work of philosophers who were important in the development of analytic philosophy but who are now often forgotten.

The current volume, edited by Erich Reck, was specially commissioned when the series as a whole was established. Reck has played a key role in shaping the new field of history of analytic philosophy, beginning with an influential collection published in 2002 entitled From Frege to Wittgenstein:...
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Michael Beaney
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Michael Beaney is Professor of Philosophy at the University of York, England. He is the author of Frege: Making Sense (1996) and Imagination and Creativity (2005), and editor of The Frege Reader (1997), Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (with Erich H. Reck; 4 vols., 2005), The Analytic Turn (2007), and The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (forthcoming). He is also Editor of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy. He has published a number of papers on the history of analytic philosophy and on conceptions of analysis in the history of philosophy. He is currently working on analysis and creativity in the history of philosophy and mathematics.

Stewart Candlish is Senior Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Western Australia, Editor of Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. He is the author of The Russell/Brady Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth-Century Philosophy (2007; paperback ed., with a new foreword by Michael Beaney, 2009); recently he has also contributed the chapters ‘British Idealism: Theoretical Philosophy’ to the Routledge Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy (2010) and, with his co-author Nic Damnjanovic, ‘Reason, Action and the Will: The Fall and Rise of Causalism’ to the Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, and ‘The Identity Theory of Truth’ to the Oxford Handbook of Truth (both).

A.W. Carus has published a number of papers on Carnap and logical empiricism, as well as on the philosophy of social science. His book, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment (2007), based on unpublished notes, correspondence and diaries, gives an account of Carnap’s development from the earliest writings to the Aufbau and especially of the development from there to the very different Logical Syntax. He is a co-editor of the Collected Works of Rudolf Carnap. He is currently working with various economic historians to develop a conceptual framework for the study of institutions.

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Peter Hylton was educated at King’s College, the University of Cambridge, and Harvard University. Currently he is Professor of Philosophy and UIC
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