THE HISTORICAL TURN IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY,

ABSTRACTS FOR THE CHAPTERS

Thomas Baldwin, "C. I. Lewis and the Analyticity Debate"

In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine brackets together C. I. Lewis and Carnap as two pragmatists who, by remaining committed to the analytic/synthetic distinction, have not taken their pragmatism to its proper conclusion. The ensuing debate between Carnap and Quine has been much discussed; I here discuss Lewis’s side in this debate, beginning with an account of his pragmatist theory of our a priori conceptual schemes and comparing this with Carnap’s empiricist logic of science. In assessing the impact of Quine’s arguments on Lewis’s position, it is proposed that Kuhn’s paradigms indicate an enduring role for a modified version of Lewis’s conceptual schemes in philosophy of science; and also that Wittgenstein’s rule-following discussion indicates a non-Quinean pragmatist approach to logic which connects with some themes from Lewis’s writings, though without the odd combination of Platonism and voluntarism which Lewis actually affirms.

Michael Beaney, "Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy: The Development of the Idea of Rational Reconstruction"

Analytic philosophy has had an uneasy relationship with the discipline of history of philosophy throughout its life. Analytic philosophers often either scorn or simply ignore history of philosophy. Where interpretations have been offered of past philosophical works, in what we can call "analytic" history of philosophy, they have tended to be "rational reconstructions". In recent years, however, philosophers trained in the analytic tradition have begun to look at the history of analytic philosophy itself more seriously, and the debate about the relationship between philosophy and history of philosophy has been brought closer to home. In this essay I consider some of the philosophical and historiographical presuppositions and implications of this debate, focusing on the idea of rational reconstruction. This idea developed alongside analytic philosophy itself and holds the key to understanding one central thread in the history of the relationship between analytic philosophy and history of philosophy.

Stewart Candlish, "Philosophy and the Tide of History: Bertrand Russell’s Role in the Rise of Analytic Philosophy"

This essay examines the distinction between philosophy and its history by looking afresh at some prominent topics in the most influential writings of Bertrand Russell from the end of the nineteenth century through the first quarter of the twentieth: his early conception of propositions and their constituents; the theory of denoting phrases; the multiple relation theory of judgment and its associated account of truth; the theory of definite descriptions; his view of the status of mathematics; and
his treatment of the controversial topic of relations. The chapter exposes some myths (and their attendant dangers) about the origins of analytic philosophy.

André Carus, "History and the Future of Logical Empiricism"

It has become almost conventional wisdom to regard the differences between Carnap and Kuhn as resting on misunderstanding and differing rhetorical emphases. This essay argues, in contrast, that the differences were quite fundamental; it was no accident that the acceptance of Kuhn's agenda brought about the demise of logical empiricism. However, room was left in Carnap's conception of descriptive pragmatics for a quite different approach from Kuhn's to the history of science. This opening was exploited by Howard Stein, one of Carnap's students, who used a historical perspective to overcome some of the weaknesses in Carnap's philosophy. Though much less in the limelight than Kuhn and his progeny, Stein's work has been quite influential. The resulting body of writings deserves more attention, and can be regarded as the basis for a historically-informed continuation of logical empiricism.

Hans-Johann Glock, "The Owl of Minerva: Is Analytic Philosophy Moribund?"

The current state of analytic philosophy is a combination of triumph and crisis. On the one hand, it is now the dominant force within Western philosophy. On the other hand, there are continuous rumors about the "demise" of analytic philosophy and complaints about its actual or alleged ills. In view of this situation, my essay explores the following questions: Has analytic philosophy ceased to be a distinct and potentially vibrant movement? Is the historical turn a manifestation of, or perhaps even a contributing factor to, its demise? Is analytic philosophy in the course of being replaced by a "post-analytic" philosophy? And should it be superseded by such a movement? I shall give a tentative and qualified no in answer to all of these questions. To substantiate these answers, I draw not just on classics of analytic philosophy, but also on recent contributions to the burgeoning field of the history and methodology of analytic philosophy.

Gary Hatfield, "Psychology, Epistemology, and the Problem of the External World: Russell and Before"

This essay examines the background to Russell's invocation of psychological considerations in his work on knowledge of the external world from 1913-14. This background includes the natural realism of William Hamilton, its criticism by J. S. Mill, and the ongoing discussion of the problem of the external world by English philosophers in the 1890s and the ensuing decade, including James Ward, G. F. Stout, S. Hodgson, T. Case, L. T. Hobhouse, and G. Dawes Hicks. In light of this examination and Russell's own description of his "logical analytic" method, the conclusion is that, on one historically reasonable conception of psychologism (that deriving from Kant), Russell's appeal to psychology is not psychologistic, whereas it can be so classed in accordance with the more extreme view (stemming from Frege) that any appeal to the data of experience in epistemology counts as psychologism.
Jeremy Heis, "Frege, Lotze, and Boole"

Thirty years ago, Michael Dummett and Hans Sluga engaged in a prolonged controversy over the value of locating Frege's writings in the context of late nineteenth century German philosophy. I argue against Dummett that by reading Frege in his historical context, historians of philosophy in the analytic tradition can judge in a more balanced way the philosophical significance of the new logical language that Frege developed. I illustrate this historiographical point by showing that Frege's criticism of the theory of concept formation implicit in Boolean symbolic logic agrees in significant ways with a criticism given by his contemporary Hermann Lotze. But I argue, against Sluga, that the substantial overlap in their criticisms of Boole should not obscure for us the great philosophical advance that Frege made over Lotze—an advance that would not have been possible without the invention of Frege's Begriffsschrift.

Peter Hylton, "Quine and the Aufbau: The Possibility of Objective Knowledge"

Quine interpreted Carnap's Aufbau as putting forward an empiricist epistemology, along the lines suggested by Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World. Over the last twenty years or so this interpretation has been disputed by Michael Friedman, Alan Richardson, and others. They have put forward an interpretation that emphasizes the neo-Kantian aspects of the Aufbau and, in particular, its concern with what makes objective knowledge possible. This essay asks how we should think about the relation between Quine's epistemology and that of the Aufbau, in the light of this new interpretation. It argues that Quine is engaged in what is in some sense the same enterprise as that which the new interpretation attributes to the Aufbau but in very different ways; and that there is something general to be learned about the relation between Carnap and Quine from these differences.

Michael Kremer, "What is the Good of Philosophical History?"

Using Scott Soames's recent work in the history of analytic philosophy as a springboard for my discussion, I examine the value of doing philosophy historically. Soames's presents a choice between two unsatisfactory conceptions of philosophical history, antiquarianism and presentism. I agree with Soames in rejecting antiquarianism, but draw on general historiography and the historiography of science to show the dangers of Soames's presentism. Following Bernard Williams, I argue for a third possibility for understanding the value of philosophical history: work in philosophical history is distinctive in that it is a way of doing philosophy. Doing philosophy historically requires that we attempt to understand the philosophical past, a task that both presentism and antiquarianism avoid. I conclude with a brief discussion of some examples illustrating the value of the approach to philosophical history that I recommend, drawn from the work of Cora Diamond.

Erich Reck, "Frege or Dedekind? On their Relation, Reception, and Revival"

In recent philosophy of mathematics much attention has been paid to neo-logicist and neo-structuralist views. These views are usually traced back to Gottlob Frege.
and Richard Dedekind, respectively, although often only in very sketchy ways, as the emphasis tends to be on philosophical and mathematical aspects while historical matters are treated in a cursory way. Logicism and structuralism are also often seen as opposed to each other, so that we are presented with the basic choice between a Fregean and a Dedekindian perspective. Moreover, the Fregean side has long been favored in the analytic tradition. In the present essay I reconsider this opposition, Frege's and Dedekind's relationship, and their respective legacies. I proceed by intertwining history and philosophy, with the goal of enriching both. The essay can thus be seen as an example of doing philosophy of mathematics historically.

Alan Richardson, "Taking the Measure of Carnap's Philosophical Engineering: Metalogic as Metrology"

A number of scholars, including Richard Creath, A.W. Carus, and Sam Hillier, have attributed an engineering conception of philosophy to Rudolf Carnap. This essay attempts to specify a particular type of engineering sensibility that one might attribute to Carnap; it argues that Carnap's attitudes in logic and metalogic were based in the development of measurement technologies in the science of metrology. This perspective is explored in relation to Carnap's long-term interest in scientific measurement, especially his 1926 monograph, *Physikalische Begriffsbildung*. The essay uses this account of Carnap's philosophical attitude to illuminate his side of the famous debate with Quine regarding the analytic/synthetic distinction. It ends with a consideration of whether questions in philosophy of technology reveal more telling weaknesses in Caranp's position than do the standard Quinean objections.

Julia Tanney, "Ryle's Conceptual Cartography"

This essay traces ideas in philosophical logic that ground Ryle's work in *The Concept of Mind*. Although sometimes mentioned along with Wittgenstein and Austin as an "ordinary language" philosopher, Ryle’s affinities and his own independent development of notions now associated with Wittgenstein and Austin have gone largely unnoticed, especially in discussions of circumstance-dependency or context-sensitivity. In locating Ryle's thoughts in the context of his own elaboration of twentieth-century philosophical logic and in emphasizing his rejection of referential theories of language that are assumed in much work today, I hope to show the relevance and importance of Ryle’s work for a more satisfying understanding of the distinctively conceptual nature of philosophical investigation.