The Qi wu lun or "Sorting that Evens Things Out" chapter of the Zhuangzi ends with a famous story about Zhuangzi:

Last night Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly ... and did not know about [Zhuang] Zhou. When all of a sudden he awoke, he was Zhou with all his wits about him. He does not know whether he is Zhou who dreams he is a butterfly or a butterfly who dreams he is Zhou. (7/2/94–96)

Against this, we might counterpose a question that the young Theaetetus asks Socrates in the first section of Plato's dialogue of that name:

But I really shouldn't know how to dispute the suggestion that a dreamer [believes what is false] ... when he imagines he has wings and is flying in his sleep. (Theaetetus 158b)

Zhuangzi might have answered Theaetetus:

While we dream we do not know that we are dreaming, and in the middle of a dream interpret a dream within it; not until we wake do we know that we were dreaming. Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream. (6/2/81–82).

Socrates replies:

You see, then, it is not difficult to find matter for dispute, when it is disputed even whether this is real life or a dream. Indeed, we may say that, as our periods of sleeping and waking are of equal length, and as in each period the soul contends that the beliefs of the moment are pre-eminently true, the result is that for half our lives we assert the reality of the one set of objects, and for half that of the other set. And we make our assertions with equal conviction in both cases. (Theaetetus 158d)

Both passages use the example of dreams to question or doubt our ability to know in two of the most important epistemological inquiries within their respective traditions. Theaetetus 158 is the first of many examples within the Western tradition of the use of dreams to frame skeptical claims or counterarguments. Zhuangzi's dream has become a locus classicus for articulating a variety of views about the unknowable, or impermanent, nature of things.

Both the Qi wu lun and Theaetetus engage in extended discussions of the nature of knowing, language, explanation, perception, and perceptual judgment. Paul Woodruff asks a question about Plato that can also be applied to Zhuangzi: "Which came first, the sceptic or the epistemologist?" The epistemologist asks what knowledge is and how it can be acquired; the skeptic tries to detach her from that project. Zhuangzi, like
Plato, may be doing something different from either of these, though it
smacks of both. The *Qi wu lun* is the major consideration of epistemol-
ogy in Warring States writings; the *Theaetetus* is the only Platonic dia-
logue devoted to a discussion of *epistēmē*, knowing. Yet we may observe
that Zhuangzi never offers his own theory of knowing, and Socrates
never reaches a definition of *epistēmē*. In this essay I compare several
ostensibly skeptical elements in the *Qi wu lun* chapter of the *Zhuangzi*
and the *Theaetetus* of Plato. I argue that the *Zhuangzi* and the *Theaete-
tus* use remarkably similar skeptical methods to explore epistemologi-
cal problems in ways that are unique within their respective traditions.
My purpose in making this case is twofold. One, I want to show that
methods of argument in China and Greece may have more in common
than we may be predisposed to suppose. Two, the comparison allows
us to reexamine our own understanding of what skepticism is and
does.

The term skepticism generally refers to points of view that doubt the
possibility of real knowledge, or that claim that there are no adequate
grounds for certainty as to the truth of any proposition (*Oxford English
Dictionary*). Skepticism has shaped many of the questions, and answers,
of several areas of the Western philosophical tradition, whether as a
serious view or as an object of continual attack and refutation.

In Greek philosophy, the term generally refers to two Hellenistic
schools. The skeptics of Plato’s Academy, Arcesilaus and Carneades,
claimed the legacy of Plato, especially Socrates’ claims to “know noth-
ing.” Pyrrhonian skepticism was associated with Pyrrho of Elis and Sextus
Empiricus.⁷

Skepticism had a constitutive role in the development of modern
philosophy through the study of works of Pyrrhonian skepticism, begin-
ning in the sixteenth century, and through the efforts of such philoso-
phers as Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant to address skeptical chal-
enges.⁸ Some claim that it has been dismissed and undervalued because
skeptics reject (or doubt) a commitment to reason that is central to the
history of Western thought.⁹ Hostile accounts of skepticism have even
gone so far as to describe it as “oriental indifference” or “systematic
negation.”¹⁰

Three Kinds of Skepticism

For the purposes of this discussion, I want to distinguish between
three kinds of skepticism: skepticism as a thesis, skepticism as a recom-
mandation, and skepticism as a method.

As a thesis or doctrine, skepticism is the proposition, explicit or tacit,
that nothing can be known.¹¹ The so-called “skeptic’s circle,” the logi-
cally self-refuting claim that nothing can be known (including the claim
that nothing can be known) refers to, and tends to undermine, skepti-
cism as a doctrine.
As a recommendation, skepticism is an imperative to suspend judgment. According to Sextus, the result of this attitude of mind is “mental suspense,” or suspension of judgment, epochê, followed by “unperturbedness,” tranquility, or quietude, ataraxia (OP 8). As a recommendation, skepticism does not risk self-refutation, since it makes no positive claim to, or denial of, knowledge (or belief).

As a method, skepticism is a question or inquiry that leads to doubt. Its form tends to reject, or ignore, a skeptical thesis, and tends to advocate, or at least suggest, a skeptical recommendation. Skeptical methods refute existing claims to knowledge, including their own. Some methods work by direct argument, for example Socrates’ technique of refuting, first, the theses of a dogmatic opponent, and then, his own.12 Direct approaches of this kind may be attempts to steer a path between a skeptical thesis and the skeptic’s circle; the systematic and regular method of the elenchus itself suggests a skeptical thesis, the latter by never formulating one in so many words. Other, less direct techniques include humor, complex narrative structures, and what Gregory Vlastos has called complex irony.13 These indirect methods avoid the risks of the skeptic’s circle by never articulating a skeptical thesis. Yet they take more risks than a passive suspension of judgment. They lead the inquirer to a state of mind that questions claims to knowledge, but in doing so they also evoke complex emotional registers: for example, the power of complex narrative structures to create momentary disorientations as they shift perspectives; or the power of humor to evoke the tensions of misplaced (if tacit) expectation.

Skeptical doctrines, methods, and recommendations are all logically independent.14 Each is susceptible to multiple interpretations. As Gisela Stryker points out, modern debates have concentrated on skepticism as a doctrine, while ancient debates were more concerned with skepticism as a recommendation. This emphasis would severely limit the scope of an investigation of skepticism since a skeptical thesis seems incommensurable with skeptical recommendations and methods. The follower of a skeptical recommendation suspends judgment about everything, including a skeptical thesis. And if she proceeds by skeptical methods, she is likely to prefer something more subtle than a skeptical thesis, which, in any event, remains vulnerable to the charge of self-refutation, the classical argument against skeptical doctrines.

In the case of the Zhuangzi, I begin by showing the noteworthy absence of a skeptical doctrine in the Qi wu lun, a text pervaded by a skeptical flavor. I go on to show how skeptical methods create that flavor. My discussion of the Theaetetus focuses on 151d–186e, in which Socrates argues that knowledge is perception. I elucidate the skeptical methods of the Theaetetus by comparing them with the skeptical theses of Sextus Empiricus. Finally I compare the skeptical methods used in both texts.

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Skeptical Doctrines

In the Zhuangzi, the dream passage concludes the Qi wu lun. This chapter mingles dream journeys and logical attacks on the philosophies of the day. Opinions divide over the nature and extent of rationalism, skepticism, and relativism in the Zhuangzi, and in the Qi wu lun in particular. Angus Graham has presented Zhuangzi as a “great anti-rationalist” who had his own reasons for not listening to reason. Chad Hansen reads the Zhuangzi as “a skeptical, relativistic reaction to the philosophy of language of the Neo-Mohists” in which the Qi wu lun is a coherent exposition of a relativist (as opposed to an absolutist) position. Robert Allinson argues that Zhuangzi was not a relativist, and P. J. Ivanhoe goes further, to claim that Zhuangzi was not only not a relativist but probably not a skeptic.

Much of that debate is not apt for our purpose for two reasons. First, most of these discussions do not distinguish skeptical doctrines from skeptical methods or recommendations. Secondly, some of this debate is not about skepticism, however defined, but about relativism, with a certain tendency to conflate the two by attributing a position of “skeptical relativism” to Zhuangzi. Skeptical theses and relativist doctrines are both self-referential, and as such are open to the charge of self-contradiction. Otherwise, they are mutually exclusive in that, strictly speaking, skepticism precludes relativism. A skeptical thesis holds that we cannot know anything; a relativist thesis holds that we can know, but that knowing is relative to our (individual, cultural, and so on) perspective. To put it another way, if we doubt our ability to recognize truth (the skeptical position), we must also doubt our ability to know that there isn’t any (the relativist position).

The Zhuangzi. I divide the Qi wu lun into three sections. At the beginning and end, vivid narratives frame and reframe, but do not necessarily resolve, the problem of knowing. The central section consists of a series of arguments against a variety of doctrines and methods.

The Introductory Narratives: Ziqi’s Trance. Ziqi of Nanguo reclines on a cushion, sighs, loses himself in a trance: “The reclining man here now is not the reclining man of yesterday” (3/2/1). “I lost ‘me’” (wu sang wo), he adds, and elaborates with a metaphor of the “pipes” of earth, humanity, and heaven. The pipes of earth are the hollows and valleys through which the wind blows. The pipes of humanity are the hollow tubes that comprise the human body. The pipes of heaven “puff out the ten thousand distinctions.”

A short poem introduces distinctions between great and small perspectives about wisdom (zhi) and language (yan).26
Great knowledge [da zhi] is free and easy,
Petty knowledge [xiao zhi] picks holes.
Great speech [da yan] has a mild taste,
Petty speech [xiao yan] is all rant. (3/2/9–10)27

The poem sets up a hierarchy between “great” and “small” knowledge, language, fear, and awakening but proffers no theory or recommendation as to which is which. Small knowledge is associated with shi fei, the language and practice of moral judgment.28 Great knowledge is associated with illumination (ming), Dao, and awakening (jue). The Zhuangzi does not describe it directly but uses a variety of formal devices to illustrate it. These include paradox, perspective shifts, and thumbnail sketches of the behavior and skills of sages; these devices go a long way to produce the unique humor and flavor of the Zhuangzi.29

Together the narrative and the poem question what we can know. The suggestion that Zi qi, in “losing himself,” experienced a profound reorientation toward the world calls into question all his previous perceptions of external reality. But is this skepticism? We may ask where Zhuangzi places himself in his own hierarchy of great and small knowing (zhi). What is his experience of, and attitude toward, great knowing? Our answer to this question will have important implications for our reading of the text. Which reading we prefer will affect our interpretation of many individual passages in the Qi wu lun.

Let us consider three possibilities: (1) Zhuangzi writes as a seeker of great knowledge who has not yet experienced it, but is sure it exists; (2) he doesn’t have great knowledge, seeks it, but questions whether knowing is possible; (3) unitive mystical experience is the source of the knowing Zhuangzi refers to as “great”; he has great knowledge but writes as if he didn’t. In these three interpretative standpoints, Zhuangzi respectively seeks great knowing, questions whether it is possible, and claims to have it but declines to talk about it. This last position may go hand in hand with skepticism about the “knowing” of mundane life, be it shi-fei distinctions or the cognitive systematic “knowledge” of contemporary political and cultural elites.30 For the purposes of this discussion, I adopt a skeptical reading, but one that does not preclude the third, mystical approach.31

The Arguments. The central section attacks claims for a set of innate (and knowable) criteria for epistemological and moral judgments. These include claims for an innate authority for shi-fei judgments and claims for an innate natural order expressed in language and susceptible to discrimination (bian).32 The discussion begins with the analogy of the parts of the body. The question is: “Who’s in charge?”

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It seems that there is something genuinely in command, and that the only trouble is we cannot find a sign of it. . . . Of the hundred joints, nine openings, six viscera all present and complete, which should I recognize [as a source of authority]? (4/2/15–17)\(^3\)

Most of the central section is taken up with a series of arguments, which call into question a series of tacit or explicit claims, namely:

1. Subjective certainty of the correctness of one’s judgments is sufficient to grant them moral (shi-fei) authority.
2. Shi and fei exist independently of or prior to the cultured heart-minds that make shi-fei judgments.
3. Language has fixed meaning.
4. The shi-fei judgments of Confucians and Mohists lead to knowledge.
5. (Sophist) discrimination provides an adequate basis for judgment.
6. Language is meaningless.

Argument (1) questions Mencian claims for the cultivated heart-mind (cheng xin) as a source of authoritative judgment:

But if you go by the complete heart and take it as your authority, who is without such an authority? Why should it be only the man who knows how things alternate and whose heart approves its own judgments who has such an authority? The fool has one just as he has (4/2/21–22)\(^4\)

Here the Zhuangzi uses skeptical methods to question claims for the inherent authority of cultivated minds. If everyone’s judgment has authority, no one’s has. (This is the argument Socrates uses in his first refutation of Protagoras.) The passage does not, however, explicitly reject the possibility of authoritative moral judgments, as would a skeptical doctrine, nor does it make a clear recommendation on how to act.

The force of the next claim (2) is to question the a priori existence of shi-fei moral judgments:

For shi and fei to exist before a completed mind would be to “go to Yue today and arrive yesterday.” This would be to take what doesn’t yet exist as existing [yi wu you wei you]. (3/2/22)

Hui Shī’s paradox uses humor to make the indirect claim that shi-fei judgments have no existence prior to that of completed heart-minds (cheng xin); therefore Mencius is wrong to claim authority for them. Any claim for the authority of cheng xin presupposes the prior existence of shi fei, which would be to put the cart before the horse.\(^5\) It also suggests that there is nothing innate about shi-fei, and that shi-fei judgments are conventional, a view rejected by Mencius.\(^6\) The method is to use humor and analogy to induce doubt about the possibility of authoritative moral judgments. There is no assertion that they are groundless (a skeptical doctrine) and no claim that they should be rejected in practice (a skeptical recommendation).
The ground shifts to a consideration of whether the distinctions of language reflect an inherent order of nature. The next passage (3) seems to claim that there is no fixed meaning in language:

Saying is not blowing breath. When someone speaks, there is something said, but what is said is never fixed. Is there truly something said? Or has there never been anything said? If you think it different than the sounds of fledglings, is there a distinction (bian) or is there no distinction? (4/2/23–24; Graham 1981, p. 52)

The force of this passage is to question the possibility of fixed meaning or an external verification of any statement. It uses a series of rhetorical questions to ridicule the distinctions (bian) of the Neo-Mohists and Sophists. Yet it does not offer a skeptical doctrine, that there is no difference between human language and bird calls, or a skeptical recommendation, that conventional meanings or language be ignored.

The next passage (4) introduces the claim that language is the source of Confucian and Mohist discriminatory judgments. What obscures both dao and language, and leads to artificial notions of real and false and of shi fei? The answer is: small (xiao) speech and small knowledge:

Thus we have the shi-fei of Confucians and Mohists; by which what one shis the other feis, and what one feis the other shis. You may want to shi what they fei or fei what they shi, but this is not as good as using illumination (mo ruo yi ming). (4/2/26–27)

Here we have what seems to be an unambiguous statement that illumination (ming) is better than the discriminations (shi-fei, bian) of the Confucians and Mohists, which are interchangeable, depending on perspective. This argument broadens into a general comment on evaluative judgments.

At this point Zhuangzi introduces a historical perspective, within which he locates distinctions as an intermediary stage in the history of knowledge:

The knowledge of the ancients had arrived at something, but at what? There were some who thought there had not yet begun to be things—the utmost, the exhaustive, there is no more to add. The next thought there were things, but there had not yet begun to be borders. The next thought there were borders, but there had not yet begun to be shi fei [judgments]. The lighting up of shi fei is the reason the dao is flawed. (5/2/40–42)

These four stages seem to describe: (1) the ancients who had arrived at the utmost in knowledge, (2) earlier monistic Daoism, (3) the Sophists or Neo-Mohists, and (4) the shi-fei judgments of Mencius.

In the next section (5) Zhuangzi uses a series of temporal and existential distinctions to question, or ridicule, Sophist dialectic. “Trying to put it...”

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into words,” Zhuangzi makes a string of discriminations of the form “there exists ‘X’” (you X ye zhe). Each move makes a new distinction from the previous one. He distinguishes the existence of:

(a) ‘beginning’.
(b) a time before ‘beginning’ existed.
(c) a time before the time before ‘beginning’ existed.
(d) ‘something’ and ‘nothing’.
(e) a time before ‘nothing’ existed.
(f) a time before that time before ‘nothing’ existed.

All of a sudden, there is ‘nothing’ (you wu), yet we don’t yet know of ‘something and nothing’ (you wu) which truly is [you] and which truly isn’t [wu]. Now, I have already referred [we] to ‘something’, yet I don’t yet know whether my reference really refers to ‘something’ or whether it refers to ‘nothing’. (5/2/50–51)39

The argument seems to be that the categories of something and nothing are meaningless because they are mutually pervasive and mutually contradictory; therefore we cannot use these categories to make discriminatory judgments. But is this a joke, or does he make this argument in earnest? In a skeptical reading, the reductio ad absurdum is at least partially serious. We can, of course, make temporal and ontological discriminations in practice, yet the discriminations of language are conventional and, if pushed to the extreme, ridiculous and unverifiable.40 Avoiding skeptical doctrines, the passage never asserts that there is no such thing as being and not-being (you wu), or that words are meaningless, only that referents are not fixed, and therefore not verifiable.

These discriminations are posed as questions, not as assertions. Zhuangzi never answers these questions, and never directly claims that we cannot make distinctions, whether as perceptual judgments or in language. Were he to make the skeptical claim that language is meaningless, Zhuangzi would be open to the charge of self-refutation. The Neo-Mohists, whose arguments Zhuangzi presumably knew, make exactly this charge against the monistic Daoist Shen Dao.41

Thus Zhuangzi uses discrimination to attack discrimination. He induces doubt of the very method he uses to induce doubt.

Several of Hui Shi’s paradoxes bring the reader to the question of whether it is possible to say something (6):42

Now that we are one, can I still say something? Already, having called us one, did I succeed in not saying something? One and the saying makes two, two and one makes three. Proceeding from here even an expert calculator cannot get to the end of it, much less a plain man. Therefore if we take the step from nothing to something we arrive at three, and how much worse if we take the
step from something to something! Take no step at all, and the shi that works by circumstance will come to an end. (5/2/53–55)

The skeptical methods in this passage rely on the humor of reductio ad absurdum. Skeptical doctrines (or even recommendations) would have no place in it.

The final note is to relegate discrimination (bian) to the realm of “small talk” (xiao yan), without quite articulating the primitive Taoist position that all language was meaningless:

The greatest dao does not usurp,
great bian does not speak [yan],
great ren is not ren,
great integrity does not make itself awkward,
great courage is not excessive. (5/2/58–59)

The Closing Narratives: Dream and Waking. The Qi wu lun closes as it began, with a series of stories in which quasi-“idiotic” characters question our ability to know. In the first, “Gaptooth’s” questions Wang Ni:

[G] Would you know something of which all things agreed ‘shi’? [W] How would I know that?
[G] Would you know what you did not know? [W] How would I know that?
[G] Then does no thing know anything? [W] How would I know that? However, let me try to say it [put it into words]: How do I know that what I call knowing is not ignorance? How do I know that what I call ignorance is not knowing? (6/2/64–66)

Next, the passage questions the human tendency to love life and fear death. Another series of perspective-shifts contrast imagination and “reality,” the ultimate dream (da meng) and the “ultimate awakening” (da jue) (6/2/82), and even, self-referentially, “you and I arguing over alternatives” (6/2/84–85). The Qi wu lun closes with Zhuangzi’s dream of the butterfly.

Is Zhuangzi a skeptic by doctrine? The evidence seems to refute this possibility. Only two statements in the Qi wu lun even suggest a skeptical doctrine. We are asked whether it differs from the twittering of birds (a negative answer might count as a skeptical doctrine), but the question is never answered. Zhuangzi does state unambiguously that language is the source of the false distinctions of the Ruhists and Mohists, but that statement is not in itself a skeptical doctrine. In most of the other sections of the chapter, there is a striking refusal to state a skeptical doctrine, but there is considerable evidence for skepticism as a method.

The Question of Socratic Skepticism. Before turning from the Zhuangzi to the Theaetetus, I want to contextualize the problem of skepticism in the Theaetetus in a longstanding debate about the origins of skepticism. At issue was whether Plato and Socrates were skeptics. Arcesilaus
(ca. 315–241 B.C.E.), the founder of the skeptical Academy, claimed Plato and the Platonic Socrates as his source. This claim for the legacy of Plato’s Academy became a focus of a variety of attacks, both ancient and modern. Cicero (106–43 B.C.E.) defends the claim, and describes the methods of Socrates at some length. Socrates affirmed nothing, but refuted others; he asserted that he knew nothing except that he knew nothing. According to Cicero, Plato’s followers in both the Academy and the Lyceum abandoned this Socratic practice of doubt and restraint from making positive statements. Yet less than three hundred years later, Sextus Empiricus (ca. 200 C.E.) distinguishes skepticism from the “dogmatism” of Socrates and Plato, despite their didactic methods, and rejects a skeptical interpretation of Plato.

One difficulty with this historical argument is that neither side specifies what kind of “skepticism” it means when it applies, or denies, the name of skeptic to Plato and Socrates. It is noteworthy that the arguments that Plato and Socrates were not skeptics focus on the question of skeptical doctrines and recommendations, while Cicero’s defense focuses on skeptical methods. Paul Woodruff argues that much of the subsequent study of Plato has emphasized his doctrines at the expense of his methods, and that this emphasis has taken attention away from the aspects of his work that made him an ancestor of skepticism, specifically his methods.

Skeptical Doctrines in the Theaetetus. Bearing in mind this debate, we may ask whether the style of argument of Theaetetus 151–184 is skeptical, and if so in what way. To answer this question, I begin by asking whether this section of the Theaetetus contains skeptical doctrines.

The Theaetetus Argument on Knowledge as Perception. In the Theaetetus, Plato proposes and rejects four definitions of knowledge. He rejects several proposed branches of knowledge (that is, geometry and astronomy) as descriptions of objects of knowledge, rather than of knowledge itself (146c–e). He also rejects definitions of knowledge as perception or sensation (151d–186e), true opinion (187a–201c), and true opinion justified by an account or logos (201c–210a). The dream passage occurs within the attempt to define knowledge as sense perception. This discussion is concentrated at 151d–186e, and occupies over half the dialogue.

The Theaetetus, like the Zhuangzi, has been subject to divergent interpretations. Bishop Berkeley read the Theaetetus as anticipating and supporting his own empiricist theory of knowledge. Yet the eighteenth-century philosopher Richard Price considered the dialogue effectively to refute the empiricist epistemologies of Berkeley and Hume. These two interpretations take very different views of 151d–184a, the consideration of sense perception. At issue are two approximately parallel questions: whether Plato agrees with the arguments of Protagoras and Heraclitus;
and whether the epistemology of the *Theaetetus* is consistent with the Theory of Forms as presented in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. A positive answer to both questions supports Berkeley’s empiricist reading. Here Plato believes that Protagoras and Heraclitus give a true account of perception, but that perception is not knowledge. A negative answer to both questions supports Price’s anti-empiricist interpretation. In this view, *Theaetetus* 151d–184a presents a self-sufficient critique of empiricism in which Plato changes his mind from earlier works. His treatment of Protagoras is ironic, and he is not committed to the arguments of Protagoras and Heraclitus.54

*The Exposition.* The first section introduces three doctrines and the example of dreams and madness.55 The Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is a theory of general relativism in which “man is the measure of all things” (151e–152c). The Flux theory of Heraclitus states that nothing is just one thing, and that everything is its opposite because nothing “is,” but everything is “becoming” (152d–155e). Next, a Heraclitean explanation of Protagorean relativism reformulates Protagorean “being” as Heraclitean “becoming” (157b).

After the presentation of the three theses to Theaetetus, Socrates disavows knowledge by claiming to be a midwife who is barren of theories, and who is attending the labor of Theaetetus. Only after he has brought Theaetetus’ own beliefs (dogma) into light will it become clear whether they are a live birth or a wind-egg (157d).56 At this point we may speculate as to what a “live birth” would be. If we emphasize that Socrates is not a skeptic by doctrine, we might expect him eventually to guide Theaetetus through his own objections to some correct definition. If, on the other hand, we emphasize his skeptical methods, a live birth might be guiding Theaetetus to ask the right questions, not to formulate the right answers.

When Theaetetus seems satisfied with this account, Socrates challenges it with the evidence of dreams and madness, arguing that dreams and madness are indeed false perception. However, if nothing remains the same over time because being and becoming are always relative to somebody or something, which are also in flux, a false perception may be true for the person who made it at the time it was made. Thus the argument from dreams provides the challenge that forces Socrates to refute the combined arguments of Protagoras and Heraclitus, which do not admit the possibility of false perception, whether it be dreams, madness, or mistaken judgments about the future.

*The Refutations of Protagoras.* The trivial refutation of Protagoras raises the problem of expertise (161c–163a) as a new challenge to the Measure Doctrine, which seems to deny the possibility of differences in wisdom. If knowledge is perception, how can expertise exist? How can Protagoras Lisa Raphals
teach? It accuses Protagoras of self-contradiction (163a–165e) by means of arguments that show that “know” and “perceive” are not interchangeable. In a “Defense of Protagoras,” Socrates takes on the role of Protagoras (166a–170a), and argues that the charge of self-contradiction against Protagoras rests on trivial semantic distinctions. Socrates makes the pragmatic argument that experts, for example doctors or politicians, know how to make the perceptions of others better, but not truer. Socrates restates the Relativism doctrine as: for each person and each city, things are what they seem to them to be (168b).

The serious refutation of Protagoras rea...
Socrates' answer to the argument for sense perception based on the case of dreams and madness takes up the first part of Woodruff’s “definition-testing elenchus,” wherein he undermines the premises of his interlocutor, in this case the definition of Theaetetus, based on the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. However, at this point, any number of questions can be raised about Socrates' disproof of the definition of epistêmê as aisthêsis. These include ironic elements in Socrates' impersonation of Protagoras\textsuperscript{57} and questions about whether Socrates has really refuted Heraclitus.\textsuperscript{58}

*The Direct Proof.* In the second part of the elenchus, Plato begins again, this time from his own premises, in an entirely new demonstration (184e–186e). Socrates begins by asking whether we perceive with or through the eyes and ears, to raise the philosophical issue of whether there is one perceiving consciousness (through) or a plurality of perceivers (with), whom Plato compares to the soldiers hidden in the Trojan horse. Plato rejects the “Trojan horse” model of perception in favor of the unity of consciousness. He argues that there are qualities that are grasped, not through the senses, but through the mind’s activity of thought. These include existence, number, and likeness. The argument concludes with the observation that, if perception cannot grasp being, it cannot grasp truth, a necessary condition of knowledge. Therefore, Plato argues, perception is not knowledge.

Is Plato’s argument from dreams a skeptical doctrine? If so, it is clearly not the doctrine of Socrates, but rather follows from the combined positions of Heraclitus and Protagoras. Socrates not only refutes it; he refutes it twice. Does this mean that we are to side with Sextus and judge that the Platonic Socrates is not a skeptic?

Not necessarily. We may still decide that Socrates takes seriously the skeptical recommendation to suspend judgment, without explicitly affirming the skeptical doctrine that one cannot aver or deny knowledge about knowledge. Socrates constantly disavows knowledge. We may also decide that he is a skeptic by method, a possibility that even Sextus leaves open.

Skepticism as a Recommendation

Both the Qi wu lun and Theaetetus seem to encourage doubt by advocating skepticism in its second sense, as a recommendation. Like Sextus, Zhuangzi is clearly concerned with problems of equanimity amid the difficulties of a vexed age,\textsuperscript{59} and traditional interpretations of the Zhuangzi tend to emphasize this aspect.\textsuperscript{60}

We can go one step further, and give this method a name, ming. Zhuangzi consistently states that various formulations of “small knowing” are “not as good as using ming.”\textsuperscript{61} In the case of great knowing, the

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typical formulation is “it is this that is meant by ‘using ming’.” The characters who have great knowing consistently refrain from dogmatic judgments, although their equanimity never prevents them from acting.

In the case of the *Theaetetus*, the skeptical recommendation is made through the force of the persona of Socrates and his methods of inquiry, to which he gives the name of midwifery. In comparing his own questioning of Theaetetus to the activity of the midwife, Socrates claims to be himself a midwife, and the son of a midwife, Phaenarete, “she who brings virtue to light” (149a), a phrase that might pass as a literal translation of *ming de*, the traditional activity of the sage-kings. There follows an extended description of the skills of the midwife/enlightener (149a–151d). At 157d, Socrates disavows knowledge by claiming to be a midwife who is barren of theories, and who is attending the labor of Theaetetus. Only after he has brought Theaetetus’ own beliefs (*dogma*) into light will it become clear whether they are a live birth or a wind-egg. At the end of the last section of the dialogue, Socrates and Theaetetus seem to conclude that Theaetetus has finished giving birth, but has produced only wind-eggs (210bc). Socrates concludes that, while he himself “does not know what other men know,” the inquiry itself will improve the subsequent theories of Theaetetus (210c), if he has any. This is all that the midwife’s art can hope to achieve (210d). Here Socrates’ elenchus seems to collapse. He denies that his method can define knowing, but continues to recommend his method of inquiry. This would appear to be skepticism as a recommendation.

Skeptical Methods

Next I want to discuss several of the skeptical methods that I consider to be operating in the *Qi wu lun* and *Theaetetus*. Skeptical methods produce a state of uncertainty by appearing either to affirm nothing, or to affirm what they concurrently deny. Skeptical methods in these texts include the alternate pursuit and abandonment of *reductio ad absurdum* arguments, humor, complex narrative structures, and complex irony. Overall, they use narrative and dramatic techniques to create a textual situation that invites the reader to question whether the meaning of the whole is precisely equal to the sum of its philosophical parts.

*Reductio ad Absurdum*. Both dialogues use *reductio ad absurdum* arguments to attack the views of predecessors or contemporaries. Zhuangzi uses them to attack Mencian claims for the supremacy of the complete heart-mind, to show the limitations of *shi-fei* judgments, and to ridicule Sophist, Neo-Mohist, and Daoist predecessors and near-contemporaries.

In the *Theaetetus*, Plato uses elaborate (and arguably unnecessary) *reductio ad absurdum* arguments to refute Protagoras and Heraclitus, before introducing his own premises.

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Both sets of polemics deal with the serious problem of self-refutation, but in very different ways. The *Zhuangzi* manages to avoid it entirely by never articulating a skeptical doctrine directly, and never risking an inherently self-refuting statement of the limitations of language. Plato takes on the problem of self-refutation directly. His second refutation of Protagoras (170a–171d) provides a classic formulation of the self-refutation argument against skepticism.64

*Narrative Techniques.* Both texts seem to say one thing and do another. They use the arguments they appear to refute, or don’t use the arguments they appear to advance. In the end, each admits of interpretations that are so divergent as to be contradictory, and the reader is led to suspect that this is not an accident.

There is, in both texts, a curious lacuna between the questions they ask and the lack, or complexity, of the answers they provide. Jokes, puns, poetry, and character sketches provide commentary or “stage directions” about the explicit arguments, which are digressive and indirect.

The *Qi wu lun* emphasizes the limitations of Neo-Mohist dialectic, yet it makes extensive use of the very form of argument it appears to attack. The *Theaetetus* seems to seek a positive definition by elenctic argument, yet none of the elenctic argument leads to a positive definition. Over half the dialogue concerns the first definition, of knowledge as sense perception. Most of that consists of indirect proofs and a substantial digression. The direct proof used to reject the first definition is very brief. All four proposed definitions of knowledge are ultimately rejected.

The *Qi wu lun* is easily accused of “not quite making sense,” of being disjointed and disjunctive. Are these breaks in the narrative an artifact of textual corruption, a demonstration of Zhuangzi’s disregard for, disinterest in, or hostility toward rationality? Or is it part of the “mysticism” of the text? The *Qi wu lun* uses humor to demonstrate the relative and arbitrary nature of the “small knowing” (*xiao zhi*) of Confucians and Mohists: Mencian *shi fei* judgments and Neo-Mohist *bian*. It surrounds arguments with images: Ziqi’s reclining in reverie, Gaptooth, and the dream of the butterfly.

The *Theaetetus* uses a variety of jokes and puns in such incidents as the critical portrayal of the materialists (as opposed to the Heracliteans) and in its sketches of Heraclitean “Flux” extremists. Plato may have banished the poets from the Republic, but they are very much present in the *Theaetetus*. Homer appears at the head of the Heracliteans and in the “Trojan Horse model” of a non-unified consciousness. Lines of Pindar appear for dramatic effect (for example, at 173e). Later portions of the *Theaetetus* rely not only on logical argument but on detailed similes to represent theories of knowledge, for example the wax block (191a–195b)
and the aviary (196d–199c). It has even been argued that the *Theaetetus* 161–171 has the structure of a comedy, in which Plato “turns the tables” (peritropē) on Protagoras. He does so embroiling Protagoras in a philosophical farce, which not only lends dramatic flair to the arguments under discussion, but also allows Plato to “show up,” as well as refute, Protagoras.65

**Complex Irony: Is the Whole the Sum of Its Parts?** These narrative and dramatic elements present the reader with a complex set of “stage directions” that must be included and interpreted in our readings of both texts. These elements, including the arguments from dreams, lead us to question whether the meaning of the whole is precisely equal to the sum of its philosophical parts. They seem to call into question the very arguments the texts appear to advance.

Like Socrates, Zhuangzi asks more questions than he answers, and repeatedly formulates ideas in order to revise and attack them.66 He asks, and never answers, questions of the form “Is it X, or is it not X?” Yet Zhuangzi and Plato each present a hierarchy of knowing that contrasts a kind of superior knowing, which is never precisely defined, with inferior “knowledges” that are discussed at great length. In the *Theaetetus*, this “true knowledge” is epistēmē. In the *Zhuangzi*, the superior knowledge is “great knowing,” and it is identified with ming, illumination, and dao.

The argument from dreams does very different things in these two texts. For Zhuangzi, it challenges our ability to know the truth of our perceptions. For Plato, it demonstrates the existence of false, and thence of true, perceptions (although it does not specify which perceptions are true or how we would identify them).68

**Skeptical Methods and Styles of Reasoning.** Because of the similarities between the skeptical methods used in these works, we should abandon the bias that Greek thought is analytic or rational and Chinese thought is holistic or intuitionist. But how do we understand these similarities?

One explanatory device that will not work is the vexed, but still pervasive, notion of mentalities. The term was given currency by the French sociologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who used it to explain the thought processes and/or belief systems of groups of peoples, especially peoples whose thought processes he characterized as prelogical and mystical.69 These terms have been widely applied to Chinese thought in general and to the *Zhuangzi* in particular, but they might not find ready acceptance as descriptive of Plato, Socrates, or the *Theaetetus*. An alternative would be to frame the question of skeptical methods within the broader problem of styles of reasoning in China and Greece.70
Conclusion

In this essay I have perhaps artificially emphasized a distinction between skeptical doctrines, recommendations, and methods, in a manner that Zhuangzi, if not Socrates, might have found most antipathetic. I have done so for two reasons.

First, I believe this distinction can clarify the current debate about the presence, or absence, of skepticism in the Zhuangzi. That debate has been entirely concerned with the question of skeptical doctrines and recommendations, with the effect of obscuring the question of skeptical methods. The force of my distinction is to strengthen and emphasize the presence of skeptical methods in the Zhuangzi, and at least to suggest the presence of skeptical recommendations.

Secondly, this method of analysis illustrates the importance of skeptical methods in both texts, a similarity that would simply not be apparent if the discussion focused on either skeptical doctrines or skeptical recommendations.

In conclusion, I would suggest that this examination of skepticism in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus raises the broader problem of styles of reasoning in China and Greece. The prevailing tendency has been to talk about differences between Chinese and Greek philosophical arguments; I have chosen to look for similarities. I have argued that the Zhuangzi and the Theaetetus are skeptical texts by virtue of their use of skeptical methods, and that skepticism may inhere in form as well as content. If so, the arguments of Socrates and Zhuangzi may have more in common than we think, or than the rationalist tradition would admit.

NOTES

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The following abbreviation is used in the text and Notes:

OP "Outlines of Pyrrhonism," in Sextus Empiricus, vol. 1 (see the Works Cited below, under Sextus Empiricus). Lisa Raphals
1 – Pinyin romanization is used throughout this article. Laozi may be more familiar to some readers as Lao Tzu, Zhuangzi as Chuang Tzu, Daoism as Taoism.

2 – Citations of passages refer to the Harvard Yenching concordance. Unless otherwise specified, translations are taken from or based on Graham 1986.

3 – Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by M. J. Levett and M. F. Burnyeat, in Burnyeat 1990.

4 – Other examples include Sextus Empiricus, Descartes (Meditations I), Hume, and Freud (Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 83 f).

5 – For impermanence, see Li Bo’s untitled poem on Zhuangzi. For questioning the content or source of knowledge, see Du Fu’s Meng Li Bo, “Dreaming Li Bo.” For translations of these poems see Obata 1935 and Hawkes 1967, pp. 87–92.

6 – See Woodruff 1990, p. 61.

7 – Skepticism flourished during some five hundred years between the fourth century B.C. and the third century A.D. The major academic skeptics were Arcesilaus (ca. 315–ca. 242 B.C.) and Carneades (ca. 213–129 B.C.). The major Pyrrhonian skeptics were Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 360–ca. 270 B.C.), Aenesidemus (fl. first century B.C.), and Sextus Empiricus (fl. A.D. 200). For general discussions of the history of Greek skepticism, see Bevan 1913, Patrick 1929, and Bury 1933. Schofield (1980), Burnyeat (1983), and Groarke (1990) discuss a range of more recent views. The major sources for skeptical doctrines are the writings of Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes Laertius. All references to these texts are from the Loeb Classical Library editions.

8 – For discussion of the impact of skepticism on later philosophical traditions, see Burnyeat 1983, pp. 1–3, and Groarke 1990, p. 3.

9 – See Groarke 1990. Groarke (p. 4) thus opposes skepticism to such movements as Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Cartesianism.


11 – Thus Sextus Empiricus describes skepticism as “an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever” (OP 8). Sextus distinguishes his skepticism from the dogmatism of several important philosophical predecessors: Heraclitus, despite his theory of flux; Protagoras, despite his relativism; Democritus, despite his distrust of sense perception; and Socrates and Plato, despite their didactic methods (OP 1: 213–225).
12 – Paul Woodruff describes this “definition-testing elenchus” in Woodruff 1986, pp. 22–23 and 31–33.


14 – For the distinction between doctrine and recommendation, and their mutual independence, see Stryker 1980, pp. 54–55.

15 – This title has been variously interpreted and translated as: “essay on seeing things as equal” (Graham 1970), “sorting which evens things out” (Graham 1986, p. 48), and “discourse that equalizes things” (Hansen 1983, pp. 26, 50–52).

16 – For the purposes of this discussion, I restrict consideration of the Zhuangzi to the Nei pian or “Inner Chapters” of what is widely believed to be a composite work. By “Zhuangzi” I mean not the historical Zhuangzi, of which we know virtually nothing, but the coherent voice of the “Zhuangzi” of the Qi wu lun. For discussions of the textual history of the Zhuangzi see Graham 1986 and Roth 1991. For the importance of the Qi wu lun as a distillate of the arguments of the Zhuangzi, see Hansen 1983, p. 31.


18 – Hansen 1983, pp. 27, 38. He also argues that the paradigm for skepticism was sense perception in Greece and language in China. For further discussions of the problems of rationalism and skepticism, see Hansen 1991, pp. 196, 203–205; and 1983, pp. 27, 30–34, 37–38, 48–50, respectively.


21 – Graham simply assumes skepticism (1989, pp. 186, 193–195). Hansen makes explicit arguments for a skeptical reading of the Qi wu lun, but does not distinguish kinds of skepticism (1983). Ivanhoe (1992) discusses four kinds of skeptical argument, which he terms epistemological, sense, ethical, and language skepticism. While he does not make the distinction, it is my impression that all four are variants of a skeptical thesis, rather than a skeptical method or recommendation.

22 – Hansen (1983, p. 27) and Allinson (1989, p. 11). Hansen does separate the two in his argument that Zhuangzi is a relativist, as opposed to an absolutist (1983, pp. 38–46).
23 - In the case of relativism, the claim that if all knowing is a function of one’s perspective, no one can advocate any one truth claim over another, including the claim that knowing is a function of one’s perspective.

24 - Wang Fuzhi’s commentary (1961, p. 11) suggests that at the time he reclined on the cushion, he was already making use of the linguistic distinctions of the Confucians and Mohists. Up to that point, he had been in a state of disassociation, and had forgotten language.

25 - *Chui wan bu tong* (3/2/8; based on Graham 1981, p. 49). An alternative translation is “blow the ten thousand disputing voices,” possibly the contradictory arguments of philosophers (Graham 1970, pp. 149–150). Hansen further interprets the passage implicitly to raise the question of whether the distinctions of language are natural. In Hansen’s view, this passage directly attacks the primitive Daoist position that language and its distinctions are unnatural, insofar as the users of these conflicting discourses are “natural” (Hansen 1983, pp. 38–39, and 1992).

26 - See Raphals 1993 for a discussion of the role of verse in the *Zhuangzi*.


28 - While the term *shi fei* is often associated with the later Mohists, it does appear in Mencius at 2A6, 3B8, 4B31, 5A1, and 6A6.

29 - For a discussion of these skills, and of the problem of skill knowledge in general, see Raphals 1993 and Ivanhoe 1992. For a discussion of the importance of humor as an element in intellect, see Harbsmeier 1989.

30 - Such a reading would provide an alternative to the general tendency to attribute “quietistic” attitudes to both mysticism and skepticism. For a vigorous attack on the latter see Hallie 1985, pp. 6–9.

31 - These three readings are pursued at length in a forthcoming study.

32 - For further discussion of Zhuangzi’s critique of Mencius, see Hansen 1983, pp. 39–44.


34 - Ibid.

35 - For support for this reading, see Wang Fuzhi 1961, p. 16.

36 - Chad Hansen (1983, p. 41, and 1992) takes this claim one step further, to argue that *shi-fei* is not inherently natural.

Based on Graham 1981, p. 54.
38 – From the perspective of Reading C, this passage seems to describe a return from undifferentiated “mystical” experience to the perceptual and linguistic distinctions of the phenomenal world.

39 – See Graham 1959 for discussion of you and wu as one of the six functions of “to be” in Classical Chinese.

40 – Part of the humor of this passage lies in the parody of such cosmogonic accounts as Laozi 42. I am grateful to Harold Roth for calling this aspect of the passage to my attention.

41 – According to Shen Dao, the Great Way was capable of “embracing all things, but not of discriminating among them” (92/33/43–44; trans. Watson 1968, p. 369). The Neo-Mohists responded: “To claim that all saying contradicts itself is self-contradictory” (Mozi B71; trans. Graham 1978, p. 445). For a discussion of this passage, see Hansen 1983, p. 38. Plato makes virtually the same case against Heraclitus when he rejects the Extended Flux theory of Heraclitus on the grounds that it leads to the impossibility of meaning in language (Theaetetus 179c–183c).


43 – Graham 1981, p. 56. Yin shi, the “adaptive” shi that works by circumstance, is contrasted to wei shi, the “contrived” shi of “deeming,” which is the means by which boundaries are established (5/2/55). The “contrived” shi, which distinguishes a stalk from a pillar and Xi Shi from a leper, is contrasted with the dao, which interchanges these things and treats them as one (4/2/35–36). For a translation of these passages, see Graham 1970, pp. 153, 155.


45 – For a concise summary of that debate, see Woodruff 1986, pp. 23–24.

46 – Cicero, Academica 1.44–46.

47 – Cicero argues that Arcesilaus was a true follower of Plato (Cicero, Academica 1.46), that Socrates and Plato were skeptics (Cicero, Academica 2.74), and that Arcesilaus used their methods (Cicero, Academica 2.77, De Finibus 2.2, De Natura Deorum 1.5.11).

48 – Cicero, Academica 1.4.15–18. According to Socrates, others claim to know when they are ignorant; he himself knows only that he is ignorant, which is why Apollo judged him wisest of all, since wisdom is not to think you know what you do not (Cicero, Academica 1.4.15–16). The reference to Apollo also occurs in Plato at Apology 21a.

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50 – Sextus, OP 1.213–225. He also distinguished his skepticism from the “dogmatic” views of several other important philosophical predecessors: Heraclitus, despite his theory of flux; Protagoras, despite his relativism; and Democritus, despite his distrust of sense perception.


52 – Woodruff divides what he calls the definition-testing elenchus into two parts. First Socrates refutes a dogmatic interlocutor by showing that the questioner does not understand the conditions for successful definition (Woodruff 1986, p. 33). Next, Socrates (or his stand-in) takes the interlocutor’s place and refutes views of his own, not because they are false, but because they are not definitions and thus not knowledge. I take it that Woodruff’s emphasis is on the purpose, as distinct from the logical methods, of the elenchus. For description of some of the latter, see Vlastos 1982. The main difference between this Socratic method and skeptical argument is that Socrates claims knowledge of his own ignorance (Plato, *Apology* 23ab.) and Arcesilaus insists that he himself does not even know *that* (Cicero, *Academica* 1.45). The latter are strategies for inducing *epechē*, not proofs of ignorance (Woodruff 1986, pp. 22–23, 33).


54 – For various versions of the positive reading, see Cornford (1935, pp. 7, 28, 83, and passim) and Cherniss (1971, pp. 20–22). McDowell (1973, pp. 257–259), Cooper (1970), and Burnyeat (1990, pp. 8 and passim) all present versions of the negative reading. The positive reading seems to be the prevalent view within Plato scholarship.

55 – For the purposes of discussion I divide *Theaetetus* 151d–186e into four components, based on Burnyeat 1990, pp. 251–255. I have, however, combined the refutations of Protagoras into one section. They are: (1) Exposition of the three initial theses (151d–160e); (2) Refutations of Protagoras (161–179c); (3) Refutation of Heraclitus (179c–183c); and (4) Refutation by direct proof (183c–186e).

56 – That is, a false pregnancy.

57 – Edward Lee (1973) argues that Plato’s representation of Protagoras is deeply ironic, and that Plato repeatedly represents Protagoras as
holding views at odds with his actual views. Examples include speaking scornfully against persuasive speech and advocating fixed standards of validity that Protagoras’ own philosophy precluded.


59 – For discussions of Warring States thought as a response to the decline of the Zhou, see Graham 1989, pp. 2–4. For a comparison of the skepticism of Zhuangzi with that of Sextus Empiricus, see Kjellberg 1994.


61 – For example at 4/2/27.

62 – For example at 5/2/47; Graham 1981, p. 55.

63 – For discussion of the apraxia argument, that skepticism is incompatable with daily life, see Stryker 1980, pp. 63–68.

64 – Theaetetus 17a–171d.

65 – For the details of this very interesting argument, see Lee 1973, pp. 255–259.


68 – I am grateful to the anonymous reader for Philosophy East and West for this observation.

69 – See Lévy-Bruhl 1922 and 1975, as described in Lloyd 1980.

70 – Following G.E.R. Lloyd’s argument (Lloyd 1980) that the notion of a style of reasoning has more explanatory force than the mentalities.

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