

## Skepticism and Divination in China, Greece and Rome

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Debates on the nature of self, agency and fate are central to both the Chinese and Greek philosophical traditions.<sup>1</sup> In both China and Greco-Roman antiquity, divination was an object of philosophical debate, often within the context of questions of fatalism and determinism, for which it had important implications. The arguments of Cicero (Rome) and Wang Chong (China) are particularly well known. But both wrote against a significant background of defenses and attacks (skeptical and otherwise) on divination. The first section surveys the key issues in Warring States and Greek debates about divination. The second addresses the use of these debates in the *Lunheng* and *De Divinatione*.

Scholarship over the past two decades have focused on important sociological and epistemological dimensions of divination, both in antiquity and in the present. It underscores the rationality of divination, the pervasive influence of divinatory thinking, its complex social history, its role in the development of other hermeneutic traditions, and its place in an archaeology of knowledge. The "default" position in both traditions was the approval and practice of divination, including by those we are accustomed to think of as philosophers.

### 1. Debating Divination

#### 1.1 Warring States Debates on Divination

There is extensive Chinese evidence of contact and active competition between diviners and Masters 子. Teaching was one of several livelihoods made possible by literacy and specialist expertise. Divination was another, either through self-employment in the marketplace or as a court official. Thus competition between Masters and mantic specialists involved career choice, patronage, students and the status of modes of knowledge. Debates on divination were part of this intellectual milieu.

Confucius famously recommended a respectful distance from "ghosts and spirits" (*Lunyu* 6.22). A more nuanced picture of his possible views appears outside the *Lunyu* and in excavated texts. In the Mawangdui text Yao 要, Confucius claims that the virtue he seeks is superior to the turtle and yarrow divinations of incantators and *wu* (祝巫卜筮), and seems to claim that cultivating virtue is superior to mantic expertise. But elsewhere in the same text, when asked

whether he believes in yarrow divination, he replies that he has performed one hundred *Yi* divinations, and seventy have been correct (夫子亦信其筮乎？子曰吾百占而七十當).<sup>2</sup> Similarly, in the *Lüshi chunqiu* Confucius performs divination and discusses it with his students.<sup>3</sup>

The case becomes more complex with Mencius, who describes virtue as manifesting in the body. At 2A2 he describes *qi* as filling the body and commanded by the will 志; its concentration is a function of morality, through accumulated *yi* (集義). At 7A21 he describes the four virtues of the *junzi* as rooted in the heart-mind, and visible in the harmony of the countenance and in the appearance of the back and limbs. They produce a glossy color visible in the face and limbs.

But if virtue is visible in the body it is also logically possible to "read" it, and Mencius effectively defends this version of physiognomy:

存乎人者，莫良於眸子。眸子不能掩其惡。胸中正，則眸子瞭焉；胸中不正，則眸子眊焉。聽其言也，觀其眸子，人焉廋哉？ (4A15)

Wang Chong attacks him for this and argues that clarity of the pupils is determined at birth and does not depend on character.<sup>4</sup>

Divination was also an object of disagreement between Confucius and the Mohists, in debates in which the Master gets the better of a *wu*. In the *Lüshi chunqiu* Confucius discusses political reform with the *wu* Maqi 巫馬旗, who cannot grasp his ideas (1441, 察賢 21.2). Mozi debates with the *wu* Mazi 巫馬子 on the value of the knowledge of contemporary innovators, the sage kings of antiquity and ghosts and spirits, accessed by divination.<sup>5</sup> The Mohists also regarded prognostication as an effective component of defensive military strategy. Generals were advised to employ *wu* and prognosticators, but to keep their results and methods strictly secret from the army (68.894-5). The *Guanzi* also recommends divination; Guan Zhong advises Duke Huan of Qi to scrutinize the portents of Heaven and observe the results of divination.<sup>6</sup> It argues that diviners protect rulers from the effects of changing conditions, confusion and recklessness (and even specifies how much they should be paid) (4ab, 山權數 22.75; 20a, 侈靡 12.35). The point of these examples is that Masters considered divination normal and acceptable, even if they sometimes chose to distance themselves from diviners.

In both China and Greece debates about divination arose relatively late, in China with the growth of a specifically Confucian philosophy in the late Warring States and in Greece with the efforts of 3<sup>rd</sup> century Stoics to address arguments of Aristotle and his later contemporaries. Whereas positive statements about divination tend to be general, critiques tend to have specific targets, and to show the results of self-conscious reflection. Some critiques of divination are strikingly Chinese, others peculiarly Greek; some apparently similar critiques are used for different reasons and in different ways.

Epistemological critiques of divination argue that it is an inferior, inconsistent, or ineffective mode of knowledge. Ethical attacks focus on both individual practitioners and the ethics of divination itself. In both China and Greece organized schools made claims to a universal knowledge beyond the limitations of technical specialists. The most significant Chinese critique of divination is the Daoist claim that only knowledge of *dao* provides understanding of the future; divination is an inferior practice and an inferior mode of knowledge. The *Zhuangzi* and *Guanzi* contrast the equanimity of the sage with the frenetic manipulations of the diviner, and recommend meditation and "inward training." As the *Zhuangzi* puts it:

能無卜筮而知吉凶乎!<sup>7</sup>

The *Guanzi* tells us how:

搏氣如神，萬物備存。能搏乎？能一乎？(5a, 內業 16.49; 6a, 心術下 13.37)

Another *Guanzi* passage praises a sage, who:

不日不月，而事以從。不卜不筮，而謹知吉凶 (10a, 白心 13.38).

A different argument appears in the *Huainanzi*, which associates divination with deceit and deception. Similarly, the *Yantielun* contrasts the search for auspicious days with the ethical orientation of the sages of antiquity.<sup>8</sup>

Confucian polemics on divination are ethical. *Zuozhuan* accounts stress the superiority of prediction based on moral character over the results of divination. Confucians considered moral character a precondition for divination; they transformed the *Zhouyi* from a divination manual into a Confucian classic for universal moral guidance that supplanted divination.

*Xunzi* attacks divination on ethical grounds, while affirming its value as part of state ritual. In "Against Physiognomy" 非相 he argues that: physiognomizing people's forms is

inferior to speaking of their heart-minds:

相形不如論心。<sup>9</sup>

Poor physiognomy does not prevent correct values, and good physiognomy cannot take the place of incorrect values. (He gives examples of the poor physiognomy of legendary sages and rulers, even including Confucius.) What makes us human is the act of making distinctions; this does not depend on physiognomy, which is determined at birth (5/25).

In addition to positive attitudes toward divination, most Chinese philosophers argued about ming 命. They disagreed about its nature and what to do about it, but all considered it part of the landscape. However, debates about ming were separate from debates about divination. Most Chinese accounts of divination do not pursue questions of determinism and causality. An exception is the Tianlun 天論, "in which Xunzi argues prayer and divination do not cause their objects, and important decisions should not be based on divination. Prayers for rain do not cause rain; prayer and divination do not cause good fortune. Han Fei also argues that prayer does not cause good fortune, but neither pursues the issue of causality at any length."<sup>10</sup>

Excavated texts prominently include divination manuals and instruments, and thus provide additional information on mantic activity and early Chinese views of divination, fate and agency. They are richest in the territory associated with Chu, other sites are in Hunan, Henan, Hebei, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shandong and Gansu.

### **.1.2 Greco-Roman Debates on Divination before Cicero**

Greek mantic discourse recognized that knowledge of the future somehow implied its preexistence.<sup>11</sup> Tension between belief in the efficacy of divination and belief in inexorable fate first appears in Homer. The problem of the poets was to reconcile divination (which sought to "change" the future) with belief in the plan of Zeus. The philosophers had an opposite problem: to theorize divination in ways that reconciled traditional religion with new theories of nature, cause and so forth.

Most philosophers before Socrates (c.469-399) either affirmed some kind of belief in divination, or held beliefs compatible with it, including Thales,<sup>12</sup> Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras, whose nous can be converted into attentive Providence. Democritus based his notions of prediction on laws of mechanical movement of atoms in space. Yet even he believed

in the possibility of presentiment of future events because he considered the universe to be ordered by divine will according to providence.<sup>13</sup>

The two major Presocratic critics of divination were Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Xenophanes repudiated divination in its entirety, attacking the immorality of the Homeric gods (frs. 11 and 12) and the anthropomorphism of Greek religion (ff. 14-16). The god postulated by Xenophanes would have no motive to provide divinatory knowledge to humans, nor would humans understand it. Heraclitus criticized the religious conventions of his day in order to advance new notions of flux and the union of opposites. He rejected technical divination, oneiromancy, and ritual purifications after murder, but accepted the divination of the Sibyl and Pythia (fr. 92), and asserted that the Delphic oracle offers signs to humankind, and "neither speaks nor hides, but signifies": *oute legei oute kruptei alla sêmeinei* (fr. 93, Plut. *Pyth. orac.* 404d8).

Other Presocratics may have been diviners. Diogenes (8.32) reports that Pythagoras instructed his students to "honor every kind of divination"; and that he was called "Pyth-agoras" because he outdid the Pyth-ia (the priestess of Apollo at Delphi) in the truth of his public pronouncements in the agora (8.21). The Purifications of Empedocles begins with a claim to be in high demand everywhere, to: "some seeking mantic arts, others seeking healing oracular speech for all kinds of diseases" (fr. 112, Clem. Strom. 6.30).

But perhaps the most interesting Greek philosopher for the present discussion is the Platonic Socrates, the apocryphal creator of so much of Greek philosophy. Did Socrates believe in divination? The question is not trivial, because it becomes an important element in the trial that led to his death. The moral status of Socrates' philosophic activities is a central point in his trial, and his claim that these pursuits are grounded in divination is central to his defense. He describes the oracle to Chaerephon (that no man is wiser than Socrates) as the source of his philosophical mission, and repeatedly affirms his trust in his daimonion to warn him against error (Apol. 20e, 22c, 31d, 40a-b).

Commentators typically disregard this apparent trust in divination as a source of truth, and the implication that Socrates' moral and philosophical convictions are religious in origin. But, as Brickhouse and Smith have argued, the daimonion provides him with certainty that he

must serve the god by practicing philosophy in Athens, but not about anything else, including the nature of virtue. This leaves Socrates in the position of being certain that his philosophical activities are virtuous but unable to offer a *logos* to explain their virtue.<sup>14</sup> So in recommending the mantic arts he was not advocating laziness or shortcuts because he did not consider divine knowledge a substitute for human knowledge.

And Socrates did recommend them, as attested by two of his students: Plato and Xenophon. In addition to his own defense, he urged his friends to trust themselves in cases where the results were certain, but to consult the Pythia in uncertain ones, for example his advice to Xenophon on whether to join the expedition of Cyrus. Xenophon goes to Delphi, but asks the wrong question: not whether to go, but to which god to sacrifice for success on the expedition. Socrates rebuked Xenophon, but advises him to obey the oracle's advice and go (Xen. Anab. 3.1).

Socrates thus brought divination into the purview of philosophy; and Plato (428-347) and his successors continued that approach. Plato enjoins the city to consult the oracle on religious and moral issues (Rep 427b; Laws 738b-d). He also linked divination to the benevolent activity of the gods, describing *mantikê* as the first of four kinds of divine madness (Phaed. 244a-e). It is the madness of priestesses possessed by Apollo, who provide great benefits to others when mad, and none when sane (244b). The observation of birds (*ornithon*) and signs (*semeion*) are as inferior to it as is human sanity to divine madness, which purifies and inspires (244c-e). Similar arguments appear in the *Timaeus* (71b-e).

A positive Greek consensus on divination always coexisted with *ad hominem* attacks against individual practitioners. But divination itself became an object of heated debate in Hellenistic Greece because of its key role in new arguments about fate, causality, necessity, determinism and their ethical implications, both for Stoic advocates of divination and for their Epicurean and skeptical critics. That debate, as in China, had both epistemological and ethic ramifications, but for very different reasons.

The most significant epistemological element in the Hellenistic debates was skepticism, both asserted and denied. Another type of critique was purely empirical: does divination work? Empirical arguments figure unevenly in Greek debates, and it is noteworthy that recorded

accounts of tests of the reliability of oracles come from foreigners; Greeks seemed to consider such tests both unnecessary and impious. Most the most famous is the "test" oracle of Croesus as reported in Herodotus (1.46-55). The two other figures reported to comment on the accuracy of oracles are also non-Greeks: Amasis (Hdt. 2.174) and Xerxes and Mardonius (Hdt. 8.133-36).

From Plato to Aristotle there is a sudden and brutal transition. Aristotle rejects inductive divination and relies on dreams and physiological explanations. As Auguste Bouché-Leclercq puts it, Plato tried to absorb science in revelation; Aristotle sought to absorb revelation in science.<sup>15</sup> Chrysippus and the Stoic defenders of divination claimed empirical efficacy but denied any causal link between the "signs" of divination and their signifiers. Causal explanation would make divination a science like any other; it would lose its privileged metaphysical status as a hermeneutic for divine knowledge and agency.

Aristotle was the first to raise the possibility that a deterministic destiny precludes moral choice, and ethical debates about divination were driven by Hellenistic debates on fate, causality, necessity, determinism and their ethical implications. Efforts to reconcile determinism and moral responsibility become a major issue in Stoic attempts to refute attacks by skeptics and Epicureans. These arguments were also part of a broad debate about modality and modal logic that preoccupied many Hellenistic philosophers. The ethical problem of human responsibility for events foretold by gods first appear in Homer, but early texts do not emphasize these difficulties. For example, the mechanistic atomism of Democritus raises issues of human responsibility for a modern reader, but not, apparently, for Democritus. Plato touches on the relation of destiny and human choice in Republic 10, but destiny and determinism are not a central issue. It was Aristotle who made choice central to notions of human responsibility. Determinism threatens human choice and human freedom, and Aristotle was the first to suggest that determinism precludes morality and agency, which were central to his concept of the good life.

Aristotle treated cause as a matter of explanation, and did not connect the notions of cause and necessity. He viewed events not as chains of cause and effect but as ripples from a stone in a pond. He thus denied that all events are determined by necessary chains of causation. He held that some events result from chance rather than necessity, but his treatment of chance and coincidence did not rule out determinism. His primary interest was in the problem of

explanation (the possibility that there are chance events with no scientific explanation), without recourse to indeterminism.<sup>16</sup> Hellenistic debates about determinism and freedom began as reactions to Aristotle's incomplete analysis of causation, determinism and responsibility. The question of whether the future can be known is logically distinct from the question of whether the universe is deterministic, but in antiquity arguments about fate and prediction were considered related, perhaps because individual fate was so often the object of prediction.

But there was general agreement that for a future event to be knowable, it must in some sense be caused. The Stoics treated prediction under the rubric of divination and used divination to argue theories of fate. Their account of prediction and divination was part of an integrated systematic theory that included ethics, theology and metaphysics. These debates begin with Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school. He attempted to use logic to "prove" that "all things happen according to fate (heimarmenê).<sup>17</sup> He devised a "syllogism" to prove that the gods exist and reveal the future:

If there are gods and they do not declare the future to mortals, then either they do not love humans, or they do not know the future, or they think that knowledge of the future will not benefit humanity, or they think it against their own majesty to presignify to mortals what the future will be, or they themselves are not able to determine it (Cic. Div. 2.101).

Chrysippus tried to develop new accounts of possibility and necessity that were consistent with both moral responsibility and the Stoic "fate principle." He described his modal theory as a "proof," but also makes or implies empirical claims for divination.

Posidonius attempted to theorize divination by *sumpatheia*, divine providence, and claims that nature gives signs of future events, which unfold over time in the manner of a cable unwinding. Epicurean critics argued that chance, rather than fate, controlled events, and skeptics refused to acknowledge any role for providence. Plutarch defended inspired divination and the reputation of the Delphic oracle, but attacked Chrysippus for contradictions between his theories of possibility and fate. In Plutarch's own theory of moral agency, fate mixed and intertwined with chance. In this and other middle Platonic views, moral choice is not fated, but fate affects the consequences of moral choice. These arguments, Stoic notions of co-fated events, and notions of



events contrary to fate attempted to solve the moral dilemma by incrementally ramifying the concept of fate to soften its deterministic edges. They are reminiscent of some of the anti-fatalist arguments of Wang Chong, who also introduced new categorizations of fate and placed a new emphasis on the role of chance in human events.

### **.1.3 Comparing the Early Debates**

A key element in both Chinese and Greek divination debates about divination is epistemological. In each case divination is rejected as an inferior mode of knowledge. The early Daoists used it rhetorically to argue for the superiority of understanding of dao; Plato used it rhetorically to argue for the superiority of philosophy. Greek critiques of divination were significantly and self-consciously skeptical, whereas skepticism is not a central argument in Chinese debates about divination.

Ethics was a significant factor in both Chinese and Greek debates, but in culturally very particular ways. Some Chinese critiques associated divination with acquisitiveness and inauthenticity; others rejected it as inferior to prediction on the basis of moral character. Greek ethical debates focus on divination as a concomitant of determinism, and the perceived conflict between the key value of moral choice and the determinism implied in certain accounts of necessity and causality. The extremely elaborate logical debate that ensued is peculiarly Greek, and goes hand in hand with other features of Greek debate, including emphasis on proof and the use of quasi-legal modes of argumentation.

Despite these profound differences there are some similarities. Both traditions broadly held that valid and authentic divination arises from the sagacity, wisdom, insight, or more broadly the "virtue" of the diviner understood in terms that combine religious and philosophical values and perspectives. Both understood it to be a "right" reading of the text of the cosmos. Finally both understood it to be hermeneutic, and in this sense, fundamentally the same as any sort of textual interpretation.

## **2 Using the Past: Han and Rome**

Given this active history of debate about divination in both pre-Han China and Presocratic to Hellenistic Greece, how did these debates play out in the works of Wang Chong and Cicero, the major commentators on the mantic arts in Han China and Rome?

### **.2.1 Wang Chong**

Wang Chong is often portrayed as a skeptic and his attacks on divination (with the interesting exception of physiognomy) are an important part of this picture. Many of his actual arguments are highly rhetorical and largely consist of ridiculing opponents. Recent debate has addressed whether he was the rational skeptic previously supposed. He makes two major critiques of divination. How do they compare to the debates of the Warring States?

The first was that belief in (in)auspicious days and wind divination ignored relations between cause and effect: events were not caused by the intervention of heaven or the movements of the stars. Similarly, Wang argues that inauspicious times cannot cause sickness, misfortunes, deaths or the destruction of families (72, 辨崇). He attacks belief in defences, prohibitions and attempts to align activities to the movements of the stars (73, 難歲). Finally, Wang attacks wind divination and the implied possibility of moving Heaven. He argues that signs of rain come, not in response to prayer, but from Heaven's normal operations. He attacks the view that omens like the appearance of phoenix and unicorn occur for the sake of an emperor or in response to the virtue of a sage (51.749, 指瑞). Similarly, winds blowing over royal residences do not cause prices to rise, winds from the dwellings of prisoners or the dead do not cause them to fall, nor is there any causal relation between the movements of the winds and the victory of an army (43, 變動). In summary, diviners cannot question Heaven and Earth because Heaven follows the same principles as humanity:

天與人同道 (71.999, 卜筮).

The intellectual core of these arguments appears in the arguments for cosmic regularity in Xunzi's Tianlun. Xunzi argued for regularities in nature for different reasons than Wang Chong. Nor does Wang draw on Xunzi in his presentation, which is much more extensive, and has different intellectual targets.

Wang's second major argument is a critique, not of individual diviners but of the entire system of divination of his time. He uses the case of inaccurate dream divination to argue that, even if dreams offer accurate signs, human limitations prevent their correct interpretation:

夫占夢與占龜同。晉占夢者不見象指，猶周占龜者不見兆者為也。象不然，兆無不審，人之知闇，論之失實也 (71.1006-1007).

He argues that there are divination signs, but their meaning is not fixed:

夫蓍筮龜卜，猶聖王治世；卜筮兆數，猶王治瑞應。瑞應無常，兆數詭異。詭異則占者惑，無常則議者疑。疑則謂平未治，惑則謂吉不良。(71.1005).

He compares turtle and yarrow divination to the rule of a sage king. Omen numbers (兆數) are like omens (瑞) that respond to sage rule, but because the omens are not constant (無常) and the numbers are strange (詭異) good and ill auspice are misjudged. Wang thus argues that there are portents, but their meaning also is not fixed:

且夫太平之瑞，猶聖王之相也。聖王骨法未必同，太平之瑞何為當等？(57.816, 宣漢).

He compares the omens (瑞) of Great Peace to the diverse physiognomies (相) of the sage kings: in both cases the expectation of consistency was misguided.

夫卜筮非不可用，卜筮之人，占之誤也 (71.1006).

So the problem is not that divination is inherently wrong but that diviners prognosticate incorrectly, and they do so because they are not sages. Michael Puett has recently argued that Wang Chong's critique of the views of his age is not his primary purpose. The goal is not to use divination correctly, but to listen to sages, who understand the right way, not by prognostication but by looking within.<sup>18</sup> This is almost exactly the epistemological critique of the Zhuangzi and Guanzi, which prefer the certainty of sages (as they define them) to the inferior knowledge of divination.

Wang Chong's critique of divination makes an important exception for physiognomy, which in his view has a material cause, because both the body and ming are given at birth (from parents and Heaven, respectively). He argues that ming is visible in the body and individual fate can be read or predicted through the body and bones. Members of the same family are animated by the same qi; they thus have common qualities, visible in bone structure and lines on the skin, that reveal fate and character (11.114-20, 骨相). Elsewhere, Wang uses the case of an adverse prediction from bad physiognomy to argue against Mencius' claim that original nature is good (13.133-35, 本性).

All these arguments use examples from the Classics and appeal to the social hierarchy and moral character. Wang Chong does not make an ethical attack on divination, but ethics

clearly figure in his defense of physiognomy.

It is also striking that he never mentions practical uses of physiognomy. By contrast, physiognomy appears repeatedly in both transmitted and excavated Han texts. The *Shiji* and *Hanshu* contain accounts of correct predictions by physiognomists such as Tang Ju 唐舉, a female physiognomist from Liang who predicted the rise of Li Si 李斯.<sup>19</sup> Manuscripts from Dunhuang provide important additional information, including five texts attributed to Xu Fu 許負 and other experts who appear in Han, *Hou Han* and *Sanguo* texts.<sup>20</sup>

Nor does Wang Chong avail of a well developed Warring States discourse on physiognomy that uses it for rhetorical purposes, with no interest in the actual techniques. In *Zhuangzi* 24, the recluse Xu Wugui 徐无鬼 uses the example of dog and horse physiognomy to instruct the Marquis Wu of Wei (24.819-25). The *Lüshi chunqiu* uses a specialist in sword physiognomy to argue the logic of the "hard and the white." The point is an argument about perspective: the nature of swords made of yellow and white metal is constant, but two observers judge them differently (1642-43, 別類 25.2). Another passage describes an expert in dog physiognomy who finds a "good" dog that could catch rats, but sought bigger game: deer and pigs. Only by tying its legs could it be made to catch rats (1689-90, 士容 26.1). A third *Lüshi chunqiu* passage describes the famous horse physiognomist Bo Le:

伯樂學相馬，所見無非馬者，誠乎馬也 (507, 精通 9.5).

This passage specifically compares Bo Le's art to the mastery of Cook Ding in *Zhuangzi* 3 who for three years he saw nothing but oxen. All these passages are concerned not with the practice of physiognomy, but in its use as a rhetorical illustration. One passage does elaborate on the actual techniques of horse physiognomists (1414, 觀表 20.8).

By contrast, titles of actual physiognomy texts appear in the Miscellaneous Divination (雜占) and Morphoscopy (刑法) sections of the *Hanshu Yiwenzhi*, including agricultural applications and titles on physiognomizing people (相人), blades (相寶劍刀) and domestic animals (相六畜).<sup>21</sup> These indicate the practical and technical uses of physiognomy, which could assess the economic worth of objects, animals and people. Excavated texts on physiognomy also

emphasize these practical contexts, for example, a dog physiognomy text from Yinqueshan (相狗方), a sword physiognomy text from Juyan 居延 and a horse physiognomy text from Mawangdui (相馬經).<sup>22</sup>

In summary, Wang Chong's critique of divination and defense of physiognomy are both highly rhetorical in tone. They show little engagement with actual practice, and may be grist for a very different argument about the importance and nature of sages.

## **.2.2 Cicero**

Cicero's *De Divinatione* is set up as a dialogue between a skeptic (Cicero or Marcus) and a Stoic (his brother Quintus). Cicero defines divination as prediction and knowledge of future events; at issue is the proposition that knowledge of the future is possible (1.1). The first book is a defense of the mantic arts in which Quintus presents the Stoic position that divination is communication from the gods, without whose existence, and interest, it is impossible. After an initial exposition, it largely consists of anecdotal examples that rely on example and appeal to experience, including accounts of the importance of divination in Roman myth and history. Book 2 is a skeptical refutation of the Stoic position. Here Cicero argues that there is no causal connection between signs (the flight of a bird or appearance of a liver) and communication from the gods (2.29). He gives empirical examples (2.45) and argues that Quintus' account lacks logical consistency and is obscure in many details. All this includes considerable ridicule of the examples Quintus presents.

Cicero uses the Greco-Roman past in several very different ways. First, Book 1 begins with a distinction between two kinds of divination: technical (*Ars*) and natural (*Natura*). Cicero describes this as the "consensus of antiquity" (*Div.* 1.6.12), but it may in fact have come from Plato. Plato distinguished between the true mantic art (*mantikê*), the beneficial madness (*mania*) of Sibyls and Pythias, and *tekhnê*: studying signs of future events by the flight of birds and other methods (*Phaedr.* 244a-e). For Plato their inspired divination is unlearned (*adidaktos*) and without skill (*atekhnos*), while technical divination is both learned (*entekhnos*) and skilled (*tekhnikos*).

Plato and Cicero both prefer inspired divination, but for different reasons. The distinction is part of Plato's broad epistemological agenda to contrast the self-conscious reflection of the

philosopher with the inferior, unreflective activity of the seer and bard. Socrates also plays on this distinction in his account of the oracle given to Chaerophon (that no man is wiser than Socrates) in the Apology (22c). He argues that inspired seers and bards work not by wisdom (*sophia*) but by nature (*phusis*). They are ignorant of what they create; they can describe sword and shield but cannot wield them. Plato needs to deny seers and bards self-consciousness reflection about their art in order to reserve this ability for philosophers.

But if Plato's agenda was philosophical, the argument in Book 1 is theological. The importance of natural divination is that it comes from the gods, and Book 1 represents it as the highest form of the mantic art. It comes "without reason or consciousness" (*sine ratione et scientia*) and occurs either when the soul was free of the body (as in dreams or to those approaching death) or when the soul's natural power of prediction became overdeveloped, manifesting as frenzy or inspiration, as in the case of Cassandra.<sup>23</sup> Cicero explicitly excluded from the category of natural divination both the use of reason and prediction by "natural law," for example, the predictions of physicians, pilots, or farmers (1.49.111-1.50.112). He gives the examples of predictions by Thales (an eclipse) and Anaximander (an earthquake). By contrast, technical divination (hepatoscopy, portents, lots, astrology and augury) required rationality (*ratio*) and intelligence (*intelligentia*) to interpret signs from the gods in natural phenomena (1.70). At the time of the completion of *De Divinatione* Cicero was an Augur 占兆官.

Plato and Cicero's classification took on a life of its own in evolutionist schemes in philosophy, history of science and history of religion. "Primitive" inspired or "intuitive" divination was contrasted with "inductive" technical divination, a "rational" mode of proto-science. Friedrich Schlegel, Erwin Rohde and Friedrich Nietzsche used it in antinomies between Greek reason and "barbarian" Asian mystery cults. It also informs the structure of Auguste Bouché-Leclercq's monumental history of divination in Greco-Roman antiquity. His influence in turn propagated it among later scholars. The distinction continues to reappear in histories of divination.

Cicero's second use of the past, Greco-Roman and otherwise, was as evidence for claims for the universality of divination, through the empirical argument that humans aspire to predict the future.

Now I am aware of no people, however refined and learned or however savage and ignorant, which does not think that signs are given of future events, and that certain persons can recognize those signs and foretell events before they occur (1.2)

He gives examples from the entire world as he knew it, beginning with Calchas, the mantis for the Greeks at Troy. Other examples come from Anatolia, Rome, Corinth, Gaul, Persia, the Peloponnese, Syria, Etruria, as well as Phrygia, Umbria and Arabia (1.88-91).

Two more points can be briefly mentioned. The defense of divination in Book 1 is a reformulation of the views the Stoic school, and is an important source for Stoic arguments whose original sources have been lost. (It is also a flawed source, since the arguments are presented in order to be refuted.) Finally, Cicero used the rhetorical platform of past debates on divination to adapt Greek philosophy to Roman tastes. *De Divinatione* takes up a subject of interest to a Roman audience in ways would appeal to a Roman reader with little knowledge of Greek philosophy.<sup>24</sup>

In conclusion, the Chinese and Greek divination debates have very different flavors, and these flavors resurface in their treatments by Wang Chong and Cicero. Both have been portrayed as secular rationalists who exploded and ridiculed the superstitions of their own times. Yet each drew heavily, in different ways, on a long history of debate about the mantic arts.

<sup>1</sup>The author would like to thank Mr. Sun Zhuo for his translation, and also to thank Dr. Chai Jie for supplementary translations and comments.

<sup>2</sup>Chen Songchang 陳松長 and Liao Mingchun 廖名春, "Boshu 'Ersanzi wen,' 'Yi zhi yi,' 'Yao' shiwen" 帛書二三子問易之義, 要釋文, *Daojia Wenhua yanjiu* 道家文化研究 3 (1993): 435.

<sup>3</sup>*Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi* 呂氏春秋校釋 (ed. Chen Qiyou 陳奇猷, Shanghai: Xuelin, 1984), 1505 (壹行 22.4).

<sup>4</sup>*Lunheng jiaoshi* 論衡校釋 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990) 13.135 (本性).

<sup>5</sup>Mozi 墨子 (*Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng*) 46.656-61.

<sup>6</sup>*Guanzi* 管子 (Sibu beiyao) 20a (侈靡 12.35). Its efficacy is explained through the powers of the turtle (3a, 水地 14.39).

<sup>7</sup>*Zhuangzi jishi* 莊子集釋 (ed. Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩, Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961) 23.785.

<sup>8</sup>*Huainanzi* 淮南子 (Sibu beiyao) 8.1b and 6.9bff; *Yantielun* 鹽鐵論 (*Zhuzi jicheng*) 29.32-35.

<sup>9</sup>*Xunzi yinde* 荀子引得 (Shanghai: Guji, 1986) 5/2.

<sup>10</sup>*Xunzi* 17/38-39. See *Hanfeizi jishi* 韓非子集釋 (ed. Chen Qiyou 陳奇猷, Beijing: Zhonghua, 1958), 1102-1103 (顯學 19.50).

<sup>11</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, Greek primary texts and translations are taken from the Loeb Classical Editions (Cambridge MA) and otherwise from standard editions. All fragments are from H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th ed., 1966). Abbreviations follow the Liddell-Scott *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1940).

<sup>12</sup>Plut., *Conv. sept. sap.* 3.2.

<sup>13</sup>Cic. *Div.* 1.5, cf. Fr.166 and Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 735a-b.

<sup>14</sup>T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith, "The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1.2 (April 1984): 125-31.

<sup>15</sup>*Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité* (rpt. New York: Arno Press, 1975, 4 vols.) 1.57.

<sup>16</sup>Arist. *Met.* 1027a20-b14. For details see R. Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory* (Duckworth, 1980).

<sup>17</sup>Diog. Laert. *Vit.* 7.149; Cic. *Fat.* 20.

<sup>18</sup>M. Puett, "Listening to Sages: Divination, Omens, and the Rhetoric of Antiquity in Wang Chong's *Lunheng*." *Oriens Extremus* 45 (2005-2006): 271-281.

<sup>19</sup>Tang Ju: *Shiji* (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959) 79.2418, cf. *Xunzi* 5/1/12. The *Shiji* also mentions two correct predictions by Xu Fu. *Shiji* 49.1970-71, cf. *Lunheng* 11.117-26.

<sup>20</sup>Three (P2572, P2797r and P3589v) are in the Bibliothèque Nationale, two (S5969 and C117v) in



the British Library. Most complete is P2572. See C. Despeux, "Physiognomie," in *Divination et Société dans la Chine Médiévale: Étude des Manuscrits de Dunhuang de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France et de la British Library* (ed. M. Kalinowski, Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 2003): 513-555.

<sup>21</sup>*Hanshu* (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962) 30.1772-73.

<sup>22</sup>See Li Ling 李零, *Zhongguo fangshu kao* 中國方術考 (Beijing: Renmin, 1993): 84-87; Wu Jiulong 吳九龍, ed., *Yinqueshan Hanjian shiwen* 銀雀山漢簡釋文 (Beijing: Wenwu, 1985): 243 and passim; *Juyan xin jian: Jiaqu Houguan yu di si sui* 居延新簡: 甲渠候官與第四燧 (Beijing: Wenwu, 1990): 98. The Mawangdui text is transcribed in *Wenwu* 1977.8: 17-22.

<sup>23</sup>Dreams: 1.20.39-1.28.59. Sleep: 1.29.60-1.30.63. Approach of death: 1.30.64. Inherent power of prediction: 1.30.65-1.31.66. Frenzy and inspiration: 1.19.38, 1.31.66. Disassociation from the body: 1.113-115. Cassandra: 1.31.66 and 1.40.89.

<sup>24</sup>See M. Beard, "Cicero and Divination: The Formation of a Latin Discourse" and M. Schofield, "Cicero For and Against Divination," *Journal of Roman Studies* 76 (1986): 33-46 and 47-65, respectively.

中國，希臘與羅馬的懷疑論與占卜

瑞麗 (Lisa Raphals)<sup>1</sup>

孫琢 譯

關於自我的本質，行為和命運的論辯對於中國和希臘的哲學傳統而言，都是處於核心地位的。在古代中國和希臘羅馬，占卜作為哲學辯論的對象對宿命論和決定論意義非凡，而它又往往處於這二者飽受質疑的背景之下。西塞羅（羅馬）和王充（中國）對占卜的論辯尤為著名。但他們的論辯卻都是在對占卜進行辯護與非難（質疑及其他方式）的情況下寫就的。本文第一部份將全面審視戰國時期和希臘關於占卜的辯論中的主要論題。第二部份則將對這些論辯在《論衡》與《論占卜》中的運用加以陳述。

過去二百年間的學術研究集中于占卜的社會學與認識論兩個重要方面，對古代和現今的占卜都是如此。這些研究強調占卜的合理性，卜筮思想的普遍影響，其複雜的社會歷史，占卜在其他解釋傳統發展中所扮演的角色及其在知識考古學中所處的位置。占卜在中國和希臘羅馬這兩種哲學傳統中的“缺省”地位正是人們對它的認同和實踐，其中也包括那些我們習慣稱之為哲學家的人。

## 1. 對占卜的辯論

### 1.1 戰國時期關於占卜的論辯

對於卜者與諸子之間的交流與積極競爭是有大量的中文證據的。識文斷字和一技之長使很多生計成爲了可能，授徒正是其中之一。而占卜則是其中的另一種，不管是在市集上卜卦為生還是充當朝臣都是這樣。因此，諸子與卜者的競爭涉及職業選擇，資助，生徒和知識形態的地位，而關於占卜的辯論則是這種知識環境的一部份。

孔子曾提出出色的建議——敬鬼神而遠之（《論語》6.22）。而在《論語》之外，可能存在有細微差別的觀點，對這些觀點的描述可見諸於出土簡牘中。在馬王堆文要中，孔子稱其所追求的德行是高於祝巫卜筮的，似乎也宣稱了修德要高於卜筮之技。但在此簡牘的其他地方，有人問及，“夫子亦信其筮乎？子曰吾百占而七十當。”<sup>2</sup> 同樣的，在《呂氏春秋》中，孔子演卦并與弟子進行討論。<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 作者感谢孫琢先生他的翻译，另外感谢柴婕博士她的补充的翻译并且评论。

<sup>2</sup> 陳松長，廖名春，《帛書二三子問易之義，要釋文》，道家文化研究 3 (1993): 435.

<sup>3</sup> 《呂氏春秋校釋》（陳奇猷編，上海：學林出版社，1984），1505（壹行 22.4）。

孟子使這種情形變得更加複雜，他認為美德是可以從人的身體上表現出來的。他在《孟子·公孫丑上》（2A2）中描述說，氣蘊於身并為志所宰御；它通過集義彙集成道德作用。在《孟子·盡心上》（7A21），他認為君子之“四端”（仁義禮智）是植根於心的，其生色焉，睟然見於面，盎於背，施於四體。

但是，如果美德可見於身體，那麼按照邏輯來說，它也是可以“解讀”的，而孟子實際上為這種相術之說進行了有效的辯護。

存乎人者，莫良於眸子。眸子不能掩其惡。胸中正，則眸子瞭焉；胸中不正，則眸子眊焉。聽其言也，觀其眸子，人焉廋哉？（4A15）

王充針對這一點對他進行了攻訐，他認為眼神的明亮或者眸子是在出生之時即被決定的，而並不取決於人的品性<sup>4</sup>

卜筮是孔子與墨家信徒的另一個分歧點，在辯論中夫子戰勝了巫。在《呂氏春秋》中，孔子與不懂察賢的巫馬旗討論政治改革（1441, 察賢 21.2）。墨子與巫馬子就當時改革家知識的價值，古代聖君以及鬼神進行了辯論。<sup>5</sup> 墨家亦將預測當作軍事防禦策略的有效組成部份。將領們被建議去僱使巫卜之士，但他們所得出的結果和方法則要對軍隊嚴格保密(68.894-5)。《管子》也推崇卜筮；管仲建議齊桓公對天意細加體察并觀察占卜的結果。<sup>6</sup> 該書認為卜者可以防止統治者陷入變數，迷惑和魯莽的影響（甚至載明他們應得多少酬勞）（4ab, 山權數 22.75; 20a, 侈靡 12.35）。這些事例的要點在於，儘管諸子有時選擇與卜者保持距離，但他們卻把占卜視為尋常之事而且是可以接受的。

關於占卜的辯論在中國和希臘都出現的相對較晚。在中國，它是伴隨著戰國晚期特有的儒家哲學的興起而產生的；而在希臘，這種辯論的出現則得力于公元三世紀斯多葛派哲學家們的努力，他們討論了亞里斯多德以及與之同時代而稍晚於他的人的觀點。但對占卜的正面陳述往往是普遍的，對其的批評則往往有著明確的目標，并意圖展示占卜是自我意識反應的結果。一些對占卜的批評顯然是中國的，另一些則是典型的希臘式批評；一些批評明顯相似，但原因和方式有所不同。

對占卜的認識論的批評認為占卜是一種劣等的，前後矛盾的，或者說是毫無效

<sup>4</sup> 《論衡校釋》，北京：中華書局，1990，13.135 (本性).

<sup>5</sup> 《墨子》（《新編諸子集成》）46.656-61.

<sup>6</sup> 《管子》（《四部備要》）20a (侈靡 12.35). 其徵驗由龜甲來解釋(3a, 水地 14.39).

果的知識形態。道德方面的攻訐著眼于卜者個人和占卜本身的道德問題。在中國和希臘，有組織的學派都曾提出一種超然于專門技藝之上的、普適萬物的知識。中國對占卜最重要的批駁來自于道家，他們宣稱只有“道”才能夠洞悉未來；卜筮是一種低級的方法，一種低級的知識模式。《莊子》和《管子》將聖人的恬淡與卜者的狂熱做法進行對照，並提倡冥思和“內修” 誠如《莊子》所說：

能無卜筮而知吉凶乎!<sup>7</sup>

《管子》告訴我們怎樣去做：

搏氣如神，萬物備存。能搏乎？能一乎？（5a，內業 16.49；6a，心術下 13.37）

《管子》中的另一篇對這樣一個聖人大加溢美之詞：

不日不月，而事以從。不卜不筮，而謹知吉凶（10a，白心 13.38）。

另一種不同的論辯出現在《淮南子》中，《淮南子》將占卜與欺詐和蒙蔽聯繫在一起。與之類似的，《鹽鐵論》將尋求吉日與古代先賢的道德傾向進行對照。<sup>8</sup>

儒家對卜筮的辯論是與倫理道德相關的。《左轉》的敘述強調基於道德品性上的預言要優於占卜的結果。儒士們將道德品性視為占卜的先決條件；他們將《周易》從一本卦書轉變為儒家經典，使它成為普天之下的道德導向而不是占卦指導。

荀子在道德基礎上對占卜進行非難，但對其作為隆重儀式一部份的重要性加以肯定。在“非相”中 他辯論道：相形不如論心。<sup>9</sup>

相貌的醜惡不會對正確的價值觀有所妨害，相貌的美好也不能替代錯誤的價值觀。（他以傳說中的聖賢和君王面相醜陋為例，其中甚至包括孔子在內）。人之所以為人是由於能對事物做出區別；而這並不取決於與生俱來的面相。（5/25）。

除了針對占卜的肯定態度以外，絕大多數中國哲人都圍繞命進行了辯論。他們在命的本質和應該如何對待命的問題上存在分歧，但他們都將命視為占卜的一部份。但是，關於命的辯論與關於占卜的辯論是分開的。大多數對占卜的描述並未對決定論和因果的問題加以討論。有一個例外則是《天論》，在《天論》中，荀子認為禱祝者和占卜並不能

<sup>7</sup> 《莊子集釋》（郭慶藩編，北京，中華書局，1961）23.785.

<sup>8</sup> 《淮南子》，《四部備要》8.1b and 6.9bff; 鹽鐵論 《諸子集成》29.32-35.

<sup>9</sup> 《荀子引得》（上海，古籍出版社，1986）5/2.

達到他們的目的，重大的決策也不應該以卜筮為基礎。雨水不因祈雨者而降下；禱祝者與占卜也不會帶來好的運勢。韓非也認為禱祝者並不能帶來好運，但他也沒有在因果問題上繼續深入。<sup>10</sup>

出土簡帛包含卦書和占卜器具，因而也提供了一些有關占卜活動和早期中國人對占卜、命運以及行為之看法的額外信息。與楚國相關聯的地區所出土的簡帛最為豐富，其他一些出土地主要是湖南、河南、河北、安徽、江蘇、山東和甘肅。

## 1.2 西塞羅之前希臘羅馬關於卜筮的論辯

古希臘人有關語言的論述中提出，有關未來的知識或多或少地暗示了這種知識的先存在。<sup>11</sup> 對占卜效驗的崇信與命運不可改變的信念之間的緊張關係首先體現在荷馬身上。詩人們的難題在於調和占卜（它試圖“改變”未來）與對宙斯意圖的信仰之間的關係。哲學家們則有一個與之對立的難題：即用調和傳統宗教與自然，起源等新理論的方式來將卜筮理論化。

蘇格拉底（前469-前399）之前的大多數哲學家們要麼對卜筮的某種信服予以肯定，要麼持與之相容的信仰，這其中也包括泰勒斯（Thales）<sup>12</sup> 阿納克西曼德（Anaximander），阿納克西米尼（Anaximenes），以及阿納克薩哥拉（Anaxagoras），他們可以將對理性的信仰轉變為對天命的信服。德謨克利特（Democritus）將其關於預言的觀點建立在原子在空間中機械運動的基礎上。而他甚至相信預知未來之事的可能性是存在的，因為他認為宇宙是由神的意願按照天意安排的。

<sup>13</sup>

蘇格拉底之前的兩位主要的占卜批評者是賽諾芬尼（Xenophanes）和赫拉克利特（Heraclitus）。賽諾芬尼對占卜全盤否定並對荷馬所述神祇的不道德（frs. 11 and 12）和希臘宗教中對神的人格化加以攻訐（ff. 14-16）。賽諾芬尼所假設的神明既沒有任何

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<sup>10</sup> 荀子7/38-39. 參見《韓非子集釋》（陳奇猷編，北京：中華書局，1958），1102-1103（顯學19.50）。

<sup>11</sup> 如無注明，希臘的主要文獻和譯本都來自洛布古典叢書版（Loeb Classical Editions）（劍橋 MA）和標準版本。所有的殘篇都出自 H. Diels and W. Kranz 編纂的《蘇格拉底前哲學殘篇》（*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*）（第六版，1966）。縮略語依照 the Liddell-Scott *Greek-English Lexicon*（牛津，1940）。

<sup>12</sup> Plut., *Conv. sept. sap.* 3.2.

<sup>13</sup> Cic. *Div.* 1.5, cf. Fr.166 and Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 735a-b.

賦予人類占卜知識的動機，而人類也無法理解這種知識。赫拉克利特批駁他所處時代的宗教習俗，藉以提出“萬物皆流”和對立統一的新觀點。他拒絕接受專門性的占卜，釋夢以及殺戮之後的滌罪儀式，但他接受女先知和皮提亞的占卜(fr. 92)，並力陳德爾菲神諭向人類提供了事情的徵兆，“既沒有透露亦沒有隱藏，但卻有所象徵”：*oute legei oute kruptei alla sêmainei* (fr. 93, Plut. *Pyth. orac.* 404d8).

其他的一些蘇格拉底以前的哲學家們也許曾經是卜者。第歐根尼（Diogenes）(8.32)記述說，畢達哥拉斯（Pythagoras）引導他的門生們“尊敬每一種占卜術”；而他被稱為“Pyth-agoras”，因為他在集會中所作的公眾聲明的真實性勝過了皮提亞（德爾菲的阿波羅祭司 (8.21).<sup>14</sup> 恩培多克勒（Empedocles）的淨化論以一種在任何地方都極為需要的說詞開始“一些人尋求預言之術，另一些人則尋找能治愈百病的治療神諭。(fr. 112, Clem. *Strom.* 6.30).

就目前的探討而言，最為有趣的希臘哲學家或許就是那位疑為多種希臘哲學締造者的理想主義的蘇格拉底。蘇格拉底相信占卜嗎？這並不是一個無關緊要的問題，因為這個問題在那個使其走向死亡的審判中變成了一個事關重大的要素。蘇格拉底的哲學活動的道德狀況是審判的核心點，而他稱這些工作是建立在占卜基礎上的說法是其辯護的中心。他將凱勒豐（Chairephon）所得到的神諭（即沒有人比蘇格拉底更睿智）描述為其哲學使命的源泉，並多次確認了他崇信“守護神”以警示自己遠離錯誤。（*Apol.* 20e, 22c, 31d, 40a-b).

對於這種視占卜為真理之源的明顯信任以及蘇格拉底的道德和哲學信念源自宗教的守護神暗示，註釋者向來加以漠視。但是正如Brickhouse和Smith所認為的那樣，“”為蘇格拉底提供了一種確定性，即他必須通過實踐哲學來事奉雅典的神靈，而其哲學實踐並不是為了任何其他事情，包括美德本身在內。而這將蘇格拉底置於這樣一種位置，他確定其哲學活動是合乎道德的，但卻無法以理性來解釋這些活動所具有的美德。<sup>15</sup> 因而在對占卜術的推介中，他並非要提倡懶惰和捷徑，因為他並不認為這種

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<sup>14</sup>Pythagoras 由 Pyth-和-agoras 兩部分組成，Pythia 是德爾菲的阿波羅神廟的女祭司，而 agoras 在古希臘語中是指集會、集市。

<sup>15</sup>T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith, "The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology," 柏拉圖《申辯篇》中蘇格拉底問答法 *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 1.2 (April 1984): 125-31.

神的知識可以替代人類知識。

誠如蘇格拉底的兩個門生柏拉圖和賽諾芬尼所證明的那樣，他確實建議進行占卜。除了他自己所做的辯護以外，他力勸其友人在結果確定的情況下信任自己，而在結果不定的情況下去詢問阿波羅神諭，例如他建議賽諾芬尼在是否要加入塞勒斯

(Cyrus) 遠征軍的問題上去請求阿波羅的神諭。賽諾芬尼前往德爾菲，但卻提出了錯誤的問題：不是問是否要前去，而是問向何位神明獻祭以求遠征的勝利。蘇格拉底對賽諾芬尼予以斥責，但建議他遵循神諭并前往遠征。(Xen. *Anab.* 3.1).

蘇格拉底將卜筮引入了哲學範疇，而柏拉圖(428-347)及其後繼者將這一步繼續推進。柏拉圖叮囑市民在宗教和道德問題上去詢問神諭 (*Rep* 427b; *Laws* 738b-d)。他亦將占卜與神靈的仁愛之行聯繫起來，將占卜技藝描述為四種神聖的瘋狂之首(*Phaed.* 244a-e)。它是由阿波羅所支配的女祭司的瘋狂，他在瘋狂時給予他人好處而正常時則不予一物(244b)。正如人類的正常心智是遜於有滌罪和神啟作用的神聖瘋狂一樣，觀察禽鳥(*ornithon*)與徵兆 (*semeion*)與占卜相較同樣是處於劣勢的 (244c-e)。類似的點出現在《帝論邁歐篇》(*Timaeus*)中 (71b-e)。

希臘人對占卜持肯定態度的共識往往與對占卜者個人的人身攻擊同時共存。但是，不論是對於提倡占卜的斯多葛派，還是對於伊壁鳩魯派和懷疑的批評者來說，由於占卜在關於命運、因果關係、必要性、決定論和道德內涵的新爭論中的關鍵性作用，其本身在希臘化時期的希臘已變成熱門辯論對象。如同在中國一樣，這種辯論出於不同原因，既有認識論分支又具有道德的分支。

在希臘化時期的辯論中，不管是申明還是否認，懷疑論都是其中最重要的認識論因素。另一種批評則純粹是經驗論的：占卜有用嗎？經驗論的辯論在希臘辯論中出現的並不均衡，而值得注意的是，關於神諭可靠性的驗證的記載都來源於外國人；希臘人似乎認為這樣的驗證既無必要又褻瀆神明。最著名的是克羅伊斯(Croesus)對神諭的“驗證”，這是由希羅多德(Herodotus)所記述的(1.46-55)。其他兩個據說曾對神諭正確性加以評論的人也都不是希臘人：阿美西斯(Amasis) (Hdt. 2.174)，薛西斯(Xerxes)以及馬鐸尼烏斯(Mardonius) (Hdt. 8.133-36)。

從柏拉圖到亞里斯多德(Aristotle)之間有一個突然而激烈的過渡。亞里斯多德

拒絕歸納法的占卜而信賴夢和生理學解釋。誠如 Auguste Bouché-Leclercq 所述，柏拉圖嘗試將科學吸收到神啟之中；亞里斯多德則試圖將神啟吸收到科學中<sup>16</sup> 克呂希波（Chrysippus）以及斯多葛派的占卜辯護者宣稱了經驗上的有效性，但否認占卜的“徵兆”與其象徵物之間的任何因果聯繫。因果律的解釋可以使占卜像其他任何事物一樣成為科學，但是它將像神聖知識與行為的解釋一樣失去其形而上學的特權地位。

亞里斯多德首先提出了這樣一種可能性，既定的命運將道德選擇摒除在外，而占卜的道德性辯論是被希臘化時期關於命運，因果關係，必要性，決定論及其道德暗示的辯論所引發的。調和決定論與道德責任成為斯多葛派嘗試駁斥來自于懷疑論者和伊壁鳩魯主義者攻擊的主要問題。這些辯論也是困擾許多希臘化時期的哲學家參與的關於形態和模態邏輯的廣博辯論的一部份。人類對神明預言之事負有責任這一道德上的難題首先出現在荷馬的著作中，但早期的著作並未強調這些困難。例如，德謨克利特的機械原子論對現代讀者提出了人類責任問題，但這個問題顯然不是針對德謨克利特提出的。柏拉圖在《理想國》<sup>10</sup>中觸及了命運與人類選擇的關係，但這並非其中心問題。正是亞里斯多德將選擇置於人類責任的中心地位。決定論威脅了人類選擇和人類自由，而亞里斯多德是首個提出決定論排斥道德與行為，而道德與行為正是其幸福生活概念的核心。

亞里斯多德無非是將原因當作一種解釋來對待，而且並未將原因與必然性的概念聯繫起來。他並非將事件看做一條因果鏈條而是將其當作將石子投入池塘而泛起的漣漪。因而他否認所有的事情都是由必要的因果鏈條所決定的。他堅信一些事情是由偶然性引發的而不是必然性，但他對偶然性與巧合的處理並未排除決定論。他的主要興趣在於解釋的問題（存在著不具備科學解釋的偶然事件的可能性）而並未訴諸于非決定論。

<sup>17</sup> 希臘化時期關於決定論與自由的辯論開始于針對亞里斯多德對因果關係，決定論和責任並不完整的解析所做出的反應。未來是否可知的問題與宇宙是否是決定論的，問題在邏輯上是不同的，但在古代關於命運與預言的辯論中卻被認為是有關聯的，或許這是因為獨立個體的命運常常是預言的對象。

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<sup>16</sup>*Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité*（古代占卜史）（rpt. New York: Arno Press, 1975, 4 vols.）1.57.

<sup>17</sup>Arist. *Met.* 1027a20-b14. For details see R. Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory*（需要，原因與責難：對亞里斯多德理論的看法）（Duckworth, 1980）.



但有一種廣泛的共識，如果未來事件是可以預知的，它在某種意義上是被引起的。斯多葛派將預言置於占卜的範疇之下，並以占卜來提出命運理論。他們對預言和占卜的描述是一個綜合的系統化理論的一部分，這種理論包含道德，神學和形而上學。這些辯論以斯多葛學派的第三代領袖克呂希普（Chrysippus）為開端，他試圖用“邏輯”去“證明”“一切事物皆遵循命運”（*heimarmenê*）。<sup>18</sup>他設計了一種“演繹推理法”去證明神是存在的並且揭示了未來：

如果神靈是存在的而且他們並未將未來告知凡人，那麼他們要麼是不愛人類，要麼並不知悉未來亦或是他們覺得關於未來的知識並不會給人類帶來好處，或是他們認為將未來是什麼樣子預示給人類有礙他們的權威，又或者者他們對此無法決定（*Cic. Div. 2.101*）。

克呂希普試圖對可能性和必要性進行新的闡述，這種新的闡述是與道德責任和斯多葛學派的“命運原則”相契合的。他將其模態理論描述為一個“證明”，但也為占卜做出了或者說暗示了經驗主義的主張。

波希多尼（Posidonius）試圖通過宇宙“同情”和神聖的天意來將占卜理論化，並宣稱自然給出了未來的跡象，隨著時間的流逝，這種跡象就會以鋼索延展開來的形式展現出來。伊壁鳩魯主義的批評家們認為是事情是由偶然控制的，而不是命運，但懷疑論者拒絕承認上天意志的任何作用。普魯塔克（Plutarch）為神啟的占卜和德爾菲神諭的英名加以辯護，但他卻對克呂希波展開攻擊，因為克呂希波的可能性理論與命運理論是自相矛盾的。在普魯塔克自己關於道德行為的理論中，命運與偶然是糾纏在一起的。在這種以及其他中期柏拉圖主義的觀點中，道德選擇並不是命中註定的，但命運卻會影響道德選擇的結果。這些爭論，諸如斯多葛學派世事與命運相關聯的觀點，世事與命運相對立的觀點，試圖通過增加命運概念的複雜性以弱化決定論的色彩，從而解決這種進退兩難的道德困境。這些使人想起王充的一些反宿命論者的觀點，他也對命運進行了新的歸類，並以新的視角強調了偶然性在人類事件的作用。

### 1.3 早期辯論的比較

中國和希臘的占卜辯論的關鍵要素都是認識論的。占卜在中國和古希臘都作為一種劣等的知識形態而被剔除。早期的道家利用它來捍衛悟道的優越性和重要性；柏拉圖則利用它為希臘哲學的優越性進行辯論。希臘的占卜批評者是自覺的懷疑論者，然而

<sup>18</sup>Diog. Laert. *Vit.* 7.149; Cic. *Fat.* 20.

懷疑論在中國關於卜筮的辯論中並非中心辯題。

道德在中國和希臘辯論中都是一個重要方面，但從文化上說則各有其獨特的方式。一些中國的批評將卜筮與貪婪和不可靠聯繫在一起；另一些則以其劣於建立在道德基礎之上的預言而拒絕接受它。希臘的道德論戰集中于作為決定論衍生物的占卜和一種易於察覺的衝突，而這種衝突存在于道德選擇的核心價值與對必要性和因果關係某種敘述中體現的決定論二者之間。隨之而來的不厭其詳的邏輯辯論則是希臘特有的，而且與希臘辯論的其他特徵密不可分，包括強調證明以及準法律形式證明法的運用。

儘管有這些區別，相似之處還是存在的。這兩種傳統大體上都主張可信的占卜源自于卜者的睿智，聰慧，洞察力，或者更廣泛而言的“美德”，而這樣的卜者是將宗教和哲學的價值與視角結合起來。中國與希臘兩種傳統都將占卜理解為對宇宙文本的“正確”解讀。最終二者也都將占卜理解為解釋學，這樣一來，占卜基本上無異於任何一種文本闡釋。

## 2 對過去論辯的利用：漢朝與羅馬

鑒於漢代以前的中國和前蘇格拉底時代至希臘化時期的占卜論戰的鮮活歷史，王充和西塞羅作為中國漢代和羅馬占卜術的主要評釋者，這些論戰在他們的著作中是如何體現的呢？

### 2.1 王充

王充常被描繪為一個懷疑論者，而他對卜筮的攻訐（相術是一個有趣的例外）是其中的一個重要方面。許多他現存的論辯都是極為雄辯的而且在很大程度上帶有對敵對方的嘲諷。最近的辯論討論了他是否如之前所認為的那樣，是一個理性的懷疑論者。他對占卜做出了兩種主要批判。而這二者與戰國時代的辯論相較又如何呢？

第一個是相信吉凶之日和風鑿會忽視因果關係：世事並不因上天和星辰移動而發生。與之類似的，王充認為凶災之日並不會引起疾病，不幸，死亡或是殫家滅門。(72, 辨崇). 他反對崇信抵觸，禁忌以及妄圖將人的活動與星辰移動相聯繫。(73, 難歲). 最後，王充對風鑿和天動的可能性加以批駁。他認為雨的跡象出現並不是回應祈雨之人，而是上天的正常操控。像鳳凰麒麟現身這樣的徵兆是為王者而現亦或是有感於聖人之德，對此他同樣加以駁斥。(51.749, 指瑞). 與之類似的，風從吹過皇家宮苑而來不會引起價格上漲，風從囚死之地而來也不會帶來其價格下跌，而風動與軍隊的勝利也毫無因果

聯繫。(43, 變動)。總的來講，卜者不能問天地，因為天與人同道 (71.999, 卜筮)。

這些論辯的智慧內核出現于荀子《天論》中關於宇宙規律的論點。荀子與王充對自然規律的辯論是出於不同的原因。荀子的論述更為廣博而且知識定位有所不同，而王充在其陳述中並沒有引入荀子的論述。

第二個批駁並不是針對卜者個人，而是針對其所處時代的整個卜筮系統。他以一個不確的占夢為例進行辯論，即使夢境可以提供準確無誤的徵兆，人類的局限性也會阻滯正確解釋的產生：

夫占夢與占龜同。晉占夢者不見象指，猶周占龜者不見兆者為也。象不然，兆無不審，人之知闇，論之失實也 (71.1006-1007)。

他認為存在卜筮兆數，但其含義卻並不固定：

夫著筮龜卜，猶聖王治世；卜筮兆數，猶王治瑞應。瑞應無常，兆數詭異。詭異則占者惑，無常則議者疑。疑則謂平未治，惑則謂吉不良。(71.1005)。

他將著筮龜卜比作聖王的統治，兆數就如同聖王統治的瑞應，但由於瑞應是無常的，兆數是詭異的，因而吉凶之兆就會被混淆。因而王充認為徵兆是存在的，但它們的意義是不固定的：

且夫太平之瑞，猶聖王之相也。聖王骨法未必同，太平之瑞何為當等？(57.816, 宣漢)。

他將太平之瑞與聖王各種各樣的面相作比較：二者對一致性的語氣都受到了誤導。

夫卜筮非不可用，卜筮之人，占之誤也 (71.1006)。

因此，問題並不在於卜筮本來就是謬誤的，而是卜者的預言有誤，他們之所以如此是因為他們並非聖賢。Michael Puett 近來提出王充的主要目的並不是對其他所處時代之觀點的批判。他的目標不是如何正確地占卦，而是去聆聽那些深諳正道的聖賢，他們不是通過預言，而是通過內省体道。<sup>19</sup> 這幾乎正是對《莊子》和《管子》的認識論的批駁，《莊子》和《管子》傾向於聖人確知萬物（如同他們所定義的那樣）而對次等的占

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<sup>19</sup>M. Puett, “Listening to Sages: Divination, Omens, and the Rhetoric of Antiquity in Wang Chong’s *Lunheng*.” (聆聽聖賢：卜筮，徵兆和王充的《論衡》中的古代辯論)， *Oriens Extremus* 45 (2005-2006): 271-281.

卜之術不加青眼。

王充對占卜的批判有一個重要的例外，即相術。在他看來，相術是有其物質原因的，因為身體和命都是與生俱來的（分別秉承自父母和上蒼）。他認為命是可以從身體上顯現出來的，個人的命也可以從身體筋骨上瞭解和預知。一家之人同氣而生，因而體質相似，這是可見于骨骼結構與肌膚紋理的，而這又透露了命數和性格(11.114-20, 骨相)。在其他篇章中，王充以對醜惡面相的負面預言為例去反駁孟子的人性本善論。(13.133-35, 本性)。

所有這些論辯都運用了出自于經典的事例，訴諸于社會等級和道德品質。王充並未對卜筮進行道德攻擊，但道德規範在其對相面之術的辯護中清晰的顯現出來。

他從未提及相術的實際應用，這一點也是非常引人注意的。與之大相徑庭的是，相術在流傳下來的和挖掘出土的漢簡中反復出現。《史記》和《漢書》中對相士的正確預言有所記載，例如唐舉，一個來自梁國的女性相士預言了李斯的發迹。<sup>20</sup> 敦煌文書提供了其他重要的信息，包括被認為是許負所撰的以及出現在漢代，後漢和三國文獻中的其他相術行家的五篇文章。<sup>21</sup>

王充沒有利用戰國時期關於相術的用於修辭目的，而並不關注實際技巧的記載。在《莊子》第24章中，隱士徐无鬼以相犬和相馬為例來教導魏文侯(24.819-25)。《呂氏春秋》以一個相劍者為例進行“堅白”邏輯問題的辯論。其關鍵點是一個關於視角的/論點由白黃二色金屬所鑄的劍質地相同，但兩個看客對堅白的判斷迥異。(1642-43, 別類 25.2)。另一篇描述了一個相狗者，他找到了一條能捉老鼠的“良”狗，而這條狗志在獐麋豕鹿，只有桎其後足才能迫使它捉老鼠(1689-90, 士容 26.1)。第三個《呂氏春秋》的篇章講述了聞名遐邇的相馬者伯樂：

伯樂學相馬，所見無非馬者，誠乎馬也 (507, 精通 9.5).

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<sup>20</sup>唐舉：《史記》(北京：中華書局，1959) 79.2418, cf. 《荀子》5/1/12. 《史記》還提到其他兩個由徐負做出的正確預言。《史記》49.1970-71, cf. 《論衡》11.117-26.

<sup>21</sup>Three (P2572, P2797r and P3589v) are in the Bibliothèque Nationale, two (S5969 and C117v) in the British Library. Most complete is P2572. See C. Despeux, "Physiognomie," in *Divination et Société dans la Chine Médiévale: Étude des Manuscrits de Dunhuang de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France et de la British Library* (中国中世时期的占卜与社会——法国国家图书馆与大英图书馆所藏敦煌写本研究), (ed. M. Kalinowski, Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 2003): 513-555.

此段特別將伯樂的技藝同《莊子》第三章中庖丁的技藝相比，庖丁其人，三年而目無全牛。所有這些篇章都無心于相術的實踐而是取其用作辯論中的例證。有一篇確實詳細描述了相馬者的實際技巧。(1414, 觀表 20.8).

相反的，實際相術的篇目出現在《漢書·藝文志》中的雜占和刑法部份，包括農業應用和關於相人，相寶劍刀，相六畜的篇目。<sup>22</sup> 這些意味著相術的實際應用和技術應用可以評價物件，動物和人的經濟價值。關於相術的出土簡牘同樣強調了這些實際背景，例如銀雀山出土的相狗方，居延出土的相劍刀冊以及馬王堆出土的相劍經。<sup>23</sup>

總之，王充對占卜的批評和對相術的辯護在語氣上都極盡雄辯。這些辯論都極少涉及實際應用，這或許對一種截然不同的，針對聖賢的特點與重要性的論點大有裨益。

## 2.2 西塞羅

西塞羅的《論占卜》是以一個懷疑論者（西塞羅或者是馬可·奧勒留）與一個斯多葛派哲學家（其兄昆圖斯（Quintus））之間的對話的形式建立的。西塞羅將占卜定義為預言和未來事件的知識(1.1)。他們所爭論的是這樣一個命題：關於未來的知識是否可能。第一冊是對占卜術的辯護，在這一冊中昆圖斯提出了斯多葛學派的立場，即占卜是與神靈的溝通，如果沒有神的存在，沒有樂趣，占卜是不可能的。在開頭的闡述之後，其論述主要由趣聞佚事性的事例組成，這些論辯依賴於例子，訴諸于經驗，其中還包括對羅馬神話和歷史中對占卜重要性的記敘。第二冊是對斯多葛學派所持立場的懷疑論反駁。在這裡，西塞羅認為徵兆（禽鳥的飛翔或者是某個人的出現）與人神的溝通沒有因果聯繫。(2.29)。他舉出經驗的實例 (2.45) 並且認為昆圖斯的敘述缺乏邏輯一致性而且在許多細節上含糊不清。所有這些包含了對昆圖斯所提出的事例的極大嘲諷。

西塞羅以多種方式對過去的希臘羅馬[歷史加以利用。首先，第一冊以技術(Ars)的和自然(Natura)的這兩種不同占卜術之間的區別為開端。西塞羅將之形容為“古代的共識”(Div. 1.6.12)，但其實際上可能來源於柏拉圖。柏拉圖對幾種占卜加以區別：真正的占卜術(mantikê)、有所裨益的女預言家和皮西厄斯(Pythias)的瘋狂(mania)以及技術性的占卜(tekhnê)，即通過禽鳥的飛翔和其他方法來研究未來事件的徵兆。

<sup>22</sup> 《漢書》(北京：中華書局，1962) 30.1772-73.

<sup>23</sup> 參見李零，《中國方術考》(北京：人民出版社，1993): 84-87; 吳九龍編，銀雀山漢簡釋文(北京：文物出版社，1985): 243 and passim; 居延新簡：甲渠候官與第四燧(北京：文物出版社，1990): 98. 馬王堆漢簡由文物出版社騰錄1977.8: 17-22.

(*Phaedr.* 244a-e). 對柏拉圖而言，他們神啟的占卜是無師自通 (*adidaktos*) 而且無須技巧 (*atekhnos*)，而技術性的占卜既需要學習 (*entekhnos*) 又需要技能 (*tekhnikos*)。

柏拉圖和西塞羅都青睞神啟的占卜，但他們的原因各有不同。這個差別是柏拉圖宏大認識論議題的一部份，將哲學家的自覺反省與預言家和詩人的次一等的，缺乏思索的活動進行了對比。在《申辯篇》 (*Apology*) 中，蘇格拉底也在對給凱爾封的神諭（沒有人比蘇格拉底智慧）的敘述中利用了這點區別 (22c)。他認為受神啟示的預言家與詩人並不是靠智慧 (*sophia*) 工作而是依靠本性 (*phusis*)。他們並不知道自己創造了什麼；他們可以描摹劍與盾卻不知如何使用。柏拉圖需要剝奪預言家與詩人的對其自身技藝的自覺反省，從而為哲學家們保留這種能力。

但如果說柏拉圖的議題是哲學的，而第一冊中的辯論是神學的。自然占卜的重要性在於它來自于神明，而且書的第一冊以之表示占卜術的最高形式。自然占卜“並不帶有理性和意識” (*sine ratione et scientia*)，它出現在當心靈不受身體羈絆之時（就如同在夢中或者是像瀕臨死亡之人那樣）要麼是當心靈所具備的語言的自然力過度發達，像卡珊德拉 (*Cassandra*) 的事例那樣表現出瘋狂或靈感。<sup>24</sup> 對理性的利用，通過“自然法則”進行的預言，諸如醫師、領航員或者是農夫的預言，都被西塞羅摒除在自然占卜的範疇之外。(1.49.111-1.50.112). 他列舉了泰勒斯的預言(日食)和阿納克西曼德的預言(地震)作為實例。反之，技術性占卜(祭牲剖肝占卜術 (*hepatoscopy*)、預兆、抽籤法、佔星術)需要理性(*ratio*) 和智慧 (*intelligentia*) 去解釋來自于神和自然現象的徵兆。(1.70). 西塞羅完成《論占卜》之時，他是一名占兆官。

柏拉圖和西塞羅的分類使其自身融入了哲學，科學史以及宗教史中的進化主義系統。“歸納性的”技術占卜是一種“理性的”元科學形態，它與“原始的”神啟或“直覺的”占卜形成了對照。弗里德里希施萊格爾 (*Friedrich Schlegel*)，埃爾文·羅德 (*Erwin Rohde*) 和尼采 (*Friedrich Nietzsche*) 將其用於希臘理性與“野蠻的”亞洲神秘祭儀之間的二律背反。它同樣將 *Auguste Bouché-Leclercq* 的具有紀念意義的古希臘羅馬占卜史的結構予以展露，而 *Bouché-Leclercq* 的影響反過來使之在後來的學者中得

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<sup>24</sup>Dreams: 1.20.39-1.28.59. Sleep: 1.29.60-1.30.63. Approach of death: 1.30.64. Inherent power of prediction: 1.30.65-1.31.66. Frenzy and inspiration: 1.19.38, 1.31.66. Disassociation from the body: 1.113-115. Cassandra: 1.31.66 and 1.40.89.

到傳播。這種區別在占卜的歷史中也持續地反復出現。

西塞羅對古希臘羅馬和其他的以往歷史的第二個利用，是將其作為提出占卜之普遍性的證據，這種提法是通過經驗主義的論證得到的——即人類希望預知未來。

現在我意識到沒有一個人，不管是溫文爾雅，學識淵博或者是粗蠻無知，不認為徵兆可以預示未來，而且某些人可以辨識出那些徵兆並在事情發生以前預言它們。(1.2)

他以其所知從整個世界中舉出實例，他從在特洛伊的希臘預言者卡爾卡斯（Calchas）開始，其他的實例出自安那托利亞，羅馬，柯林斯灣，高盧，波斯，伯羅奔尼撒，敘利亞，伊特魯里亞，以及佛里幾亞，翁布裡亞和阿拉伯 (1.88-91)。

還有兩點要簡要提及。第一冊中對占卜的辯護是對斯多葛學派觀點的重新闡述，對於那些原始資料缺失的斯多葛學派的觀點，這是一個非常重要的資料來源。（它同時也是一個有缺陷的資料來源，因為這些論辯是用與反駁的）最後，西塞羅以在他之前關於占卜的辯論為平臺，使希臘哲學適應羅馬的口味。《占卜論》通過可以吸引一個對希臘哲學所知甚少的羅馬讀者的方式，對羅馬讀者呈現了一個有趣的題目。<sup>25</sup>

總之，中國和希臘的占卜論辯大相異趣。而這些不同的特色在王充和西塞羅的作品中又重新顯現出來。王充和西塞羅都曾被塑造為世俗化的理性主義者，他們對其所處時代的迷信予以揭露和嘲弄。然而他們每個人都在以不同的方式，大量洗后和運用了悠久的有關占卜藝術辯論的歷史記載。

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<sup>25</sup>See M. Beard, "Cicero and Divination: The Formation of a Latin Discourse" (西塞羅與占卜：一篇拉丁論文的構成) and M. Schofield, "Cicero For and Against Divination," (西塞羅之於占卜，贊成與反對) *Journal of Roman Studies* (羅馬研究) 76 (1986): 33-46 and 47-65, respectively.