

# 13 Reflections on filiality, nature, and nurture

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In this chapter I reflect on filiality (*xiao* 孝) from two distinct directions. One applies what in Greek would be called a *Nomos-Physis* perspective to filiality, namely to offer a gendered perspective on the differences between filiality for men and women. The other is to consider *xiao* as an emotion, rather than as a virtue. (This is a matter of emphasis; I am not suggesting that filiality is *not* a virtue!) I concentrate on the strict sense of the term, filial duty to parents, rather than husbands or other relatives. If we adopt a gendered perspective on filiality, there is a radical difference between filiality as it is defined for men and for women. Men's filiality is "genetically" defined by lineage throughout life, but women's filiality is expected to shift to the new environment of her husband's ancestral lineage at marriage. My second nature-nurture continuum concerns whether we are to regard filiality as an emotion, which is arguably "natural," at least in much traditional theory of the emotions, or as a virtue, which is a product of culture and upbringing.

## Differences between male and female filiality

I begin by arguing that classical texts tend to treat filiality as an emotion that is part of the "natural" human endowment. (Needless to say, they also recognized that there were unfilial sons, and that virtues required cultivation.) This expectation of filiality is tenable for males, but problems arise when it is applied to females, because there is no biological bond to the husband's parents.

In other words, filiality is described as "natural" to males, in that men's filiality is genetically defined throughout life. Women's filiality is entirely a product of nurture, since there is no "natural" justification for the expectation that they will shift the emotion of filial love from its "natural" object, their (natal) parents, to a husband's ancestral lineage at marriage.

Because the tradition does not make a linguistic distinction between male and female filiality, this difference creates tensions in the textual tradition, expressed by the relative absence of early narratives about filial women. I also show how some Ming accounts of filial women were constructed from

earlier narratives. The problem of gendered filiality provides a new perspective on the problem of whether the potential for self-cultivation is gendered, a question I have explored elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

### **A virtue or an emotion? Biological versus cultural theories of emotion**

Theories of the emotions provide a perspective to examine the basis for filiality as an emotion and for claims that it is "natural." Research on the cross-cultural study of emotion has challenged earlier biological and psychological theories of emotion as instinctive and primarily biologically determined.<sup>2</sup> Such theories associated the emotions with instinct and uncritically viewed them as biologically determined universals. Psychologists tended to adopt an essentialist view of emotion as some entity, something "there" to which the word "emotion" refers. While there is evidence that there are some universal emotions, the problem is complicated by a tendency within cross-cultural studies of emotion for Western ideas about emotion and Anglophone emotion concepts to be taken as conceptual universals.<sup>3</sup>

Recent approaches to the category of emotion within the social sciences, especially anthropology and sociology, have stressed the social construction of emotion, and have drawn attention to the nuanced and culturally specific character of some emotions. In these views emotion is culturally determined. Some are delimited in both time and space. Some emotions have limited lifetimes. Consider, for example, *accidie*, a kind of boredom and dejection at fulfilling one's religious duty, experienced by hermits and others. This has been described as an example of an emotion that became obsolete when the conditions that produced it ceased to be widespread.<sup>4</sup>

Since the seventeenth century, most philosophers have tended to construe emotion as simple, involuntary, affective and non-cognitive. Spinoza is an exception, as is Aristotle in the Classical world. Aristotle's discussion of emotions (*ta pathē*) is highly nuanced; for him, they are (affective) impulses that cause people to change their judgments, and are accompanied by pain (*lupē*) and pleasure (*hedonē*); they include anger (*orgē*), pity (*heleos*), and fear (*phobos*), their opposites, and emotions like them.<sup>5</sup> Aristotle's subvarieties of emotions are very subtle. Consider the correlates of anger: slight (*oligōria*), contempt (*kataphronēsis*), and insult (*hubris*). Its opposite is mildness (*praūnsis*). Other emotions discussed include love and friendship (*philia*), hatred (*ekhthros*), fear (*phobos*) and its opposite, boldness or confidence (*tharsos*), shame (*aiskhunē*) and its opposite, benevolence (*kharis*) and its opposite, virtuous indignation (the opposite of pity) and envy. Filiality would fit well into this list, as a variety of love. It is in this broad context of the relation of local moral orders and languages to the experience of emotion that I want to consider *xiao* as a specifically Chinese emotion that is gendered in very different ways for men and for women.

### A note on the controversy about *qing* 情

For purposes of my argument it is not necessary to resolve the controversy surrounding Graham's assertion that *qing* never means "passions" (even in *Xunzi*), but means "the facts" or "genuine," and responses to it by Chad Hansen, Irene Bloom, and others.<sup>6</sup> Whether we understand the phrase *qing yu* as "emotions and desires" or, following Graham, as "essential desires," it seems clear from both text and context that joy, anger, sadness, and the rest do refer to the "basic" emotions of love, hate, pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. References to these six states appear in a range of Warring States texts, including the *Zuo zhuan*, *Guo yu*, *Liji*, *Guanzi*, *Zhuangzi*, *Xunzi*, *Lüshi chungiu*, and *Huang Di neijing*. Consider these three, from the *Zuo zhuan*, *Guanzi*, and *Xunzi*, respectively.

People have love and hate, pleasure and anger, sorrow and joy. These are born from the six *qi*. Therefore be careful to choose your models from the fitting categories, in order to regulate the six intentions.<sup>7</sup>

Love and hate, pleasure and anger, and sorrow and joy are the transformations of life.<sup>8</sup>

Our nature's liking and disliking, pleasure and anger, sadness and joy, is called "the genuine in us" (*qing*).<sup>9</sup>

By contrast, the *Li ji* refers to seven feelings:

What is meant by the genuine (*qing*) in man? Pleasure, anger, sadness, fear, love, hate, desire, these seven we are capable of *without having learned them*.<sup>10</sup>

The *Zuo zhuan* passage describes the six *qing* as byproducts of the six *qi*. Heaven and earth produce the six *qi*, which become the five flavors, extend outward as the five colors, and manifest as the five sounds. In the Admonitions (*Jie* 戒) chapter of the *Guanzi* they are "the transformations of life." Unnamed *qing* are a source of argument between *Zhuangzi* and *Huizi*.<sup>11</sup>

### (Male) filiality as a natural emotion

In the light of research on the spatially and temporally local social construction of emotions, I want to offer the speculative suggestion that Confucius and his intellectual descendants valorized filiality, *xiao*, as a very culturally specific variant of love, and considered it a natural emotion. For men.

The understanding of filiality as a natural human emotion is strengthened, in the case of men, by its biological basis. From a biological perspective, the expectation of married women, that they transfer their "natural" solicitude

toward their natal parents to their husbands' parents, is correspondingly unnatural. Girls who have not yet reached marriageable age, but who are expected to marry in future, represent a third group who, for the present, are permitted and expected to feel "biological" filiality, but on a temporary basis. The expectations of female filiality, both for girls and for married women, pit a set of arguably "natural" emotions against another set that are clearly culturally constructed. Now let us see how this problem plays out in the textual record, and consider the status of filiality as a natural emotion in Warring States texts.

### *A Warring States consensus*

The antiquity and importance of family relations centered on filiality is undisputed, and there remained a remarkable consensus about the desirability of filial piety and its related virtues, as attested by the papers of Livia Kohn and others in this volume. We may note the antiquity of the vocabulary for family relationships, including words for filial piety, deference to elder brothers, and other role-specific virtues, well before the formulations of Confucius. A wide range of Warring States thinkers after him, including his critics, maintained this consensus. For example, even the *Mozi* chapter "Exaltation of the Virtuous" argues that rulers who fail to exalt the virtuous will be surrounded by men who neglect filiality toward their parents and the proper distinction of the sexes.<sup>12</sup> Han Fei devotes a chapter (51) to filiality on account of its usefulness to the state.

According to *Analects* 1.2, the roots of *ren* are filial piety and brotherly deference.<sup>13</sup> Nourishing these roots is crucially important to the *junzi*, because, once established, "dao will grow from them." Yu Jiyuan argues that for Confucius *xiao* is thus a *natural* emotion: "Filial love as natural sentiment is inborn and not culturally specific. What is required is to cherish and nurture it." He points out that, for Confucius, love must be rooted in family love because of its inherent intimacy between affection and ethical training. For Confucius, this intimacy is crucial for complying with *li*.<sup>14</sup> Mencius, too, describes filiality as natural. In a debate with the Mohist Yizu (3A5), he describes cases where sons failed to bury their parents, later found their bodies mutilated by animals, and broke out in sweat and could not bear to look. The sweat was not put on for others to see, but was an expression of their inmost hearts (*zhong xin* 中心). The question of the "naturalness" of the emotional dispositions connected with the cultivation of virtue is also central to the dispute between Mencius and Xunzi concerning human nature. That subject is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is worth mentioning that Xunzi too defines emotions as inborn. He defines the *qing* (whether understood as "feelings" or as "essential nature") as liking, disliking, pleasure, anger, sadness, and joy.<sup>15</sup>

## A Han example

A Han example of “natural” filiality shows that a filial son remains filial even to a depraved parent. The *Shiji* biography of Empress Lü relates how she murdered her rival Lady Qi in so brutal a fashion as to alienate the affections of her own son:

The Empress Dowager cut off Lady Qi’s hands and feet, put out her eyes, burned her ears out, [forced her to] drink a muteness-inducing drug, imprisoned her in a latrine, and named her the Human Pig. After some days had passed, she summoned Emperor Xiao Hui to view the Human Pig. When he had seen, asked, and finally learned it was Lady Qi, he burst into tears, and fell so ill that he could not get up for over a year. He sent a messenger to say to the Empress: “*This is not the deed of a human being! As I am the Empress’ son, I will never be able to govern the empire.*”<sup>16</sup>

Xiao Hui is so upset by the perception that his mother is “not human” that he attempts to decline the throne, but remains filial to her nonetheless. The *Hanshu* eulogy (he eventually ascends the throne as Hui Di) describes him as cultivated, *filial*, generous and kind, even though the Empress Dowager Lü “damaged and injured his perfect virtue.”<sup>17</sup>

Of course there are also many references to unfilial sons, but ample evidence from the Warring States and Han attests to the view that human feelings, including filiality, were considered “natural,” even in cases where the parent did not deserve this regard.

## The problem with female *xiao*

There is a marked contrast in the treatment of male and female gendered *xiao* in these texts. The importance of implicitly male-gendered *xiao* in Warring States and Han texts, “Confucian” and otherwise, is unequivocal; we need only recollect the legends of such filial sons as Shun and Shen Sheng. Yet there is a curious dearth of filial daughters (and daughters-in-law). When filial daughters do make an appearance, they tend to be praised for something else, often intelligence or cleverness. The treatment of the earliest work on female virtues, the *Lienü zhuan*, neglects filiality to a striking degree. (I use this term to refer to the Han–Song *Lienü zhuan*, as distinct from later Ming editions.<sup>18</sup>)

## The silence of the *Lienü zhuan*

It is striking that filiality is of so little account in the earliest versions of the *Lienü zhuan*, which devotes two chapters to the “womanly” virtues of chastity and obedience, and three to what I have elsewhere somewhat maladroitly

called the “intellectual virtues” of wisdom, benevolence, sagacity, and rhetorical skill. The fifth chapter of the *Lienü zhuan* contains examples of women who are “filial” to husbands, elder brothers, and family lineage, but rarely to their natal parents. The exceptions are stories of resolution of conflict between duty to a husband and duty to a father or brother.

The life stories of the *Lienü zhuan* are organized into six chapters based on virtues, but *xiao* is not one of them. It is full of stories of wives who advance the interests of their husbands (another form of filiality), but there is only one story in the *Lienü zhuan* that explicitly deals with filiality toward parents or parents-in-law, the story of the “Filial Wife,” a Widow of Chen County in the chapter “Chaste and Obedient” (*zhen shun* 貞順).<sup>19</sup> “Filial Wife” was an honorific title awarded to a young widow of Chen who keeps her promise to her husband, cares for her mother-in-law, and defies her parents’ wishes to remarry her. The prefect of Huaiyang, upon hearing of her virtuous conduct, recommends her to the emperor Xianwen, who awards her the title (*xiao fu* 孝婦) as well as forty catties of gold, and establishes her position to the end of her life.<sup>20</sup> (This is one of several cases in the *Lienü zhuan* where women receive special honorary titles, as distinct from rank and court titles by virtue of birth or marriage.<sup>21</sup>)

Whether this relative disinterest arose from a lack of acceptable paragons or from the relative disinterest of the original *Lienü zhuan* compilers, filiality toward parents (in-law), as distinct from husbands, seems not to have been a priority in accounts of women’s virtue in this period.

### *The intellectual virtues of filial girls*

Despite the apparent disinterest in filiality, there are any number of filial girls in the *Lienü zhuan*. One saves the life of her half-brother (which is indirect filiality toward her father), who has been (probably justifiably) captured by her husband for violating a treaty, by threatening to kill both herself and their children, including the heir apparent (which would have been profoundly *unfilial* to her parents-in-law).<sup>22</sup> Another saves her father from a death sentence that resulted from his own fault by arguing that the sentence was unjust because the law valued the life of a tree above that of a person.<sup>23</sup> When her father is discovered asleep at his post, the daughter of a ferry officer attempts to take his punishment upon herself, argues on his behalf, and even does his job, violating propriety in the process. She wins a pardon for her father and marriage to the king.<sup>24</sup> All these girls are classified in the chapter titled “Skill in Argument” (*Bian tong* 辯通).

Perhaps the most important, and certainly the best documented, of them is Ti Ying 緹縈, the daughter of the Taicang of Qi. Her story is the last in the *Lienü zhuan* chapter, and also appears in the *Shiji*. Ti Ying saves the life of her father, the Han physician Chunyu Yi, a near contemporary of Sima Qian.<sup>25</sup> When he refused to treat certain illnesses, some of the families of the sick held grudges against him, and he was denounced to the throne in the

fourth year of the reign of Emperor Xiao Wen (Chunyu had no sons). Ti Ying followed him to the capital and submitted a petition for his release.<sup>26</sup> The *Shiji* and *Lienü zhuan* give almost identical versions of her argument, which both secured the release of her father and persuaded Xiao Wen to modify the laws on mutilating punishments.

In the postscript to *Shiji* 105, Sima Qian states explicitly that “It was only because Ti Ying sent forward a document of petition that her father was able to live out his days in peace.”<sup>27</sup> His reference to her by name, rather than as Chunyu Yi’s daughter, underscores her agency in her father’s fate. Sima Qian may have felt the contrast between her intervention and his own fate when he said: “My family was poor and our wealth was insufficient to commute the punishment. Of those nearest to me, no one sought to help and none of the officials near to the throne spoke a single word for me.”<sup>28</sup>

### ***The Xiaojing and the Nü Xiaojing***

Like the *Lienü zhuan*, the *Xiaojing* also neglects filial women. It has no references to girls (*nü* 女) or women (*furen* 婦人), and mentions mothers (*mu* 母) only six times, and then in the context of mothers and fathers (*fumu* 父母).<sup>29</sup> The *Nü Xiaojing*, a Tang dynasty women’s instruction manual, emphasizes distinctions between men and women, but also stresses the importance of women cultivating talent, both in household management and in their ability to admonish their husbands indirectly. The work was written by a woman for a woman. Ten of its eighteen chapter titles are identical to corresponding chapter titles in the *Xiaojing*. Thirteen chapters cite the explicit authority of Ban Zhao, but several take their quotations not from the *Nü jie* but from the *Lienü zhuan*.<sup>30</sup>

Several recount the stories of wives who remonstrate with their husbands. For example, Chapter 9, “Sage Intelligence” (*xian ming*), includes the story of Fan Ji, wife of King Zhuang of Chu, who successfully admonished her husband against hunting and music, and helped him select good men.<sup>31</sup> Chapter 15, “Remonstrance and Admonition,” asks whether a woman who follows her husband’s commands can become a sage. Ban Zhao cites the examples of Empress Jiang’s admonitions to King Xuan of Zhou and Ban Jieyu’s admonitions to Han Cheng Di.<sup>32</sup> Her overall argument is that, during the Three Dynasties, discerning kings all had sagely ministers (and their wives) to reprimand them, and that a man with such a wife never goes against the Way.<sup>33</sup> In Chapter 18, “Prosperity and Evil,” Ban Zhao cites the legendary examples of the wives and consorts whose influence caused the rise and fall of the first dynasties (Tu Shan and Moxi for the Xia, You Shen and Danji for the Shang, and Tai Ren and Bao Si for the Zhou). Girls are enjoined to practice virtue, to eschew the vicious examples.<sup>34</sup>

Although the chapter titles of the *Nü Xiaojing* are identical to those of the *Xiaojing*, it more closely resembles the *Lienü zhuan*. It focuses on virtue(s) rather than on life-cycle roles, and emphasizes the importance of

independent-mindedness in a wife, and of the intellectual and ethical virtues of women. Thus as late as the Tang we see an emphasis on the intellectual and ethical comparability of men and women, albeit given a new framework within the emphasis on filiality.

### *Female filiality in the Ming*

In Ming dynasty editions of the *Lienü zhuan* the situation changes completely, and filiality is introduced as an important category in classifying the life stories of virtuous girls and women. Editions such as the *Gui fan* reflected changes in cultural vocabulary, with a growing stress on filiality, construed as loyalty (or chastity) to the family and the state, which replace earlier *Lienü zhuan* chapters on "Benevolent Wisdom" (*ren zhi* 仁智) and "Skill in Argument" (*Bian tong*).<sup>35</sup>

The *Gui fan* stories are classified not according to virtue, but according to life-cycle role: Daughters, Wives, and Mothers. These in turn are subclassified, according to a new list of virtues, prominently including filiality. The second book, Girls, contains thirty stories, eight from the (original) *Lienü zhuan*. Its first section, Filial Daughters (*Xiao nü* 孝女), contains fourteen stories, including the three "filial daughter" stories from the original *Lienü zhuan*, discussed above.<sup>36</sup> Wives (Book 3) contains a short section on Filial Wives (*Xiao fu* 孝婦), with six stories, including the "Filial Wife" from the original work.<sup>37</sup> Filiality, by its nature, is not applied to mothers (Book 4).<sup>38</sup> This transformation of the clever girls of the original *Lienü zhuan* into filial daughters is also accomplished by the illustrations that accompany each story.

### Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to contextualize filiality as a Chinese culturally constructed emotion that is experienced very differently by women when compared with men. Applying the theory of the cultural construction of emotions to filiality in this way opens a Pandora's box. In conclusion, let me review some of what might be in that box. On the positive side, this approach may offer a convincing explanation of why filiality is treated so differently in texts about men and women. Given the political aspects of the reification of filiality in late imperial China, it may also explain why filiality for women was simply less important than filiality for men, until social changes in the Ming put it into a new perspective. Finally, this approach de-universalizes filiality. Is filiality, like *accidie*, an emotion whose time has come and gone, an artifact of a strongly hierarchical Confucianism that is obsolete? Or can (and should) it be reconceived in ways yet to be determined, and is it being done, as we speak here?



## Notes

- 1 See L. A. Raphals, *Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998; "Gendered Virtue Reconsidered: Notes from the Warring States and Han," in C. Y. Li (ed.), *The Sage and the Second Sex*, LaSalle: Open Court, 2000, pp. 223–47; "A Woman Who Understood the Rites," in B. W. Van Norden (ed.), *Essays on the Analects of Confucius*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 275–302; "Arguments by Women in Early Chinese Sources," *Nan Nü*, 3.2, 2001, 157–95; and "Gender and Virtue in Greece and China," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 29, no. 3, 2002, 415–36.
- 2 J. Boucher, "Culture and Emotion," in J. Marsella et al. (eds), *Perspectives on Cross-cultural Psychology*, London: Academic Press, 1979, pp. 159–78; R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotions*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; P. Heelas, "Emotion Talk across Cultures," in *ibid.*, pp. 234–66; A. Hochschild, "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 1979, 551–75; H. Leventhal, "Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Emotion," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 13, 1980, 139–207; M. Rosaldo, "Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling," in R. Shweder and R. A. LeVine (eds), *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; E. Schieffelin, *The Sorrow of the Lonely and the Burning of the Dancers*, New York: St Martins Press, 1976. For a recent review of some of these issues see R. Mallon and S. Stich, "The Odd Couple: The Compatibility of Social Construction and Evolutionary Psychology," *Philosophy of Science*, 67, March 2000, 133–54.
- 3 C. A. Lutz, "Emotion, Thought and Estrangement: Emotion as a Cultural Category," *Cultural Anthropology*, 1, 1986, 297–309; and C. A. Lutz and L. Abu-Lughod (eds), *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- 4 R. Harré and R. Finlay-Jones, "Emotion Talk across Times," in R. Harré (ed.), *The Social Construction of Emotions*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 220–33, p. 221.
- 5 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378a20ff, W. D. Ross (ed.), *Ars Rhetorica*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. He considers understanding of the emotions necessary to convince an audience of a speaker's good will.
- 6 A. C. Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human Nature," *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*, Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986, p. 59, and response by Chad Hansen, "Qing 情 in Pre-Buddhist Thought," in J. Marks and R. T. Ames (eds), *Emotions in Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- 7 民(有)好惡喜怒哀樂·生于(六)氣·是故審則宜類·以制(六)志。 *Zuo zhuan*, Duke Zhao 25.3. Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 (ed.), *Chunqiu zu zhuan zhu* 春秋左傳注, Gaoxiong: Fuwen tushu chubanshe, 1991, p. 1458.
- 8 *Guanzi* 10, *juan* 26, p. 2a, *Sibu beiyao* edition. 好惡喜怒哀樂, 生之變也。
- 9 性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情。 *Xunzi* 83/22/3, *Xunzi yinde* 荀子引得, Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1986, trans. A. C. Graham, "Mencian Theory of Human Nature," p. 65.
- 10 謂人情·喜·怒·哀·懼·愛·惡·欲·(七)者弗(學)而能· *Li ji*, Chapter 9, *Li ji zhushu* 禮記注疏, *juan* 5/20A/15, Ruan Yuan (ed.), *Shisan jing zhushu* 十三經注疏, 8 vols, Taipei: Yiwen jushu, 1980, trans. A. C. Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human Nature," p. 64 (emphasis added).
- 11 *Zhuangzi*, Chapter 5, pp. 217–21, Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩 (ed.), *Zhuangzi jishi* 莊子集釋, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961, trans. A. C. Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human Nature," pp. 61–2.

- 12 *Mozi yinde* 墨子引得, Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1982, 10/9/29.
- 13 *Lunyu yinde* 論語引得, *Mengzi yinde* 孟子引得, Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 1986.
- 14 J. Y. Yu, "Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle," *Philosophy East and West*, 48, no. 2, 1998, 323–58.
- 15 See n. 7. Elsewhere he states that our natures (*xing*) flow from heaven, and their basic stuff is *qing*; and further that desires (*yu*) are reactions to *qing* (85/22/63).
- 16 *Shiji* 史記, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959, *juan* 9, p. 397 (emphasis added).
- 17 *Hanshu* 漢書, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962, *juan* 2, p. 92, H. Dubs (trans.), *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1958, vol. 1, pp. 186–7.
- 18 L. A. Raphals, *Sharing the Light*, Chapter 5.
- 19 Liang Duan 梁端 (c. 1793–1825) (ed.), *Lienü zhuan jiaozhu* 列女傳校注 (abbreviated LNZ), Taipei: Zhonghua shuju, 1983, *juan* 4, story 15.
- 20 LNZ 4:10a (*juan* 4, p. 10a); 4.15 (*juan* 4, story 15).
- 21 Similar cases include the "Mother-teacher" of Lu, who is granted the title *mu shi* 母師 by Duke Mu of Lu after the Grand Master of Lu recommends her (LNZ 1:12a in LNZ 1.12). The "Honorable Lady" wife of Bao Su of Song receives the title *nü zong* 女宗 when the Duke of Song hears of her virtuous conduct; he also recognizes her village (LNZ 2:5b in LNZ 2.7).
- 22 Ji, the Wife of Duke Mu of Qin (LNZ 2.4), discussed in Raphals 1998.
- 23 The Daughter of Shanghuai of Qi (LNZ 6.4).
- 24 The Girl Ferry Officer of Zhao (LNZ 6.7).
- 25 He was from Linzi 臨淄, and born in Qi in 216 BCE. His name as it appears in the biography (*cangong*) is derived from his title, *cang zhang*, Chief of the Granary. He practiced medicine more or less between 175 and 150 BCE.
- 26 *Shiji*, *juan* 105, pp. 2794–5. A summary of the same events also appears in LNZ 6:13b–14a.
- 27 *Shiji*, *juan* 105, p. 2817.
- 28 *Hanshu*, *juan* 62, p. 2730.
- 29 *Xiaojing* 孝經, *Shisanjing zhushu*. Sinica Scripta, <http://www.sinica.edu.tw>
- 30 Zheng Shi 鄭氏, *Nü xiao jing* (NXJ) 女孝經, in Zhang Zhengxie (ed.) *Nü'er shu ji* 女兒書輯, *Tingyutang congke* 聽雨堂叢刻, Jiaozhou: Ting yu tang, 1901. The *Nü Xiaojing* lends some support to traditions that attribute the *Lienü zhuan*, in part, to Ban Zhao. A certain Madame Zheng 鄭氏 wrote the *Nü Xiaojing* as an aid to her niece, who had married a prince. For discussion see T. Martin-Liao, "Traditional Handbooks of Women's Education," in A. Gerstlacher *et al.*, *Women and Literature in China*, Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1985, pp. 173–4. Chapters 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15 share chapter titles with *Xiaojing* chapters of the same number. These and chapters 16, 17, and 18 all cite the authority of Ban Zhao 班昭. Ban Zhao, *Nü jie* (NJ) 女戒, *Hou Hanshu* 後漢書, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965, *juan* 84, pp. 2786–92.
- 31 NXJ 9:5a–6b, LNZ 2.5.
- 32 LNZ 2.1 and 8.15.
- 33 Ji of Wei's remonstrance to Duke Huan of Qi (against licentious music) and Jiang of Qi's to Chong Er (that he regain his kingdom in Jin). NXJ 15:10a–b. These stories appear at LNZ 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
- 34 NXJ 18:12a–b.
- 35 For detailed discussion see L. A. Raphals, *Sharing the Light*, Chapter 5.
- 36 The daughter of Shanghuai of Qi (LNZ 6.4), also in Lu Kun 呂坤 (1536–1618), *Gui fan* (GF) 閩範, Xin'an (Huizhou): She Yongning, 1618, facsimile edition in Harvard-Yenching library, 2.1.1; the girl ferry officer of Zhao (LNZ 6.7, GF 2.1.2) and Ti Ying (LNZ 6.15, GF 2.1.3). Girls or daughters are otherwise classed as: daring (*lie* 烈), chaste (*zhen* 貞), incorruptible (*lian* 廉), sage and intelligent (*xian ming* 賢明), and literary (*shi nü* 詩女).

- 37 Its more populous sections are: (3.4) Wives who die for chastity (*si jie* 死節), thirteen stories, one from the *Lienü zhuan*; (3.5) Wives who protect chastity (*shou jie* 守節), ten stories, two in the *Lienü zhuan*; (3.8) Intelligent and penetrating (*ming da* 明達), ten stories, four in the *Lienü zhuan*; (3.1) Husband and Wife (*fu fu* 夫婦), nine stories, none in the *Lienü zhuan*; and (3.6) Sage wives (*xian fu* 賢婦), eight stories, seven in the *Lienü zhuan*. Only three sections have fewer stories than Filial Wives: these are (3.2) All virtues (*jian de* 兼德), (3.7) Protectors of the Rites (*shou li* 守禮), and (3.9) Learned (*wen xue* 文學), with five stories in each section.
- 38 They are described as: teachers of rites (*li* 禮), upright (*zheng* 正), benevolent (*ren* 仁), just (*gong* 公), unavaricious (*lian* 廉), stern (*yan* 嚴), knowing (*zhi* 智), tender stepmothers (*ci ji mu* 慈繼母), and tender foster-mothers (*ci ru mu* 慈乳母).