Words about Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation,
and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology
Eric Schwitzgebel
Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, U.C. Berkeley, 1997
Committee: Elisabeth
Lloyd, John Searle,
and Alison
Gopnik
Dissertation Contents
Chapter
One: Introduction
to the Dissertation: Philosophy, Developmental Psychology, and Intuition
1
- Outline of the Dissertation 5
- The Role of Analysis and Intuition
in This Dissertation 9
Chapter
Two: A
Defense of the View that Infants and Animals Have Beliefs
17
- 1. Faults in Davidson’s First
Argument Against Belief Without Language
22
- 2. Faults in Davidson’s Second
Argument Against BeliefWithout Language 36
- 3. The Word ‘Belief’ 69
Chapter
Three: An
Account of Theories Such That Children Might Have Them
97
- 1. The Axiomatic and Semantic Views
of Theory 100
- 2. Developmental Accounts of
Theories 113
- 3. An Account of Theories 121
- The Account 122
- The Centrality of
Explanation 127
-
Explanation-Seeking Curiosity 129
- A Revision of
(3.) 135
- 4. Cognitive Development and
Theories 138
- Some Views of
Theories in Development 138
- A New Domain of
Evidence for the Theory Theory 146
- 5. Conclusion 151
Chapter
Four: Representation
and Desire: Case Study in How a Philosophical Error Can Have Consequences for
Empirical Research 155
- 1. Desire in Indicative and
Contentive Accounts of Representation
157
- 2. An Example from Philosophy 163
- 3. The Error in Theory of Mind 172
- 4. Representational Art as a Test of
a Hypothesis About the Child’s
Understanding of Mind 187
- 5. Conclusion 199
Chapter
Five: Toward
a Developmental Account of Belief
200
- 1. Aims of the Account 203
- 2. All-or-Nothing Belief and the
Simple Question 209
- The Simple
Question 209
- The
All-or-Nothing View of Belief 213
- 3. The Container Metaphor 222
- 4. Conclusion 232
Chapter
Six: A
Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief
233
- 1. The Account 235
- Ceteris
Paribus Clauses and
Excusing Conditions 242
- The Importance of
Phenomenology for a Dispositional Account
250
- A Thought on Ryle
253
- 2. Mixed Sets of Dispositions 255
- Two Examples 255
- Normativity and
Patterns of Deviation 259
- Deviation and
Developmental Psychology 261
- A Short List of
Patterns of Deviation 265
- 3. A Concern about Phenomenal
Dispositionalism About Belief 269
- Externalism and
Phenomenal Dispositionalism 269
- Functionalism and
Phenomenal Dispositionalism 273
- 4. Beliefs, Causation, and
Explanation 277
- 5. Conclusion 288
Chapter
Seven: Applications
of the Account 292
- 1. Two Philosophical Puzzles 293
- Kripke’s Puzzle
About Belief 293
- Self-Deception 299
- The Puzzles
Resolved 303
- 2. What’s in a Look? 307
- The Child’s
Understanding of Object Permanence 307
- Implicit
Understanding of False Belief? 316
- 3. Conclusion 322
Chapter
Eight: Conclusion
327
Works Cited 333
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