The Problem of Known Illusion and the Resemblance of Experience to Reality

Philosophy of Science 81 (2014), 954-960

Abstract: Are objects in convex passenger side mirrors "closer than they appear"? If one adapts to inverting goggles, does the world go back to looking the way it was before, or does the world look approximately the same throughout the course of adaptation, only losing its normative sense of wrongness? The answers to these empirical, introspective questions might help cast light on the classic philosophical debate about the degree of
resemblance between our visual experience of reality and things as they are in themselves.

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