

# Stocks with Extreme Past Returns: Lotteries or Insurance?

Alexander Barinov

Terry College of Business  
University of Georgia

June 14, 2013

# Lottery-Like Stocks

- The skewness effect: Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (RFS 2010) found that stocks with more positive expected skewness earn lower future returns
- The maximum effect: Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (JFE 2012) found that stocks with higher maximum daily return in the past month have lower future returns
- The current theory: Barberis and Huang (AER 2008) argue that investors tend to overestimate the probability of rare positive event, and therefore bid up the prices of stocks with lottery-like payoffs

# Lottery-Like or Just Volatile?

- Stocks with large extreme returns and positively skewed returns are also very volatile
- My prior work shows that stocks with high firm-specific risk are hedges against increases in market volatility
- For example, Barinov (JFQA 2013) shows that the volatility risk factor explains the disagreement effect of Diether et al. (JF 2002)
- Barinov (JCF 2012) shows that the volatility risk factor explains the new issues puzzle
- Barinov (2011) shows that the volatility risk factor explains the idiosyncratic volatility discount of Ang et al. (JF 2006), as well as the value effect

# Johnson Model

$$\beta_P = E(P, S) \cdot \beta_S, \quad \frac{\partial E(P, S)}{\partial IVol} < 0$$

- As idiosyncratic volatility goes up
  - The beta of the asset behind the option stays constant
  - The real option elasticity wrt the underlying asset value declines
- Therefore, the options beta declines in idiosyncratic volatility
- The effect on the firm value is naturally stronger if equity is option-like
  - Equity can be option-like because the firm owns options, e.g., growth options
  - Equity can be option-like because it is like an option itself, e.g., if the firm is distressed

# Extending the Johnson Model

- Both idiosyncratic volatility and aggregate volatility are high in recessions
- All else constant, higher idiosyncratic volatility has two effects, both stronger for volatile firms with option-like equity:
  - Risk exposure of option-like equity decreases
  - Value of option-like equity increases
- Therefore, volatile firms are hedges against aggregate volatility risk
- The more option-like is the equity, the greater is the hedging ability

# Aggregate Volatility Risk

- Volatility increase means worse future investment opportunities (Campbell, 1993)
- Volatility increase means the need to increase precautionary savings (Chen, 2002)
- Firms with most positive return sensitivity to aggregate volatility changes have lower expected returns (Ang et al, 2006)

# Aggregate Volatility

- Aggregate volatility is measured by VIX index (old definition, current ticker VXO) from CBOE
- VIX index is defined as the implied volatility of S&P100 one-month near-the-money options
- Innovations to expected aggregate volatility - proxied by daily change in VIX
- Sample: January 1986 - December 2010 (VIX availability)

# FVIX Factor

- FVIX mimics daily changes in VIX
- I regress daily changes in VIX on excess returns to five quintile portfolios sorted on prior month sensitivity to VIX changes
- The fitted part of the regression less the constant is the FVIX factor
- The correlation between FVIX and the change in VIX is 0.653



# More about the FVIX Factor

- Negative FVIX beta is volatility risk (losing money when volatility increases)
- FVIX factor loses 1.21% per month, t-statistic -3.44 - FVIX hedges against volatility risk and has negative market beta
- CAPM alpha of FVIX is -46 bp per month, t-statistic -3.86
- Using other base assets for factor mimicking does not change the results
- FVIX is not a tradable strategy - the factor mimicking is done using the whole sample

# Two-Factor ICAPM

$$Ret_t - RF_t = \alpha + \beta_{MKT} \cdot (MKT_t - RF_t) + \beta_{FVIX} \cdot FVIX_t$$

- The main model in my paper is the two-factor ICAPM with the market factor and FVIX
- Negative FVIX beta is risk, positive FVIX beta means a hedge
- The results stay similar if I augment the Fama-French model with FVIX, even though a certain overlap exists between HML and FVIX due to the ability of FVIX to explain the value effect (see Barinov, 2011)

# Descriptive Statistics

	Low	Max2	Max3	Max4	High	H-L
<b>IVol</b>	1.163	1.597	1.894	2.252	3.095	1.932
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>30.9</i>	<i>30.0</i>	<i>31.1</i>	<i>32.3</i>	<i>30.5</i>	<i>25.6</i>
<b>Disp</b>	3.988	4.268	4.910	5.470	7.807	3.819
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>23.0</i>	<i>22.1</i>	<i>18.7</i>	<i>24.9</i>	<i>23.8</i>	<i>15.8</i>
<b>Error</b>	7.685	8.294	9.850	12.298	17.72	10.04
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>23.7</i>	<i>21.8</i>	<i>21.4</i>	<i>20.3</i>	<i>21.5</i>	<i>16.5</i>
<b>CVEarn</b>	0.834	0.844	0.917	1.016	1.232	0.398
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>34.7</i>	<i>30.9</i>	<i>31.8</i>	<i>27.9</i>	<i>38.2</i>	<i>15.5</i>
<b>CVCFO</b>	1.051	1.051	1.133	1.245	1.469	0.417
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>63.3</i>	<i>61.6</i>	<i>71.0</i>	<i>75.8</i>	<i>72.1</i>	<i>24.1</i>

- Firms with higher daily maximum return in the past month are also very volatile

# Maximum Effect and Volatility Risk

	Low	Max2	Max3	Max4	High	H-L
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.231	0.232	0.062	-0.087	-0.369	0.600
<b>t-stat</b>	1.94	2.39	0.63	-0.89	-2.35	2.30
$\alpha_{FF}$	0.140	0.166	0.013	-0.115	-0.279	0.419
<b>t-stat</b>	1.42	2.26	0.17	-1.11	-2.32	2.08
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	-0.061	-0.010	-0.089	-0.056	0.051	-0.112
<b>t-stat</b>	-0.54	-0.12	-0.88	-0.49	0.35	-0.47
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.633	-0.524	-0.328	0.068	0.912	-1.544
<b>t-stat</b>	-3.45	-3.35	-2.40	0.63	3.24	-3.38

- Lottery-like stocks are in fact hedges against increases in VIX
- Once this hedging ability is controlled for, there is no maximum effect in the ICAPM alphas

# Maximum Effect and Growth Options

	Value	Neutral	Growth	G-V
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.491	0.734	1.107	0.616
<b>t-stat</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>4.18</b>	<b>4.17</b>	<b>2.75</b>
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	0.222	0.265	0.383	0.161
<b>t-stat</b>	<b>1.36</b>	<b>1.31</b>	<b>1.42</b>	<b>0.66</b>
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.583	-1.017	-1.570	-0.987
<b>t-stat</b>	<b>-3.32</b>	<b>-3.85</b>	<b>-3.07</b>	<b>-2.53</b>

- In CAPM alphas, the maximum effect is more than twice stronger for growth firms, as predicted
- ICAPM alphas of the low-minus high maximum portfolio are flat across market-to-book groups
- Shorting growth firms with high maximum returns (high volatility) means giving up an important hedge against VIX increases

# Maximum Effect and Credit Rating

	Best	Medium	Worst	W-B
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.096	0.556	1.201	1.105
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>1.81</i>	<i>2.75</i>	<i>2.75</i>
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	-0.202	-0.125	0.117	0.318
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>-0.84</i>	<i>-0.39</i>	<i>0.30</i>	<i>0.82</i>
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.645	-1.479	-2.353	-1.707
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>-2.92</i>	<i>-4.13</i>	<i>-8.29</i>	<i>-7.62</i>

- In CAPM alphas, the maximum effect is more than twice stronger for distressed firms, as predicted
- ICAPM alphas of the low-minus high maximum portfolio are flat across credit rating groups
- Shorting distressed firms with high maximum returns in the past (high volatility) means giving up an important hedge against VIX increases

# Maximum Effect and Short Interest

- From the point of view of an expected-utility investor, firms with high past maximum returns are overpriced
- They can remain overpriced if the cost of shorting them is high, e.g., if the shorting demand, proxied by relative short interest, is high
- The CAPM alphas line up with this story, but controlling for FVIX eliminates the link between the maximum effect and short interest
- It turns out that sorting on maximum returns and short interest is similar to sorting on idiosyncratic volatility twice

# Maximum Effect and Short Interest

	Low	Medium	High	H-L
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.321	0.545	0.948	0.627
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>2.08</i>	<i>2.59</i>	<i>3.44</i>	<i>2.35</i>
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	0.022	-0.016	0.242	0.219
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>0.14</i>	<i>-0.07</i>	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.83</i>
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.628	-1.180	-1.485	-0.856
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>-5.68</i>	<i>-3.05</i>	<i>-2.82</i>	<i>-1.86</i>



# Skewness Effect and Volatility Risk

- Firms with highly positive (expected) skewness are also highly volatile, more so than firms with highly negative skewness
- This is because volatility comes primarily from the longer right tail
- Consequently, FVIX also explains the spread in returns between firms with highly negative and highly positive skewness
- The alpha goes down from roughly 40-60 bp per month in the CAPM and Fama-French model to a few bp from zero in the ICAPM with FVIX
- The key is again the ability of lottery-like stocks with highly positive skewness to hedge against increases in VIX (due to their higher idiosyncratic volatility)

# Skewness Effect in Cross-Section

- The hedge against increases in VIX is created by interaction of idiosyncratic volatility and option-like equity
- Consistent with that, volatile firms with highly positive skewness are better hedges against volatility risk if they are either growth or distressed
- This is why the skewness effect is stronger for high market-to-book firms and bad credit rating firms in the CAPM alphas, but not in the ICAPM alphas
- Also, in the CAPM alphas the skewness effect is stronger for firms with low institutional ownership and high short interest, but the relation disappears once FVIX is controlled for

# Minimum Effect: Differentiating Test

- Firms with high past minimum returns are also very volatile
- In the world where investors have the taste for lotteries, they should have positive alphas, because they are exactly opposite of lotteries
- In my world, where idiosyncratic volatility matters and lottery-likeness does not, they should have negative CAPM alphas and zero ICAPM alphas, i.e., they should be exactly like firms with high past maximum returns, volatile firms, etc.

# Minimum Effect and Volatility Risk

	Low	Min2	Min3	Min4	High	H-L
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.314	0.284	0.285	0.268	-0.336	0.650
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>2.01</i>	<i>1.73</i>	<i>1.66</i>	<i>1.61</i>	<i>-1.78</i>	<i>2.99</i>
$\alpha_{FF}$	0.164	0.109	0.104	0.113	-0.376	0.540
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>1.57</i>	<i>1.07</i>	<i>1.15</i>	<i>1.62</i>	<i>-5.15</i>	<i>3.68</i>
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	0.224	0.217	0.294	0.403	0.150	0.073
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>1.51</i>	<i>1.37</i>	<i>1.78</i>	<i>2.26</i>	<i>0.64</i>	<i>0.32</i>
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.196	-0.145	0.019	0.292	1.054	-1.251
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>-1.58</i>	<i>-0.90</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>2.61</i>	<i>3.93</i>	<i>-3.48</i>

- The minimum effect is as strong as the maximum effect in the CAPM alphas
- It disappears in the ICAPM alphas due to high minimum return firms being a hedge against volatility risk

# Minimum Effect and Growth Options

	Value	Neutral	Growth	G-V
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.033	0.227	0.831	0.799
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>0.21</i>	<i>1.34</i>	<i>2.83</i>	<i>3.59</i>
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	-0.279	-0.258	0.135	0.414
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>-1.62</i>	<i>-1.45</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>1.80</i>
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.677	-1.051	-1.511	-0.834
<b>t-stat</b>	<i>-3.64</i>	<i>-5.85</i>	<i>-2.92</i>	<i>-2.20</i>

- The minimum effect is strongly related to market-to-book, and this relation is explained by FVIX
- Expected in my world, where it is volatility, not lottery-likeness that matters, unexpected in the world with lottery-loving investors

# Minimum Effect and Credit Rating

	Best	Medium	Worst	W-B
$\alpha_{CAPM}$	0.013	0.617	0.978	0.965
<b>t-stat</b>	0.06	1.77	2.95	2.68
$\alpha_{ICAPM}$	-0.273	-0.079	0.116	0.389
<b>t-stat</b>	-1.21	-0.26	0.34	1.05
$\beta_{FVIX}$	-0.620	-1.509	-1.869	-1.249
<b>t-stat</b>	-2.73	-3.40	-5.48	-4.19

- The minimum effect is also strongly related to credit rating, and this relation is explained by FVIX
- Expected in my world, where it is volatility, not lottery-likeness that matters, unexpected in the world with lottery-loving investors

# Conclusion

- Lottery-like stocks are hedges against volatility risk
- This hedging property explains their low future returns
- The volatility risk story also generates new predictions about relation between returns to lottery-like stocks and measures of equity option-likeness (market-to-book, credit rating)
- FVIX can explain the relations above, as well as the relation between returns to lottery-like stocks and short-sale constraints
- The true driving force behind all the effects about is firm-specific risk, not lottery-likeness, as evidence by the existence of the mirroring minimum effect