Gaming with Fairness:

Some Conjectures on Behavior in Alternating Offer Bargaining Experiments

Rami Zwick
University of California, Riverside

Vincent Mak
University of Cambridge

*If I am not for myself, who will be for me?*

*If I am only for myself, what am I?*

*If not now, when?*

Rabbi Hillel (1st Century B.C.)
(Avoth 2:19)

Since Rubinstein (1982) proposed a model of alternating offer bargaining, an experimental literature has emerged that examines behavior in laboratory settings of his model, with apparently disparate conclusions. In this chapter, we attempt to understand when and why theorizing succeeds or fails to predict behavior in this type of experiment, and in more general terms the complex interaction between fairness considerations and bargainers’ gaming inclinations. In particular, we conjecture that the success or failure of predicting behavior using game-theoretical reasoning can be explained by the following three principles:

1. The same bargainer could be sometimes self-centered (“gamesman”) and sometimes inequity averse (“fairman”) depending on the context.
2. Bargaining advantages might be exploitable to different degrees according to the sources of the advantages.
3. “Fairness” has a price, and the higher its price, the lower the “demand” for it.
Consider a pie jointly owned by two people who can enjoy a part of it if they reach an agreement on how to divide it. If an agreement cannot be reached, neither party can enjoy any part of it. How should the pie be divided? This is a generic statement of the classic bargaining problem of which two general approaches have been pursued in game theory: the static axiomatic approach, with Nash (1950) as its most well-known representative, and the strategic approach, best represented by Ståhl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982). The axiomatic approach specifies certain desirable properties the division should satisfy, and, in the best case, these properties generate a unique solution to the problem. This method refrains from stipulating any protocol the bargainers should follow. Therefore, by definition, it is independent of the bargaining process. The strategic approach describes the bargaining process explicitly. It does not depend on the need to define, a-priori, what properties the allocation should satisfy – properties that are not always endorsed unanimously by bargainers in naturally occurring situations – but rather let the allocation emerges from the process itself. It was Rubinstein (1982), equipped with the then new concept of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) developed by Selten (1975), who made important contributions to this approach by exploiting what seemed to many to be a natural bargaining scenario. Ideally, the two approaches should reach common grounds in the sense that a bargaining protocol could be found to justify the axiomatic approach to bargaining. This idea has been pursued as part of the “Nash program” (Nash 1953) and progresses have been made over the past decades (e.g. Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986; see also Serrano 2005). However, it is the strategic approach – more specifically experiments that employ the alternating offer paradigm – that is explored in this chapter.

Experimentation on alternating offer bargaining began shortly after Rubinstein proposed his model (see Roth 1995, Chapter 4, Weg and Zwick 1999, Chapter 11, and Camerer 2003, Chapter 4, for surveys). As shall be outlined in the following sections, this stream of studies has been characterized by the observations that behavior often deviates from game theoretical predictions and yet sometimes come close to them. In this chapter, we contribute a number of thoughts on under what conditions human behavior in strategic interaction is expected to be well within the game theoretic predictions and under what conditions it is expected to significantly deviate from it.
The typical features of an alternating offer bargaining experiment include: (1) Bargaining is bilateral; (2) Bargaining takes place over a succession of more than one time periods, and (3) In the first period, one bargainer is the proposer while the other bargainer is the responder, and from then on bargainers alternate roles from period to period. In each period, the proposer proposes how to divide the pie between the two parties and the responder responds by choosing one of the well-defined actions from the response menu. ‘Accept’ and ‘reject’ are always on the response menu. Once the responder accepts a proposal, the parties reach an agreement, the bargaining ends and the parties divide the pie according to the proposal. Typically, a game terminates after a period only if the responder in that period accepts the proposal, or it is the final period, or a randomization procedure that mimics time discounting terminates it. Note that our description of alternating offer bargaining eliminates protocols in which one of the bargainers has no opportunity to make an offer, so we do not consider the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) or sequential bargaining games in which the offers always come from one of the bargainers (e.g., Rapoport et al. 1995). Nevertheless, excluding the implications of results from ultimatum game experiments is impossible for the present discussion, as they are at the very heart of many of the issues that we will examine.

**Early Controversies**

Early experimental studies on alternating offer bargaining were motivated in part by Rubinstein’s model and in part by the failure of SPE to correctly predict behavior in ultimatum game experiments (Güth et al. 1982, Güth and Tietz 1990, Güth 1995). In general, proposers in ultimatum game experiments offered the responders much more than the lowest monetary unit that should have theoretically enticed the responder to accept, while the responders frequently rejected positive offers that were lower than 50 percent of the pie. Naturally, the debate over ultimatum game experiments focused on the extent to which the roles that self-interested, strategic considerations as well as fairness concerns played in determining subject behavior. It quickly inspired a sequence of studies and counter-studies that employed the protocol of alternating offer bargaining (Binmore et al. 1985, 1988, 1989, 1991, Güth and Tietz, 1988, Neelin et al. 1988; also cf. the aforementioned surveys). Based on the results of the ultimatum game and early experiments on finite-horizon alternating offer bargaining games, Güth and his
colleagues concluded that “considerations of distributive justice seriously destroy the prospects of exploiting strategic power” (Güth and Tietz, 1990) and that “SPE loses all its predictive power when its payoff implications become socially unacceptable” (Güth and Tietz, 1988).

On the other hand, based on their own experiments, Binmore and his colleagues suggested that when subjects are faced with a new problem they simply choose “equal division” as an “obvious” and “acceptable” compromise. However, such considerations are easily displaced by calculations of strategic advantages once players fully appreciate the structure of the game. Such an appreciation can only emerge with extended opportunities to learn and ample incentives to pay close attention to the various procedural details of the situation. Further, they argued that if the preconceived rules-of-thumb (memes) that are embodied with fairness criteria and depend on salient or focal features of the environment in which they are used are not too firmly established, then “they can be displaced by more sophisticated rules that take better account of the strategic realities of the situation. Moreover, there is evidence that subjects are willing to justify their new behavior by asserting that it is fair” (Binmore et al., 1991). That is, Binmore and his colleagues did not claim that fairness/focal considerations are not important or that subjects are natural “gamesmen”, but rather that a theory that ignores strategic considerations is not likely to get to what lies at the heart of human bargaining behavior. Bargainers will continue to use the rules-of-thumbs as long as they produce satisfactory results, but when not, they would be motivated to switch to other rules that are often consistent with game theoretical reasoning. It is worthwhile to note that recently Binmore et al. (2007) carried on this approach and described new findings that supported their attempt to resolve game theoretical predictions, fairness concern, and other behavioral characteristics without denigrating either. Binmore and colleagues’ new experiment began with a conditioning phase in which the subjects knowingly played against robots. In different treatments, the robots were programmed to converge on one of a number of different “focal points” that include what the researchers called egalitarian (equal allocation) outcomes and utilitarian (efficient) outcomes. When the subjects later played each other, they began by playing as they had been conditioned, but then gradually adjusted their behavior until they were playing one of the exact Nash equilibria of the game. Binmore et al. (2007) suggested that the behavior in the game replicated in miniature what happens in many laboratory experiments. That is, the conditioning phase mimics the socializing processes of real life through which we learn to
operate social norms. When faced with an unfamiliar laboratory game, subjects then begin by simply operating whatever social norm is triggered by the way the game is framed, but as subjects gain experience through repeated play with different partners, their play gradually adapts to the laboratory game they are actually playing. In particular, a simple model of myopic adjustment proposed by Binmore et al. (2007) to make sense of the data works well mainly because Rubinstein’s prediction is a Nash equilibrium with stationary expectations.

Two further studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s contributed directly to the initial debate in the 1980s. Ochs and Roth (1989) and Kahn and Murnighan (1993)’s studies were designed to detect whether changes in the parameters and protocol of play influence the observed outcomes in the predicted direction. Both studies concluded that SPE not only fails as a point predictor of observed behavior, it also fails to account for observed qualitative differences. In particular, the high frequency of disadvantageous counterproposals made clear that there are nonmonetary arguments in the bargainers’ utility functions that define what acceptable or not acceptable demands are. The authors of these studies did not conclude that bargainers “try to be fair” but rather that bargainers are averse to being treated unfairly and search for the minimally acceptable offer in the specific environment they are facing, both in making offers and in responding to offers. Although the two bargainers’ perceptions of what constitute a minimally acceptable offer may differ because of their own egocentric interpretation of fairness, neither bargainer pushes the proposals to the extremes of the equilibrium predictions.

Our opinion is that the debate was settled in a draw and is best described by Rabbi Hillel’s proverb that provides the motto for this chapter. Bargaining is a complex social phenomenon, which gives bargainers systematic motivations distinct from simple payoff maximization. In bargaining there is a conflict of interest between the parties as well as an internal conflict between self-interest (“If I am not for myself, who will be for me?”) and social norms that determine which source of power is “legitimately” exploitable (“If I am only for myself, what am I?”). When both parties recognize that one bargainer has an advantage, the privileged party for the most part will exhibit “gamesman” tendencies and will try to exploit her advantages. On the other hand, the disadvantaged party will exhibit what looks like “fairman” propensities, resisting the exploitation (cf. the use of the words “gamesmen” and “fairmen” by Bimore et al. 1988 and
Spiegel et al. 1994). In fact, even fairness disposition might be adopted instrumentally and what may appear to be fair is in fact a manifestation of strategic reasoning (Weg and Zwick 1994, Carpenter 2003). Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that settlements are usually a compromise between the game theoretical solution and equal split. What is more, the degree to which the agreement deviates from game theoretical predictions depends on the extent to which the disadvantaged player can resist exploitation. Note that this argument gives game theory a central role in predicting the settlement. No theory is needed to determine what an (numerically) equal split is. On the other hand, recognizing which elements of the environment empowered bargainers with asymmetric advantages requires careful consideration of both situational and environmental (e.g., protocol) factors. Game theory is uniquely qualified for the task. The problem, of course, is that unless game theoretical analysis yields intuitive results with “face validity” it is hard to expect bargainers to detect such subtle asymmetric advantages right away. Only extensive experience with the environment and suitable learning dynamic, one in which the disadvantaged player learns faster that resisting exploitation is futile than the advantaged player learns that exploiting her advantages is unsuccessful, could asymmetric advantages manifest themselves distinctly in long-run behavior (Cooper et al., 2003).

More Puzzling Findings

To further develop the above ideas, we first describe a number of puzzling findings in alternating offer bargaining which show that in some situations SPE predicts well, even when the predictions are far from equal split, whereas in other situations the predictions fail miserably. This is in the spirit of Goeree and Holt (2001) who showed that given a game where behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement, a change in the payoff structure can lead to huge inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. Our examples will center on changes mainly in the bargaining protocol.

Consider first the behavior of subjects in alternating offer bargaining games with time discounting (geometric depreciation) versus fixed time cost (arithmetic depreciation). In Weg et al. (1990)’s Experiment 1, subjects negotiated over the division of a pie worth initially 60 Israeli New Shekels using an infinite horizon alternating offer bargaining protocol with time
discounting. There were three different experimental conditions used in a within-subject design: condition S (for strong) with $\delta_1 > \delta_2$ (where 1 and 2 refer to the first and second mover), condition E (for equal) with $\delta_1 = \delta_2$, and condition W (for weak) with $\delta_1 < \delta_2$. The actual discount factors used were (0.90, 0.50), (0.67, 0.67), and (0.50, 0.90), respectively. Experiment 2 used the same procedure but with faster shrinking rates of (0.50, 0.17), (0.17, 0.17), and (0.17, 0.50). The results were clear: according to SPE the agreement should be reached in the first period with the first mover receiving 91%, 60%, and 18% of the pie in conditions S, E and W, respectively, in Experiment 1 and 91%, 86%, and 55%, respectively, in Experiment 2. These predictions were rejected overwhelmingly by the mean final offers to the first mover. Not only did the SPE model fail as a point predictor, it also failed to account for observed qualitative differences. The model assigns the largest proportion of the pie to the first mover in condition S and the smallest in condition W with condition E falling in between. In contrast, the mean final offers were ordered in exactly the opposite way. Further, the absence of learning effects and the relatively large proportion of disadvantageous counter-offers deepened the contrast between behavior and the predictions of the SPE model. Surprisingly, a model that is based on equal monetary payoff received strong support. Zwick et al. (1992) reported similar results where the discounting was implemented as the probability of breakdown.

Now contrast the above findings with the results of Rapoport et al. (1990), who used a similar design as Weg et al (1990)’s. Subjects negotiated over the division of a pie worth 30 Israeli New Shekels using an infinite horizon alternating offer bargaining protocol. However, rather than time discounting, there was a fixed-cost per period. Two experiments are reported that are similar in all respects except that different combinations of fixed-costs were used. In Experiment 1, there were three different experimental conditions used in a within-subject design: condition S ($c_1 < c_2$), condition E ($c_1 = c_2$), and condition W ($c_1 > c_2$), where $c_i$ is player $i$’s cost per period. The actual costs were (0.1, 2.5), (2.5, 0.1), and (2.5, 2.5). In Experiment 2, the costs were (0.2, 3.0), (3.0, 0.2), and (3.0, 3.0). What makes the fixed-cost scenario attractive is the clear-cut extreme SPE predictions that it implies. That is, if $c_1 < c_2$, the first mover receives the whole pie (similar to the prediction of the ultimatum game). If $c_1 > c_2$, the first mover receives $c_2$. If $c_1 = c_2$, every partition in the closed interval $[c_1, p]$ is consistent with SPE, where $p$ is the size of the pie. The experimental results strongly support SPE. The raw data is particularly impressive as
extreme demands by and offers to the strong players are not buried in the averages. With experience, the cost-based strong players obtain in general what is predicted by SPE. Zwick and Weg (2000) and Weg and Zwick (1991) replicated these findings with similar designs for negotiation over both surplus and shortfall.

If, in the case with time discounting, considerations of fairness drive bargaining outcomes away from SPE, why is the same effect absent from the fixed-cost setup?

Another example demonstrates how changing a theoretically irrelevant element of the protocol can make a big difference in behavior, so that in one situation, behavior converges to equilibrium, whereas in the other it diverges from it. The starting point of Weg and Zwick (1994)’s paper was the different behavior exhibited in playing two forms of bargaining games for which theory predicts similar or identical outcomes: ultimatum and infinite horizon sequential fixed-cost bargaining games. Both games share the characteristic that, according to SPE, the strong player – the proposer in the ultimatum game and the player with the smaller cost in the sequential fixed-cost game – is expected to be apportioned virtually the whole sum in the first period of bargaining. Yet, in the ultimatum context, it has been shown consistently that the proposer refrains from taking full advantage of her position, whereas, as reported above, in the infinite horizon fixed-cost games, a significant proportion of cost-based strong players demand the whole pie and the cost-based weak player frequently accepts these demands. To investigate the underlying source of these differences, Weg and Zwick broadened the response strategy space in the infinite-horizon fixed-cost games, allowing a quit move that terminates the game with both players receiving nothing (null side values) but still liable for any accumulated cost. This extension preserves an important aspect of ultimatum games – the impending breakdown of the bargaining process – while keeping the normative outcomes identical to those of standard infinite horizon fixed-cost sequential games. This is because the distinction between having or not having access to a null side value is theoretically inessential, since quitting is not a credible move. Psychologically, however, this is quite surprising. If the first mover can demand the whole pie when she is the strong player in the infinite horizon fixed-cost game, can she pretend that the threat of quitting by the other player is inconsequential with regard to her demand?
Weg and Zwick (1994)’s subjects negotiated the division of a $20 pie over an “infinite horizon” (in practice, a game was terminated if negotiations reached the fourteenth period, which in fact occurred only twice) alternating offer bargaining protocol with unequal costs per period of $2.00 and $0.10. A 2 x 2 x 3 experimental design was used, where the first factor is the game type (with or without a quit move), the second factor is the costs pattern ($c_1 < c_2$, or $c_1 > c_2$), and the third factor is iteration (whether the subject playing the first mover holds this role for the first, second, or third time). The first factor was a between-subject manipulation while the last two factors were within-subject manipulations.

Weg and Zwick reported that, in all cases, first and final offers to cost-based strong player were lower when the quit move was available. The most striking behavior was in games in which the first mover was the cost-based strong player ($c_1 < c_2$). In these games, by the third iteration the first mover’s first period upper quartile demand was 90% ($18.00) of the pie for no-quit games and only 70% ($14.00) for quit games. Further, by the third iteration, 59%, (28%) of the games ended with at least 80% of the pie allocated to the cost-based strong player when the first mover was the cost-based strong (weak) player in the no-quit games. This is very different from the corresponding figures (0% and 11%) for the quit games. It is also interesting to note that, although the cost-based weak player seldom exercised his option to opt out in the quit condition (4 times out of 108 games), the availability of this option is sufficient to cause the cost-based stronger player to ask less than what she asked for in the no-quit game condition. The quit move seemed to play a symbolic function unaccounted for by direct experience.

A similar question as before can be posed: why can a theoretically empty threat drive behavior away from SPE prediction, when in the absence of this option behavior converges to SPE?

**Three Principles of Bargaining Behavior**

We conjecture that the above puzzling findings can be explained based on three conceptual principles that govern bargaining behavior:
(1) The same bargainer could be sometimes self-centered ("gamesman") and sometimes inequity averse ("fairman") depending on the context.

This first principle carries forward our earlier discussion. Note that numerous models have been proposed to incorporate inequity aversion into the bargainers’ utility function (e.g. Loewenstein et al. 1989, Bolton 1991, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002, Falk and Fischbacher 2006). We are not interested here in the exact fashion by which these concerns are integrated into the utility function, for our purpose, the qualitative statement that bargainers are self-centered yet inequity averse is sufficient.

(2) Bargaining advantages might be exploitable to different degrees according to the sources of the advantages.

Consider a professional basketball game that has been scheduled to take place in a playing field that slopes towards the side of one of the teams. Obviously, this would give the team playing on the downhill side an unfair advantage, and as such the disadvantaged team as well as any unbiased outsider would object to such a setting. But at the same time, no one would argue that a team with taller players has an unfair advantage.

The above example illustrates two types of advantages that are central to our proposed second principle of bargaining behavior. This principle expresses our belief that, when examining bargainers’ advantages and the degree to which these advantages are exploitable, it is important to distinguish between the different types of advantages that are derived from different sources. These advantages can be broadly categorized into intrinsic and procedural advantages. Intrinsic advantages correspond to a team having taller players in the basketball example. These advantages are so called because they are derived from intrinsic characteristics of the bargainers independent of the exact bargaining protocol, and are what the bargainers bring to the negotiation table. Meanwhile procedural advantages correspond to the not-level-playing field in the example. They are advantages derived from the procedural features of the protocol itself. Intrinsic characteristics of the bargainers are what the bargainers bring to the negotiation table, whereas procedural features are analogous to the shape of the table itself.
Intrinsic characteristics are typically expressed as individual-level parameters, whereas procedural features in bargaining are defined with the pair of bargainers as the unit of reference; both could be imposed on subjects in a lab experiment. For example, outside options (i.e. the best alternative to a negotiated agreement or BATNA), time preferences (“patience”), and costs of bargaining are potential advantages that are derived from the bargainers’ intrinsic characteristics. On the other hand, being the first or the last to propose is a potential advantage that is contingent on the specific procedural features of the negotiation. Both intrinsic characteristics and procedural features can bestow advantages and can create symmetric and/or asymmetric leverages. We shall argue that, for the most part, the experimental evidence of alternating offer bargaining games can be understood in light of the distinction between advantages derived from these two sources. We surmise that the two types of advantages are perceived as qualitatively different by bargainers in these games, and have different impact on bargainers’ behavior along the following major dimensions:

(a) *The two types of advantages are assessed lexicographically.* Intrinsic characteristics of bargainers are usually intuitive and easy to assess with simple introspection, and thus provide the first input to generating demands or responding to them. This is not to say that bargainers are oblivious to advantages derived from procedural features, but because these advantages are much harder to quantify, they often require at least some experience with the procedural features to be appreciated. It is clearly unreasonable to expect that naïve subjects will perform complicated mathematical operations to assess the strategic nature of the game. Rather, it is more plausible to assume that subjects create simplified representations of the task and look for easily accessible cues (Selten 1987). Because advantages that rely on intrinsic characteristics of bargainers are much more accessible than advantages derived from procedural features, we surmise that subjects attend to them before the other type of advantages. If a significant asymmetry is detected at the level of intrinsic characteristics of bargainers, this asymmetry will dominate and will be reflected in the bargaining outcome. Only if the bargainers are deemed symmetric at the intrinsic characteristic level would procedural sources be attended to – but experience with the procedure is needed for its full effect to be self-evident. In this sense, the two
types of advantages are assessed lexicographically. However, even after advantages derived from procedural features become intellectually recognizable, we expect bargainers to attempt resisting its use, as discussed in the next point.

(b) *Intrinsic characteristic-based advantages are often considered more “legitimately” exploitable than procedural advantages.* The second dimension along which the two types of advantages are qualitatively different is with respect to the assessment as to which type is “legitimately” exploitable. Existing empirical results suggest that, for the most part, it is considered “fair play” for a bargainer to exploit advantages derived from intrinsic characteristics, whereas exploitation of procedural advantages are commonly resisted as being not “fair” (compare, for example, the results of fixed-cost bargaining games, where players’ advantages are derived from intrinsic characteristics, and the results of ultimatum games where the proposer’s advantage is derived from procedural definition of the game). We speculate that two major factors contribute to the lower legitimacy of the exploitation of procedural features:

(i) For the most part, we are exposed on a daily basis to the importance of “fair process” and “level playing fields”. Because the playing field is, for the most part, determined and controlled by an indifferent party, we expect it to be level. If not, we might simply refuse to engage in the interaction under the specified rules. In the lab, both rules and intrinsic characteristics are imposed on the subjects. However, people are much more used to and have developed intuition on how to deal with intrinsic characteristics that are not under their direct control (e.g., gender, height, born to a rich parents) than to deal with rules that they can object to (cf. the literature on the endogenous emergence of rules and protocol in bargaining games e.g. Güth et al. 1993, McKelvey and Palfrey 1997, Kambe 2009, Oz 2010);

(ii) Bargaining outcomes in the real world are driven for the most part by fairness arguments broadly defined. That is, when an offer is made, for it to be considered a “good faith” offer, the proposer has to demonstrate that he/she has reason to
believe that the responder has reasons to accept it. The proposer thus needs to demonstrate that the offer is consistent with some “objective” principles of fairness that apply to the situation at hand and takes both bargainers’ circumstances into account. Market forces, other alternatives or urgency, for example, provide basis for such principles. The difficulty, of course, is that in almost any dispute multiple “objective” principles that are relevant to the situation at hand can be advanced, and each one of them might imply a different agreement. Similarly, for an offer to be rejected in “good faith”, a counter principle that can be reasonable apply to the situation must be advanced. We speculate that, given the intuitive nature of the leverages derived from intrinsic bargainers’ characteristics, verbal arguments based on this type of advantages cannot be easily dismissed (this is related to Raiffa 1982’s principle of “an offer that cannot be readily refused”). Hence they are considered exploitable and play a major role in the final agreement. Advantages that derive their meaning from procedural features are not always intuitive and often require sophisticated analysis. They are not always transparent and often lack face validity. Hence they are much harder to convey and defend. Their effect needs to be demonstrated and experienced and only after sufficient experience might both parties consider it fair play for such advantages to be exploited.

Lastly, in some cases, a disadvantaged bargainer – either in terms of intrinsic characteristics or procedural features – can unilaterally act in some ways to eliminate the other bargainer’s advantages. For example, in a bargaining game with time discounting without a quit move, a discount-based weak bargainer can simply refuse to trade for many periods so that no matter how the pie is divided, both bargainers’ shares approach zero. Whether an advantage has this characteristic depends on its source in the context of the game; any advantage with this characteristic certainly has less “bite” and is less exploitable than otherwise.

(3) “Fairness” has a price, and the higher its price, the lower the “demand” for it.
The third principle is the fact that “fairness” has a price, and the higher its price, the lower the “demand” for it. Our thinking is based on the results of Zwick and Chen (1999). Previous studies have shown that strategically strong players are sensitive to the availability of a punishment strategy to the weaker players – examples include ultimatum versus impunity games in Bolton and Zwick (1995), x-veto versus no-revenge games in Güth and Huck (1997), and with versus without (nonprofitable) outside options in a fixed cost sequential bargaining game in Weg and Zwick (1994). However, this sensitivity was only shown in an all-or-none fashion. Zwick and Chen (1999) investigated whether the strategically strong players are also sensitive to the cost (to the weak players) for delivering the punishment, and not only to the presence or absence of it. To accomplish their goal, Zwick and Chen studied bargaining behavior in a situation where one party is in a stronger position than the other. They investigated both the tradeoff the favored party makes between pursuing one’s strategic advantage and giving weight to other players’ aversion to inequality, and the tradeoff the disadvantaged player makes between pursuing a fair outcome from a disadvantaged position and the cost of that pursuit. In particular, they hypothesized that the degree to which strategically strong players attempt to exploit their strategic advantage depends on how much it costs them to do so. In addition, the degree to which weak players persist in seeking equity is also a function of how much it costs them to do so.

Bargainers in Zwick and Chen (1999)’s experiment negotiated over the division of a pie worth HK$50 using an alternating offer bargaining protocol with finite horizon and unequal fixed-cost per rejection. They used a 3 (low-cost) x 3 (high-cost) x 2 (order) x n (iteration) partial factorial design. The first three factors were manipulated between subjects and the last within subjects. The low cost of rejection per period was $0.5, $2.0, or $5.0, whereas the high cost was $10.0, $13.0, or $14.5. Order refers to who made the first proposal – the low-cost or high-cost player. Iteration refers to the number of games each subject played. The parameters were chosen such that, based on SPE, the low-cost player should demand and get the whole pie if he moves first, and be offered at least 90% of the pie if he moves second (independent of the actual cost differences). Zwick and Chen (1999) partially replicated the findings on fixed-cost bargaining games where cost-based strong players routinely demand (and granted) significant portion of the pie, and often, the cost-based weak players make such offers to the strong players. However,
contrary to SPE predictions, subjects were sensitive to the magnitude of the cost differential and not only to its presence.

To investigate the hypothesis that demand for fairness is a function of its price, Zwick and Chen (1999) looked at the pattern of disadvantageous counter-offers which were interpreted as an attempt to resist exploitation and punish such an attempt, and at the pattern of adaptation from game to game. Their examination was characterized by two major findings. First, the percentage of disadvantageous counter-offers declined almost systematically with experience. Because the low-cost players’ demands in period 1 did not decrease with experience, the decline in the number of disadvantageous counter-offers with experience indicates that the high-cost players learned to accept unequal division, rather than the low-cost players learning to demand less. However – and more importantly – both the number of subjects who made at least one disadvantageous counter-offer and the proportions of such offers follow a clear pattern: they were monotonically increasing with the cost to the low-cost player, and monotonically decreasing with the cost to the high-cost player. Second, Zwick and Chen found that the level of adaptation is also a function of the costs involved. That is, the percentage of first movers who demanded less (in the first period of the next game) after their offer was rejected (strict adaptive behavior) increases monotonically with their cost, and decreases monotonically with the cost to the second mover. The same pattern (mirror image) was detected by looking at the percentages of demanding the same after rejection. This indicates that the willingness of the low-cost players to demand their “strategic fair share” and not to adapt to the high-cost players’ reply is a decreasing function of their own costs of rejection. The willingness of the high-cost players to demand fairness and to persist in their demand for fairness (by not adapting to the low-cost players’ reply), is itself a decreasing function of their own costs of rejection.

To summarize, low-cost players recognize their strategic advantage and attempt to exploit it. The degree to which they attempt to exploit this advantage depends upon their own costs of rejection. The higher their own costs, the less extreme are their own demands. High-cost players recognize the strategic advantage of low-cost players and attempt to resist its exploitation. Their willingness to persist in rejecting extreme divisions of the money is eroded with experience and with persistent extreme demands by low-cost players. Further, the willingness of high-cost
players to demand fairness and to persist in their demands for fairness is a decreasing function of their own costs of rejection. These findings indicate that “fairness” has a price, and the higher its price, the lower the “demand” for it. This suggests that demand for fairness is subject to cost-benefit evaluation, and is in this sense deliberate and well thought out.

**Implications**

Based on the three principles that we just discuss, we are now in a position to explain why SPE predicts behavior well in some experiments whereas in others it fails miserably.

First, environments where asymmetric advantages are derived from intrinsic characteristics of bargainers (e.g. one bargainer, in having a higher time discount factor or lower time cost than the other bargainer, derives an advantage over the other bargainer) are more likely to result in outcomes that mirror the strategic nature of the asymmetry, but only if the disadvantaged player cannot unilaterally eliminate the inequality. This statement explains, for example, the different findings in discounting versus fixed-cost conditions. With time discounting, bargainers realize that as the game gets longer due to prolonged bargaining the monetary payoffs of both parties will approach zero regardless of how different the discount factors are. If the discount-based disadvantaged bargainer keeps rejecting the other’s offers, eventually both players will end up with the same payoff of zero. In contrast, in the fixed-cost case both players may be forced to pay from their own pocket if bargaining is prolonged. However, and more importantly, as bargaining continues, the difference in the monetary payoffs of the two players grows larger. As a consequence, the cost-based weak player cannot unilaterally eliminate the inequality. Any attempt to do so can only aggravate the inequality.

Similarly, allowing the cost-based weak player to opt out of the negotiation, with both players receiving null side value (as in Weg and Zwick 1994) provides the weak player with a move that can reduce the inequality (except for the cost of one period). Such possibility, despite its irrelevance according to conventional game theoretical reasoning, is sufficient for determining much more equal outcome than SPE predicts.
Secondly, environments where asymmetric advantages are derived from the procedural features of the protocol (e.g. one bargainer, in being assigned to be the first to propose, derives an advantage over the other bargainer) are much less likely to produce results that mirror the strategic nature of the asymmetry. Only after bargainers have obtained sufficient experience with the procedure, and only if the disadvantageous bargainers learn faster that resisting exploitation is futile (and can magnify the inequality) than the advantageous bargainers learn that exploiting these advantages are not likely to produce good results. Zwick and Chen (1999) investigated one factor that can be useful in predicting the likely direction of convergence. That is, if the cost to resist exploitation is significantly lower than the cost inflicted on the exploiting party, outcomes are expected to diverge away from equilibrium prediction. On the other hand, if the cost to resist exploitation is significantly higher than the cost inflicted on the exploiting party, outcomes are expected to converge to equilibrium prediction.

**Endnote: Fables and Reality**

As an endnote, we would like to highlight the uneasy relationships between theorizing and observed behavior in bargaining experiments in particular and in economics in general. On this point, Ariel Rubinstein interestingly opined that (bargaining) theory should not even be presumed to be about predicting behavior. In a commentary on Binmore et al. (2007) (which appears at the end of that paper), and in his 2004 Presidential Address to the Econometric Society (Rubinstein 2006), Rubinstein suggested that economic models should be treated as “fables” where the storyteller draws a parallel to a situation in real life and has some moral he wishes to impart to the reader. “Being something between fantasy and reality, a fable is free of extraneous details and annoying diversions” (Binmore et al. 2007). However, a fable is effective as an education tool (as opposed to sheer entertainment) if the listener can easily draw the parallels to reality and feels that the fable’s message provides sound advice or a relevant argument that can be used in the real world. Further, Rubinstein commented that he has “never thought that the alternating offers model (or any other model in economic theory for that matter) is meant to have any predictive power” (Binmore et al. 2007).
We will not pursue this line of reasoning any further, but rather turn the table and ask what a known fable tells us about the economic inquiry that is supposed to be relevant to it. To draw an analogy, we refer here to two characters from the *The Little Prince* by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry: the Geographer and the King. The Geographer spends all of his time making maps, but never leaves his desk to examine anywhere (even his own planet) to find out if his maps are consistent with reality. According to the Geographer, reality check is the job of the explorer, but the Geographer does not trust the explorer and would doubt any report indicating inconsistencies between his maps and reality. To those who are familiar with the history of experimental economics, the Geographer is a well-known stock character from days past. However, economics has moved forward and several Nobel prizes later the Geographer breed is an endangered species. All top economic journals are now routinely publishing experimental papers and theorists compete to propose models that explain behavioral regularities.

The second character of interest is the King. The King “controls” the stars, but only by ordering them to do what they would do anyway. He then relates this to his human subjects and suggests that it is the citizens’ duty to obey, but only if the king’s demands are reasonable. Surely, this should resonate well with any experimentalist who has tested a theory that produces “absurd” conclusions that do seem to square with intuitive understanding of human behavior. It is precisely a major message of this chapter that, to a great extent, game theory is a “King” in that it can successfully predict human behavior only when the theory is not too far from being “reasonable” to subjects from the subjects’ perspectives regarding the norm of behavior in an empirical setting of the model. What saves theory from obviousness is that “reasonable” in this sense can be a very complex concept that is not devoid of strategic considerations. In fact it is often dictated by strategic considerations, as human subjects attempt to rationalize/reconcile their self-interest with socially acceptable behavior while trying to learn about the strategic environment they are in through experience. As such, gamesmanship and ideas of fairness are intertwined and inseparable in human bargaining behavior.
References


