Philosophical Quarterly, 51 (2001), 76-82.

Abstract

For any proposition P, it may sometimes occur that a person is not quite accurately describable as believing that P, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe that P. Such a person, I will say, is in an "in-between state of belief." This paper argues for the prevalence of in-between states of believing and asserts the need for an account of belief that allows us intelligibly to talk about in-between believing. It is suggested that Bayesian and representationalist approaches are inadequate to the task and that a Rylean dispositional account of belief might do the trick.

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In-Between Believing

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